Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom [2026] EWCA Civ 6

Martin Groom, a volunteer Coastguard Rescue Officer, was denied trade union accompaniment at a disciplinary appeal. The Court of Appeal held that CROs are 'workers' under s 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 when attending remunerated activities, dismissing the MCA's appeal.

Facts

Martin Groom served as a Coastguard Rescue Officer (‘CRO’) with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (‘MCA’) from 1985 until his position was terminated on 5 June 2020 following a disciplinary process. He sought to be accompanied by a GMB trade union official at a ‘Challenge Meeting’ (appeal hearing) on 21 July 2020, relying on s 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999. The MCA refused. His subsequent unfair dismissal claim was struck out as out of time, but the accompaniment claim required determination of whether he was a ‘worker’ within s 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

CROs operate under three key documents: a Volunteer Handbook, a Code of Conduct, and a Remuneration document. The Handbook describes the relationship as voluntary with ‘no mutuality of obligation’. The Code of Conduct requires CROs to comply with reasonable instructions, maintain competence, attend training, and maintain reasonable incident attendance. The Remuneration document permits CROs to claim hourly payment (not less than the national minimum wage) for specified authorised activities, described as compensation for ‘disruption to your personal life and employment’. Approximately two-thirds of CROs claim payment; they receive payslips, P60s and P45s.

The Employment Tribunal held Mr Groom was not a worker, finding no contract existed. The Employment Appeal Tribunal reversed this, holding that a contract arose each time a CRO attended a remunerated activity, and substituted a finding of worker status.

Issues

The principal issue was whether, on each occasion Mr Groom attended a call-out and became entitled to claim remuneration, he did so as a ‘worker’ within s 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. This required consideration of: (i) whether a contract existed between the CRO and the MCA; (ii) whether there was an intention to create legal relations; and (iii) whether there was sufficient mutuality of obligation.

Arguments

Appellant (MCA)

The MCA argued the ET’s finding was an evaluative conclusion of mixed fact and law that the EAT should not have disturbed. The relationship was genuinely voluntary, as labelled in the documents. Relying on South East Sheffield Citizens Advice Bureau v Grayson [2004] ICR 1138, volunteering was best recognised as taking place under a unilateral contract with no obligation on the volunteer. A CRO was not compelled to continue an activity once started, and any sense of duty was public service rather than legal obligation.

Respondent (Mr Groom)

Mr Groom argued that entitlement to claim remuneration for prescribed activities evidenced a classic wage/work bargain; services were not provided gratuitously. CROs had obligations including compulsory training and minimum attendance. Relying on Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5 and Nursing and Midwifery Council v Somerville [2022] ICR 755, the absence of obligation outside attendances did not preclude worker status during attendances.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal. Bean LJ (Vice-President) held that little deference was owed to the ET given the case was a test case on agreed facts with documents common to thousands of CROs. The court was concerned only with whether, on each occasion a CRO answered a call-out and became entitled to claim payment, he did so as a worker.

Bean LJ concluded it was ‘quite unreal’ to say there was no intention to create legal relations. A contract came into existence when a CRO attended an activity for which there was a right to claim remuneration. The basic mutual obligations were the CRO’s duty to comply with reasonable instructions while on duty, and the MCA’s obligation to pay on receipt of a claim. Citing Langstaff J in Cotswold v Williams [2006] IRLR 181, this was a ‘wage/work bargain’.

The true volunteer cases such as Grayson were distinguishable because CAB volunteers received no payment beyond travel expenses. By contrast, the MCA’s remuneration document compensated for interference with a person’s use of their time, which is the essence of remuneration. Relying on Uber and Professional Game Match Officials Ltd v HMRC [2025] 1 All ER 289, the absence of obligation to attend for work did not bar worker status. The PGMOL decision placed the answer ‘beyond doubt’: a contract of employment could be limited to the period during which paid work was carried out.

The court rejected the analogy pressed by the MCA concerning distinction from a casual building labourer, Bean LJ finding no distinction in law.

Stuart-Smith LJ, with whom Popplewell LJ agreed, reached the same conclusion by a slightly different route. He held that an intention to create legal relations was unarguable given that, if the MCA refused payment following a claim, the CRO would plainly have an enforceable right. The arrangement was a classic wage/work bargain despite the MCA’s written insistence on a voluntary relationship. CROs undertook to do work or perform services: when responding to a call, they undertook to carry out the necessary work in accordance with the Code of Conduct, in consideration of remuneration. Whether analysed as an offer by the MCA accepted by the CRO, or vice versa, the result was a bilateral contract satisfying s 230(3)(b). He rejected the submission that a CRO could ‘bale out whenever it takes their fancy’, regarding this as inconsistent with the safety-critical nature of the enterprise and the obligation to comply with reasonable requests.

Implications

The decision confirms that individuals described as ‘volunteers’ may nonetheless be ‘workers’ within s 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 where they are entitled to remuneration compensating for time and disruption, beyond mere reimbursement of expenses. The critical distinction from Grayson-type true volunteer cases lies in the presence of a wage/work bargain involving consideration for services.

The judgment reinforces the principles from Uber and PGMOL that the absence of an umbrella contract or of obligation to attend for work does not preclude worker status during periods when work is actually performed. Mutuality of obligation may subsist solely during the period of engagement.

The decision has potentially wide ramifications, as acknowledged by the court, given that approximately 3,100 CROs are affected and the same definition of ‘worker’ applies to rights including the national minimum wage, paid holiday, unlawful deductions from wages, and whistleblower protection. It will also be significant for other rescue and emergency services using paid volunteers. However, the court expressly left open the status of CROs when attending activities for which no remuneration is claimable, and did not decide whether CROs are employees or whether any umbrella contract exists between call-outs. The parties’ labelling of a relationship as ‘voluntary’ is not determinative where the underlying reality is a wage/work bargain.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld the EAT’s decision that Mr Groom was a ‘worker’ within s 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 when attending activities for which he was entitled to claim remuneration.

Source: Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom [2026] EWCA Civ 6