Christie v Leachinsky [1947] UKHL 2

Police arrested Leachinsky for 'unlawful possession' under the Liverpool Corporation Act, knowing they lacked authority to arrest without warrant on that charge. They actually suspected felony but never informed him. The House of Lords held that a person arrested must be informed of the true reason for arrest, establishing fundamental principles protecting individual liberty.

Facts

The respondent, Leachinsky, was arrested by Liverpool police officers (the appellants) at his warehouse on 31 August 1942. The officers arrested him on a charge of ‘unlawful possession’ of cloth under section 507 of the Liverpool Corporation Act 1921. However, the appellants knew that under this Act, they had no power to arrest without warrant unless the person’s name and residence were unknown to them. They knew Leachinsky’s name and his residence in Southport where he had lived for eighteen years. The appellant Christie admitted at trial that he knew at the time that he had no power to arrest without warrant under the Liverpool Act in these circumstances.

The appellants subsequently pleaded that they had reasonable and probable cause to suspect that Leachinsky had stolen or feloniously received the bale of cloth. The trial judge found this to be true, but the respondent was never informed that this was the ground of his arrest. Instead, he was repeatedly cautioned and charged with ‘unlawful possession’ – a charge that did not justify arrest without warrant in these circumstances.

Issues

The central issue was whether a police officer who arrests without warrant on reasonable suspicion of felony, but who fails to inform the arrested person of the true ground of arrest (instead stating a different, inadequate ground), can justify that arrest and imprisonment by proving the reasonable suspicion of felony.

Key Questions

• Is a person entitled to know the reason for their arrest?
• Can an arrest be justified by proving reasonable suspicion of felony when the arrested person was told they were being arrested for a different charge?
• What are the consequences of failing to inform an arrested person of the true ground of arrest?

Judgment

The House of Lords held that the first arrest and imprisonment were unlawful. The appellants were not exonerated from liability for false imprisonment merely by proving they had reasonable suspicion of felony, when they never informed the respondent that this was the ground of his arrest.

Principles Established

Viscount Simon set out the following propositions:

(1.) If a policeman arrests without warrant upon reasonable suspicion of felony, or of other crime of a sort which does not require a warrant, he must in ordinary circumstances inform the person arrested of the true ground of arrest. He is not entitled to keep the reason to himself or to give a reason which is not the true reason. In other words a citizen is entitled to know on what charge or on suspicion of what crime he is seized. (2.) If the citizen is not so informed but is nevertheless seized, the policeman, apart from certain exceptions, is liable for false imprisonment. (3.) The requirement that the person arrested should be informed of the reason why he is seized naturally does not exist if the circumstances are such that he must know the general nature of the alleged offence for which he is detained. (4.) The requirement that he should be so informed does not mean that technical or precise language need be used. The matter is a matter of substance, and turns on the elementary proposition that in this country a person is, prima facie, entitled to his freedom and is only required to submit to restraints on his freedom if he knows in substance the reason why it is claimed that this restraint should be imposed. (5.) The person arrested cannot complain that he has not been supplied with the above information as and when he should be if he himself produces the situation which makes it practically impossible to inform him, e.g., by immediate counter-attack or by running away.

Lord Simonds emphasised the fundamental nature of the right to liberty:

Blind, unquestioning obedience is the law of tyrants and of slaves: it does not yet flourish on English soil.

He further stated:

The liberty of the subject and the convenience of the police or any other executive authority are not to be weighed in the scales against each other. This case will have served a useful purpose if it enables your Lordships once more to proclaim that a man is not to be deprived of his liberty except in due course and process of law.

Lord du Parcq provided extensive historical analysis, concluding:

The right to arrest and the duty to submit are correlative.

Second Imprisonment

Regarding the second alleged imprisonment on 15 September 1942, the House of Lords held that this detention was lawful. When Leachinsky was discharged by the magistrate after the ‘unlawful possession’ charge was withdrawn, Christie detained him pending arrival of Leicester police who intended to charge him with larceny. On this occasion, Leachinsky knew the felony for which he was being detained, and Christie had reasonable grounds for suspicion.

Implications

This case established fundamental principles regarding the right to liberty and the duty of those making arrests to inform the arrested person of the reason for arrest. It confirmed that:

• An arrest without proper notification of the grounds is unlawful and constitutes false imprisonment
• The police cannot substitute administrative convenience for adherence to legal requirements
• The right to know the reason for arrest is essential to enable a person to challenge an unlawful arrest or provide an explanation
• Technical precision in stating the charge is not required, but the substance of the accusation must be communicated

The case remains a landmark authority on police powers of arrest and the protection of individual liberty under English law.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed as regards the first imprisonment (appellants liable for false imprisonment); appeal allowed as regards the second imprisonment (detention on 15 September 1942 was lawful).

Source: Christie v Leachinsky [1947] UKHL 2