Rookes v Barnard [1964] UKHL 1

Trade union officials threatened B.O.A.C. with strike action in breach of contract unless the employer dismissed a non-union employee. The House of Lords held this constituted the tort of intimidation, recognising that threats to breach contracts could form the basis of this tort, and that the Trade Disputes Act 1906 provided no immunity.

Facts

The appellant, Rookes, was employed by B.O.A.C. as a draughtsman and had resigned from the trade union A.E.S.D. The three respondents, officials of the union, threatened B.O.A.C. that unless Rookes was removed from the Design Office, all union members would withdraw their labour. This threatened strike would have constituted a breach of the employees’ contracts of service, which incorporated a ‘no strike’ clause from a 1949 agreement. B.O.A.C. suspended and then lawfully dismissed Rookes by giving due notice. Rookes sued the union officials for damages.

Issues

Primary Issues

1. Whether there exists a tort of intimidation at common law.

2. Whether a threat to breach a contract (as opposed to a threat of violence or criminal conduct) can constitute the tort of intimidation.

3. Whether sections 1 and 3 of the Trade Disputes Act 1906 provided immunity to the respondents.

4. Whether the trial judge’s direction on exemplary damages was correct.

Judgment

The House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal on the question of liability. Their Lordships confirmed the existence of the tort of intimidation, holding that it extends to threats to commit breaches of contract, not merely threats of violence or tortious acts.

Lord Reid held that there is no principled distinction between threatening to commit a tort and threatening to breach a contract. Both constitute unlawful means for the purposes of the tort of intimidation.

Lord Devlin analysed the tort comprehensively, stating that the nature of the threat is immaterial to the plaintiff’s cause of action. What matters is that a ‘club’ has been used to coerce the intermediate party. If that party is threatened with an illegal injury, the plaintiff who suffers can claim he is illegally injured.

Regarding the Trade Disputes Act 1906, their Lordships held that section 1 did not apply because the act of intimidation was actionable without the element of conspiracy. Section 3 was construed as not protecting those who use tortious means (including intimidation) to induce breach of contract or interfere with employment. Lord Loreburn’s dictum in Conway v Wade was approved as correctly stating that threats or violence take a case outside section 3’s protection.

On damages, Lord Devlin delivered a landmark analysis restricting exemplary damages to two categories: (1) oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of government; and (2) cases where the defendant calculated that his profit would exceed compensation payable. The case did not fall within either category, and the jury’s direction was found to be erroneous.

Implications

This case is of fundamental importance in tort law for establishing that the tort of intimidation encompasses threats to breach contracts. It clarified the scope of the Trade Disputes Act 1906, holding that the statute does not provide blanket immunity for tortious conduct in trade disputes. The decision significantly impacted industrial relations law until Parliament subsequently amended the statutory protections.

Lord Devlin’s analysis of exemplary damages became the leading authority on this topic, substantially restricting the circumstances in which such damages may be awarded and distinguishing them from aggravated damages. The case established that private oppression by powerful entities, whilst it may warrant aggravated damages, does not justify exemplary damages.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. The judgment of Sachs J. was restored on liability, but a new trial was ordered on the question of damages only. The respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs in the House of Lords and Court of Appeal.

Source: Rookes v Barnard [1964] UKHL 1