Reeves v Commr of Police [1999] UKHL 35

A man, identified as a known suicide risk, committed suicide in police custody. The House of Lords held the police were liable for breaching their duty of care. The deceased's deliberate act of suicide did not break the chain of causation.

Facts

Martin Lynch, who had a history of suicide attempts, was arrested and taken to Leman Street police station. He was seen by a doctor who noted in the custody record that he was a suicide risk. The custody officer also recognised this risk. Despite this, Mr Lynch was placed in a cell where the flap of the door could be used as a ligature point. The flap was not locked, and he was left unsupervised. He used his shirt to hang himself from the spy-hole flap of the cell door and died. His administratrix, Ms Reeves, brought an action for damages against the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, alleging negligence.

Issues

The House of Lords considered the following key legal issues:

1. Did the police owe a duty of care to a prisoner of sound mind to prevent him from deliberately taking his own life?
2. If a duty of care was owed and breached, did the deceased’s deliberate act of suicide constitute a novus actus interveniens (a new intervening act), breaking the chain of causation between the police’s negligence and the death?
3. Could the defence of volenti non fit injuria (to one who is willing, no harm is done) apply?
4. If liability was established, could the deceased’s actions amount to contributory negligence, thereby reducing the damages awarded?

Judgment

The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the police’s appeal, holding them liable in negligence. The leading judgment was delivered by Lord Hoffmann.

Duty of Care

Lord Hoffmann affirmed that the police owed a duty of care to Mr Lynch. The specific nature of this duty arose from the complete control the police had over the prisoner and the known risk that he might try to kill himself.

The Court of Appeal was therefore right in my opinion to hold that there was a duty of care. The deceased was in the custody of the police and was known to be a suicide risk. It is not in dispute that the police were under a duty to take reasonable care to prevent him from doing so.

Causation and Novus Actus Interveniens

The central argument from the police was that the deceased’s deliberate act, as a person of sound mind, broke the chain of causation. Lord Hoffmann rejected this argument, stating that the very purpose of the duty owed by the police was to prevent the specific act of suicide. Therefore, the occurrence of that act could not be treated as a new intervening event that absolved the defendant of liability.

[T]he commissioner’s argument is founded upon a misconception of the defence of novus actus interveniens. It is that the plaintiff’s own act may break the chain of causation. But this is not a case of seeking to hold the defendant responsible for the act of a third party… It falls within the class of cases in which the defendant has a duty to prevent the deceased from acting in a certain way… The duty of care is to protect him against the particular form of harm which he in fact suffered… To say that the breach of duty was a cause of the death and that the deceased’s voluntary act was also a cause is not to say that the law regards the breach of duty as a sufficient cause of the death.

Volenti Non Fit Injuria

The defence of volenti non fit injuria was also deemed inapplicable. Lord Hoffmann reasoned that the deceased did not consent to the police’s negligence in failing to protect him.

The defence of volenti non fit injuria is also not available. The deceased did not, in any meaningful sense, agree to the police being careless in their custody of him.

Contributory Negligence

While the act of suicide did not break the chain of causation, the House of Lords held that it did constitute contributory negligence. The deceased was of sound mind and his deliberate act contributed to his death. The court upheld the trial judge’s apportionment of liability, reducing the damages by 50%.

The behaviour of the deceased in taking his own life was the very thing which the police were under a duty to prevent. But it was also a choice which he was able to make. He was of sound mind. He was not suffering from a mental illness which would have deprived him of the capacity to make a decision for himself.

Implications

The decision in Reeves is a landmark case in the law of negligence. It clarifies that where a person or authority has a specific duty to prevent an individual from self-harm, the deliberate act of self-harm by that individual (even if of sound mind) will not break the chain of causation. The case establishes that the scope of the duty of care is paramount in determining causation. It also confirms that the actions of the deceased can be treated as contributory negligence, allowing for an apportionment of responsibility and damages. This principle has significant implications for custodians such as police, prison authorities, and hospitals who have a duty to safeguard vulnerable individuals.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The House of Lords affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, finding the police liable for negligence but reducing damages by 50% on the grounds of the deceased’s contributory negligence.

Source: Reeves v Commr of Police [1999] UKHL 35