Eskander v General Medical Council [2026] EWCA Civ 372

Dr Eskander emailed her appeal against a GMC suspension to the Administrative Court on the final day of the 28-day period but paid no fee. The Court of Appeal held, applying Siniakovich, that her appeal was brought in time despite non-payment.

Facts

Dr Amy Eskander, a Specialist Registrar in Neurology, faced proceedings before a Medical Practitioners Tribunal concerning a criminal conviction for unlawful eviction and allegations of misconduct including dishonesty. On 20 August 2025, the Tribunal directed that her registration be suspended for 12 months. Notification was deemed served on 26 August 2025, giving her until 23 September 2025 to appeal under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983.

Dr Eskander instructed barrister Mr Anthony Jones on a direct access basis. On 23 September 2025 (the deadline day), Mr Jones informed her that he could not file the appeal on her behalf. Following his advice, she emailed her appellant’s notice to the Administrative Court Office (ACO) at 14.11 that day, but paid no fee. She states that Mr Jones advised her she would receive an automatic reply containing a payment link. No such link was received. On 14 October 2025 the ACO requested the £294 fee, which she paid in person on 17 October. The notice was sealed on 21 October 2025, marked with the filed date of 23 September 2025.

The GMC applied to strike out the appeal. Mansfield J, on the papers, held on 14 November 2025 that the appeal was out of time (following Rakoczy v GMC and Gupta v GMC) and declined to extend time, striking out the appeal.

Issues

Four grounds were ultimately argued on appeal:

• Ground 4 (added following Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey [2026] EWCA Civ 215): whether the appeal was in fact brought in time, notwithstanding non-payment of the fee.
• Ground 1: whether fresh evidence (of dealings with counsel) should be admitted and whether time should be extended under Article 6 ECHR because Dr Eskander had personally done all she reasonably could.
• Grounds 2 and 3: alternative formulations relating to the almost insurmountable practical obstacles faced by a litigant in person.

Arguments

Appellant

Mr Collins KC argued that Siniakovich could not be distinguished: delivery of the appellant’s notice within the 28-day period sufficed to bring the appeal, regardless of fee payment. Alternatively, Dr Eskander had relied on counsel’s advice and had personally done all she reasonably could, so Article 6 required time to be extended.

Respondent

Mr Mant KC sought to distinguish Siniakovich on three grounds: (i) Dr Eskander paid nothing at all, whereas Mr Siniakovich underpaid; (ii) this was a statutory appeal under the Medical Act 1983, not an action governed by the Limitation Act 1980, and paragraph 10 of Schedule 4 would be left with a lacuna; (iii) Dr Eskander impermissibly filed by email when a fee was payable, contrary to PD 5B paragraph 2.2. On extension of time, he argued guidance was publicly available and Dr Eskander had not done all she reasonably could.

Judgment

Ground 4 — Was the appeal brought in time?

Nugee LJ (with whom Baker and Cobb LJJ agreed) held that Siniakovich could not meaningfully be distinguished. On the first suggested distinction, he held it is impossible to draw a logical line between underpayment and non-payment: the word “brought” must either mean delivery of the originating process or delivery plus full compliance with all requirements; a middle position requiring some, but inadequate, attempt to comply is untenable and would defeat the bright-line test identified by Andrews LJ.

On the second, although paragraph 10 of Schedule 4 to the Medical Act 1983 creates a potential lacuna where an appellant files but never pays, it would be “very surprising” if “brought” meant something different under the Medical Act than under the Limitation Act. The lacuna could be addressed by the Court directing payment by a specified time, failing which the appeal could be treated as withdrawn.

On the third, although PD 5B paragraph 2.2 prohibits emailing documents where a fee is payable, paragraph 2.4 confers only a discretion to refuse to accept such filings. The ACO did not refuse; it sealed the notice on 21 October 2025 after requesting compliance. It was too late to treat the notice as rejected.

Accordingly, the appeal was brought in time on 23 September 2025.

Fresh evidence

Applying Ladd v Marshall, all three limbs were satisfied. Dr Eskander’s evidence that Mr Jones advised her to expect a payment link was apparently credible, being consistent with the contemporaneous emails (notably her use of “therefore” on 24 September). The “surrogacy principle” (per Gopakumar) did not apply because Mr Jones, acting on direct access, was not conducting the litigation; Dr Eskander was acting in person. Reasonable diligence did not require her to waive privilege and turn on her own counsel before Mansfield J’s order alerted her to the problem.

Ground 1 — Extension of time

Applying Pomiechowski, Adesina, Rakoczy and Stuewe, the Court has a duty under Article 6 ECHR, via section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, to extend time in exceptional circumstances where the appellant has personally done all they reasonably could. The available guidance on paying fees was not as clear as the GMC suggested, and Dr Eskander reasonably relied on experienced counsel who had himself consulted the Court. She raised payment three times in her emails, was only informed on the morning of the deadline that she must file personally, and emailed the ACO inviting further instructions. She had personally done all she reasonably could, and refusal would have impaired the very essence of her right of appeal.

Implications

This decision extends the reasoning of Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey from claim forms under the Limitation Act 1980 to appellant’s notices commencing external statutory appeals under the Medical Act 1983. The Court held that an appeal is “brought” for the purposes of section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 when the appellant’s notice is delivered to the Court office within the 28-day period, even if no fee accompanies it, provided the Court does not reject the filing. The Court expressly left open the position regarding internal appeals (where the originating process already exists) and whether the Court could have refused to accept a wholly unpaid filing under PD 5B paragraph 2.4.

The judgment clarifies that the “surrogacy principle” depends on agency: a litigant in person who takes direct access advice from counsel is not automatically fixed with counsel’s errors for the purposes of fresh evidence or extension of time under Article 6. It reaffirms that the Article 6 duty to extend time in exceptional cases applies to regulatory appeals and emphasises that the question is highly fact-sensitive, assessed by reference to what the individual appellant reasonably could have done.

The decision is significant for doctors and other regulated professionals facing short, statutory appeal deadlines, for litigants in person navigating Court fee procedures following the closure of public counters, and for regulators such as the GMC. It also flags a potential lacuna in paragraph 10 of Schedule 4 to the Medical Act 1983, suggesting a practical (though non-definitive) solution pending legislative clarification.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. The Court of Appeal granted permission to amend the grounds, to adduce fresh evidence, and to appeal on all grounds. It held that Dr Eskander’s statutory appeal was brought in time on 23 September 2025 despite non-payment of the fee, set aside Mansfield J’s strike-out order, reinstated the statutory appeal in the High Court, and held that her suspension ceased to have effect pending determination of that appeal. The Court indicated it would additionally have allowed the appeal on Ground 1 (extension of time under Article 6) had Ground 4 not succeeded.

Source: Eskander v General Medical Council [2026] EWCA Civ 372