Reeves v Commr of Police [1999] UKHL 35

Martin Lynch, a known suicide risk, hanged himself in a police cell using an open hatch and spy hole. The House of Lords held the police owed and breached a duty to take reasonable care to prevent his suicide, but reduced damages by 50% for his contributory responsibility.

Facts

Martin Lynch, aged 29, hanged himself on 23 March 1990 in a cell at Kentish Town Police Station. He had been remanded in custody on credit fraud charges and was under investigation for handling stolen vehicles. He had made two previous suicide attempts by strangling himself with a belt, one at Clerkenwell Magistrates’ Court three months earlier and another at Brent Magistrates’ Court on the morning of his death.

After the first incident, police recorded that he was a suicide risk. Following the second, he was examined by a doctor who found no evidence of mental disturbance but assessed him as a suicide risk and instructed that he be frequently observed. The trial judge found that:

“In this case the deceased at the time he took his own life was not suffering from any marked medical or psychiatric condition. On the evidence, I am unable to conclude other than that he was, when he took the decision to end his life, of sound mind.”

At Kentish Town, Lynch was placed in a cell whose door had a defective wicket hatch left open and a spy hole from which the glass was missing. A Home Office circular of 1968 had warned that hatches should not be left open when cells were occupied, as prisoners could secure a ligature on the hatch handle:

“[W]here cell doors are fitted with a drop-down service hatch, the hatch should not be left open when the cell is occupied by a prisoner. With the hatch open it would be possible for a person inside the cell to secure a ligature on the handle of the hatch.”

At 1.57 pm Lynch was seen lying or sitting on his bed. By 2.05 pm he had used his shirt as a ligature, tied through the open hatch and spy hole, and strangled himself. He died a week later.

His partner, Sheila Reeves, as administratrix of his estate, sued the Commissioner of Police under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 for negligence. The Commissioner accepted that the police owed Lynch a duty of care and had been negligent in leaving the hatch open.

Issues

The House of Lords considered three main issues:

• Whether Lynch’s deliberate suicide, when of sound mind, broke the chain of causation as a novus actus interveniens, or rendered the loss wholly attributable to his own act.
• Whether the defence of volenti non fit injuria applied, on the basis that Lynch voluntarily assumed the risk of death by suicide.
• Whether Lynch’s conduct could amount to “fault” for the purposes of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, and, if so, what apportionment of responsibility was just and equitable.

Judgment

Causation and novus actus interveniens

The trial judge had held that Lynch’s suicide, as a deliberate act by a person of sound mind, was the sole cause of his death and a novus actus interveniens. The Court of Appeal majority disagreed, holding that such a conclusion would empty the admitted duty of care of “meaningful content”.

The majority of the House of Lords (Lords Hoffmann, Mackay of Clashfern, Jauncey of Tullichettle and Hope of Craighead) upheld the Court of Appeal on causation. They accepted that, in general, a free, deliberate and informed act of a human being may negative causal connection, but emphasised the recognised exception where the defendant’s duty is specifically to guard against that very act.

Lord Hoffmann noted the principle stated in Hart and Honoré’s Causation in the Law that:

“the free, deliberate and informed act or omission of a human being, intended to exploit the situation created by a defendant, negatives causal connection.”

However, he stressed that Hart and Honoré also identified an exception where a duty is imposed to guard against loss caused by such acts. To hold that Lynch’s suicide broke the chain of causation would be inconsistent with the existence of a duty “to take reasonable care to prevent him from committing suicide” and would render that duty devoid of practical effect.

Lord Jauncey, considering novus actus interveniens, quoted Professor Glanville Williams’ formulation:

“If a particular consequence of the defendant’s wrongdoing is attributable to some independent act or event which supersedes the effect of the tortuous conduct, the defendant’s responsibilities may not extend to the consequences of the supervening act or event.”

He held that Lynch’s suicide was the very event at which the duty of care was directed and therefore could not be “an independent act breaking the chain of causation”. In his words:

“The deceased’s suicide was the precise event to which the duty was directed and as an actus it was accordingly neither novus nor interveniens.”

Lord Hope reasoned similarly that there was no “new” act, because the act by which the deceased killed himself was “the very act” which the Commissioner was under a duty to prevent by ensuring that the wicket gate was not left open. The suicide was a foreseeable consequence of the breach when dealing with a known suicide risk.

Lord Hobhouse dissented on causation. Applying principles of autonomy and responsibility, he considered that where a person of sound mind makes a free, deliberate and informed choice to commit suicide, that choice can be the sole legal cause of death. He stressed that the action must be decided as if Lynch himself were the plaintiff, and that a plaintiff cannot complain of the consequences of his own fully voluntary conduct.

Volenti non fit injuria

The trial judge had upheld a defence of volenti non fit injuria, following dicta in Kirkham v. Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police. In the House of Lords, the Commissioner accepted that if the negligence was a cause of death, the volenti defence could not succeed.

The majority held that volenti non fit injuria was inapplicable where the very act relied upon—Lynch’s suicide—was the act which the defendant’s duty required him to prevent. Lord Jauncey observed of Kirkham that Farquharson L.J. had said the defence was:

“inappropriate where the act of the deceased relied on is the very act which the duty cast upon the defendant required him to prevent.”

Lord Hope similarly reasoned that the principle could not apply where “the loss, injury or damage was caused by the deliberate act of self-harm which the defendant was under a duty to take reasonable care to prevent”. As with novus actus, to allow volenti in such circumstances would effectively nullify the duty.

Lord Hobhouse agreed that the traditional volenti formulation (as an acceptance of risk or contractual-type waiver) sat awkwardly with the facts, and preferred to analyse the matter directly in terms of causation and the plaintiff’s responsibility.

Contributory negligence

The key remaining issue was whether Lynch’s intentional suicide could amount to “fault” under section 4 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. That section defines “fault” as:

“negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from this Act, give rise to a defence of contributory negligence; . . .”

The Commissioner argued, drawing on Professor Glanville Williams’ view that “contributory intention should be a defence”, that an intentional self-inflicted injury should a fortiori be treated as contributory “fault”. The plaintiff contended that contributory negligence, conceptually and historically, excluded intentional acts aimed at self-harm and that such conduct could not have given rise to the defence at common law.

Lord Hoffmann accepted that it was “odd” to label Lynch negligent since he had acted intentionally, but emphasised that contributory negligence at common law rested on the idea that a plaintiff whose lack of care caused his injury could not sue, and that this logically extended to those who deliberately injured themselves. He rejected the argument that recognising contributory negligence would contradict the causation analysis; Lynch’s suicide did not negate the police negligence as a cause, but was also a cause of his death. Both causes contributed, enabling apportionment under section 1(1):

“Because the police were under a duty to take reasonable care not to give Mr. Lynch the opportunity to kill himself, the common sense answer to the question whether their carelessness caused his death is yes. Because Mr. Lynch also had responsibility for his own life, the common sense answer to the question whether he caused his own death is yes.”

Lord Jauncey considered that if the law was to “walk hand in hand with common sense”, there was no reason to interpret “fault” so narrowly as to exclude deliberate acts. He gave the example of a worker who, for a dare, plunges his hand into boiling liquid, and remarked:

“It would be bordering on the absurd if A’s entitlement to damages were reduced but B could recover in full for his own folly.”

He concluded that “the word ‘fault’ in that section is wide enough to cover acts deliberate as to both performance and consequences” and that an individual of sound mind is equally responsible for such acts.

Lord Hope analysed section 4 as having two limbs, one addressing the defendant’s conduct and the other the plaintiff’s. He rejected the contention that deliberate acts fell outside the second limb, emphasising that the statutory context is apportionment of “responsibility for the damage” under section 1(1). He stated that the definition of “fault” is “wide enough, when examined as a whole and in its context, to extend to a plaintiff’s deliberate acts as well as to his negligent acts.” He drew support from comparative authorities, including Hickey v. Zezulka and Champagne v. United States of America, where courts had apportioned responsibility in suicide cases.

Buxton L.J. in the Court of Appeal had previously argued that if Lynch’s suicide could not be treated as a novus actus for causation purposes, it could not simultaneously be treated as contributing fault. The House rejected this as a fallacy, holding that the same act could both be within the scope of the defendant’s duty (so as not to break causation) and constitute part of the plaintiff’s responsibility for his own damage.

Apportionment

Although the trial judge and Morritt L.J. would have attributed 100 per cent responsibility to Lynch, the House found that such an apportionment effectively denied the existence of the police duty by giving no weight to the policy underlying its imposition. Lord Hoffmann emphasised that the duty arose from the police’s “complete control” over prisoners and the recognised risk of suicide in custody. An all-or-nothing attribution to Lynch was viewed as “another different way of saying that the police should not have owed Mr. Lynch a duty of care.”

Lord Hope accepted the judge’s finding that Lynch was “of sound mind” and that there were “no grounds for minimising the deceased’s share of the responsibility on the basis of diminished mental capacity”. Nonetheless, he considered that the defects in the cell door, in the face of a clear Home Office warning, also justified attributing a substantial share of responsibility to the Commissioner. He agreed with Lord Bingham’s earlier view in the Court of Appeal that responsibility should be shared equally, with a 50 per cent reduction in damages.

Lord Jauncey indicated that, sitting alone, he might have apportioned one-third to the Commissioner and two-thirds to Lynch, but was content to adopt the 50/50 split favoured by the majority.

Lord Hobhouse, having concluded that Lynch’s voluntary choice was the sole legal cause of his death, would have allowed the appeal in full and entered judgment for the defendant, without any award of damages.

Implications

This decision confirms that police and custodial authorities who know a detainee is a suicide risk owe a duty to take reasonable care to prevent suicide by removing or controlling opportunities for self-harm. Where that duty is breached and suicide occurs, the breach will ordinarily be treated as a legal cause of death, notwithstanding the detainee’s deliberate act.

The House firmly rejected the use of novus actus interveniens and volenti non fit injuria to defeat claims where the very act relied on is the foreseeable act which the duty seeks to prevent. At the same time, it clarified that intentional self-harm may constitute “fault” for contributory negligence purposes, especially where the deceased is of sound mind, enabling courts to apportion responsibility in a way that balances institutional duty with individual autonomy.

Practically, the case underscores the need for police and prison authorities to comply with guidance on cell design and observation, particularly for known suicide risks, and signals that failures may result in liability even where detainees act deliberately. It also provides authoritative guidance on the interaction between duty, causation and contributory negligence in complex self-harm situations.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. The House of Lords held that the police were liable in negligence for failing to prevent Lynch’s suicide but that his own conduct constituted contributory fault. Damages were reduced by 50 per cent, with judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of £4,345 plus interest.

Source: Reeves v Commr of Police [1999] UKHL 35