Jalla and another v Shell International Trading and Shipping Co Ltd and another [2023] UKSC 16 (10 May 2023)

Following a major oil spill off Nigeria's coast in December 2011, claimants argued there was a continuing nuisance while oil remained on their land, allowing fresh limitation periods. The Supreme Court held that a one-off event causing ongoing damage does not constitute a continuing nuisance; the cause of action accrued once when the oil first affected the land.

Facts

On 20 December 2011, a major oil spill (the ‘Bonga Spill’) occurred approximately 120km off the Nigerian coast when a flowline ruptured during cargo operations. An estimated 40,000 barrels of crude oil leaked into the ocean. The claimants, Mr Jalla and Mr Chujor, Nigerian citizens owning land in the Niger Delta, alleged the oil migrated to shore and contaminated their land. The leak was stopped within six hours. For purposes of this appeal, it was assumed oil reached the shoreline within weeks of the spill and remained present without removal or clean-up.

The claimants issued proceedings on 13 December 2017, just under six years after the spill. They sought amendments to their claim after six years had elapsed, arguing there was a continuing nuisance so long as oil remained on their land.

Issues

The central legal issue was whether, assuming oil from a one-off spill remained on the claimants’ land, there was a continuing nuisance giving rise to a continuing cause of action that accrued afresh day by day, thereby extending the limitation period.

Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Lord Burrows, delivering the judgment, clarified the meaning of ‘continuing nuisance’ in law:

In principle, and in general terms, a continuing nuisance is one where, outside the claimant’s land and usually on the defendant’s land, there is repeated activity by the defendant or an ongoing state of affairs for which the defendant is responsible which causes continuing undue interference with the use and enjoyment of the claimant’s land.

Lord Burrows distinguished between the ordinary language use of ‘continuing nuisance’ (meaning a continuing problem) and the legal concept. He explained:

There was no continuing nuisance in this case because, outside the claimants’ land, there was no repeated activity by the defendants or an ongoing state of affairs for which the defendants were responsible that was causing continuing undue interference with the use and enjoyment of the claimants’ land. The leak was a one-off event or an isolated escape.

Distinction from Delaware Mansions

The Court distinguished Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council, a tree-roots case where there was held to be a continuing nuisance. Lord Burrows explained:

In that case, in contrast to this, there was an ongoing state of affairs outside the claimant’s land, constituted by the living tree and its roots, for which the defendant was responsible and which, by further abstraction of water through the encroachment of the roots, caused continuing undue interference with the use and enjoyment of the claimant’s land.

Policy Considerations

Accepting the claimants’ submission would undermine limitation law:

To accept Mr Seitler’s submission would be to undermine the law on limitation of actions – which is based on a number of important policies principally to protect defendants but also in the interests of the state and claimants – because it would mean that there would be a continual re-starting of the limitation period until the oil was removed or cleaned up.

Implications

This judgment provides important clarification on the distinction between continuing damage and continuing nuisance. A one-off event causing persistent damage does not constitute a continuing tort simply because the damage remains. The cause of action accrues when the interference first affects the claimant’s land, and the limitation period runs from that point regardless of whether remediation has occurred.

The decision has significant implications for environmental pollution claims, confirming that isolated escape events triggering long-term contamination do not give rise to continuously accruing causes of action. Claimants must bring proceedings within the standard limitation period from when damage first occurs.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the nuisance alleged by the claimants could not constitute a continuing nuisance and the limitation period should not be extended by reference to the concept of a continuing nuisance. The cause of action accrued when the oil first affected the claimants’ land.

Source: Jalla and another v Shell International Trading and Shipping Co Ltd and another [2023] UKSC 16 (10 May 2023)