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October 3, 2025

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National Case Law Archive

Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) v Gore [2012] EWCA Civ 1248

Reviewed by Jennifer Wiss-Carline, Solicitor

Case Details

  • Year: 2012
  • Volume: 2012
  • Law report series: EWCA Civ
  • Page number: 1248

A fire broke out at a tyre-fitting business, destroying neighbouring property. The claimant sought to recover damages under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant's appeal, holding that tyres are not exceptionally dangerous things, and their storage was not a non-natural use of land. The fire, not the tyres, had escaped.

Facts

The defendant operated a tyre-fitting business, storing approximately 3,000 tyres on his premises on an industrial estate. A fire, caused by an electrical fault, broke out and spread rapidly, fuelled by the stored tyres. The fire destroyed the claimant’s neighbouring property. The claimant brought claims in both negligence and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.

The Fire and Its Cause

The Recorder found that the fire originated from something occurring in the wiring and appliances within the defendant’s premises. The cause was electrical and accidental, with no evidence of negligence in maintaining the electrical system or appliances.

Role of the Tyres

While tyres are not in themselves flammable and will not ignite unless exposed to sufficient heat or flame, once ignited they burn rapidly and intensively and are difficult to extinguish. The Recorder found the tyres contributed to the fire’s intensity and severity.

Issues

The central issue was whether the defendant was strictly liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher for damage caused by the fire, which was fed by the tyres stored on his premises. Specifically:

  • Whether the tyres constituted an exceptionally dangerous or mischievous thing;
  • Whether there was an escape of a dangerous thing from the defendant’s land;
  • Whether the storage of tyres constituted a non-natural use of land.

Judgment

Lord Justice Ward

Ward LJ allowed the appeal. He held that the proper test for Rylands v Fletcher liability, as restated in Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2004] 2 AC 1, requires that the defendant must bring onto his land an exceptionally dangerous or mischievous thing, recognise or ought to recognise the exceptionally high risk of danger if it escapes, and that use of the land must be extraordinary and unusual. Applying these principles:

  • Tyres, as such, are not exceptionally dangerous or mischievous;
  • There was no evidence the defendant recognised or should have recognised an exceptionally high risk if the tyres escaped;
  • The tyres did not escape; what escaped was the fire;
  • Keeping stock of tyres on premises of a tyre-fitting business was not an extraordinary or unusual use of the land.

Lord Justice Etherton

Etherton LJ agreed the appeal should be allowed. He emphasised that the Transco decision required an escape of the thing brought onto the land, not merely fire spreading from materials on the land. He held there was no scope for applying Rylands v Fletcher where there was no escape of the tyres themselves and the fire was not created by the defendant.

Lord Justice Lewison

Lewison LJ gave a detailed historical analysis of liability for fire and concluded that Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43 was wrongly decided and should no longer be followed. He held that section 86 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 provides a complete defence to liability for accidental fires unless negligence is established. The extension of Rylands v Fletcher to fire cases where no dangerous thing has been deliberately brought onto the land and no negligence is proved cannot be justified.

Implications

This decision significantly limits the application of Rylands v Fletcher to fire cases. The Court confirmed that for Rylands v Fletcher liability to arise, the thing brought onto the land must itself escape; the escape of fire caused or fed by that thing is insufficient. The decision emphasises that strict liability under Rylands v Fletcher is exceptional and the threshold is high. It also clarifies that where a fire starts and spreads accidentally without negligence, section 86 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 provides a defence. The judgment effectively relegates Musgrove v Pandelis to historical status and reaffirms that fire damage claims generally require proof of negligence.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. The claimant’s claim was dismissed. The defendant was not liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher as the requirements for strict liability were not established.

Source: Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) v Gore [2012] EWCA Civ 1248

Cite this work:

To cite this resource, please use the following reference:

National Case Law Archive, 'Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) v Gore [2012] EWCA Civ 1248' (LawCases.net, October 2025) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/stannard-t-a-wyvern-tyres-v-gore-2012-ewca-civ-1248/> accessed 3 April 2026

Status: Positive Treatment

The decision in Stannard v Gore remains the leading authority on the application of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher to fire cases. It established a restrictive interpretation, holding that the 'thing' brought onto the land must be the thing that escapes. This principle, that the fire itself must have been brought onto the land (not simply the flammable material), has been consistently followed and applied in subsequent High Court cases, such as Smith v Land Assured [2022] EWHC 1836 (TCC). Legal commentary from major law firms and academic sources confirms it as binding precedent that significantly narrowed the scope of the tort. The case has not been overruled or received negative judicial treatment from a higher court.

Checked: 02-11-2025