R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans [2000] UKHL 48

Ms Evans, a prisoner, was detained 59 days beyond her correct release date due to a miscalculation based on earlier Divisional Court authority. The House of Lords held the detention unlawful and confirmed that false imprisonment is a strict liability tort, making the State liable in damages despite the governor’s good faith reliance on precedent.

Facts

The respondent, Ms Evans, was sentenced at Cardiff Crown Court on 12 January 1996 to two years’ imprisonment, among concurrent sentences for robbery, burglaries and assault. Under section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, periods spent in custody before trial or sentence had to be credited when calculating the time to be served.

It was for the prison governor, not the sentencing judge, to compute the reduction and determine the conditional release date. Acting on Home Office guidance and a clear line of Divisional Court decisions, including Reg. v. Governor of Blundeston Prison, Ex parte Gaffney and Reg. v. Governor of Styal Prison, Ex parte Mooney, the Governor fixed Evans’s release date as 18 November 1996.

Evans contended that those authorities were wrong and that her proper release date was 17 September 1996. On 6 September 1996 she applied for habeas corpus and, on 16 October 1996, sought judicial review of the calculation and damages for false imprisonment.

On 15 November 1996 the Divisional Court in Reg. v. Governor of Brockhill Prison, Ex parte Evans [1997] Q.B. 443 held that the earlier line of authority was erroneous, that section 67 had been misconstrued, and declared that her correctly calculated release date was 17 September 1996. She was ordered to be released immediately and had been unlawfully detained for a further 59 days.

Collins J later dismissed her claim for damages for false imprisonment but assessed damages at £2,000 should liability arise. The Court of Appeal (majority) reversed on liability and increased damages to £5,000. The Governor, supported by the Home Office, appealed to the House of Lords.

Issues

Primary legal issues

• Whether false imprisonment, as a strict liability tort, permits a defence where a prison governor has detained a prisoner in good faith in reliance on settled judicial authority later held to be wrong.
• Whether the Governor could justify detention after 17 September 1996 on the basis that he was obeying the law as then understood and complying with a court order.
• Whether the effect of the Divisional Court’s reinterpretation of section 67 should be treated as purely prospective rather than declaratory and retrospective.
• How article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights relates to unlawful detention in these circumstances.
• The appropriate quantum of damages for 59 days of unlawful imprisonment.

Judgment

Strict liability and justification

The House unanimously held that false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability and that the Governor could not avoid liability by invoking good faith or reliance on then-prevailing case law. Once the Divisional Court had held that Evans was entitled to be released on 17 September 1996, her continued detention after that date was unlawful and not capable of legal justification.

Lord Slynn explained that although the Governor had reasonably relied on existing decisions, that could not supply lawful authority:

“She never was lawfully detained after 17 September 1996. She was merely thought to be lawfully detained. That is not a sufficient justification for the tort of false imprisonment even if based on rulings of the court.”

He stressed that, in substance, it was the State that must compensate her:

“Although in form it is the governor, it is in reality the State which must compensate her for her unlawful detention.”

Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed that the case could be decided simply on the strict liability nature of false imprisonment and expressly declined to endorse any doctrine of prospective overruling in this context.

The Governor’s attempted defences

The Solicitor-General advanced several related arguments: that the Governor acted under a valid court order; that he was obliged constitutionally to obey the law as laid down in prior decisions; and that, by analogy with cases where prison governors or constables rely on apparently valid warrants or byelaws, he should have a defence of justification.

Lord Hope rejected these arguments. The sentencing order merely recorded that Evans was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and did not specify a release date. Under section 67 it was the Governor’s statutory responsibility to calculate the discount and release date correctly. Therefore, any error in computation was his (and the State’s), not the court’s. Reliance on Home Office guidance and prior authority did not equate to acting within the four corners of a court warrant:

“Relying upon guidance of that kind is not the same thing as complying with the terms of a court order. It is no answer to a claim based on a tort of strict liability to say that the governor took reasonable care or that he acted in good faith when he made the calculation.”

Lord Steyn emphasised the traditional common law principle that the executive must always be able to justify any interference with liberty, citing Lord Atkin in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria:

“no member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action before a court of justice.”

Lord Hobhouse similarly underlined that neither good faith nor reliance on prior case law could substitute for lawful authority under statute or warrant. He reviewed authorities demonstrating that governors are protected where they obey facially valid warrants specifying the period of detention, but not where they detain beyond the legal limit without warrant authority.

Retrospectivity and the declaratory theory

The Governor also argued, in substance, for a form of non-retrospectivity: that because, at the time, the law was understood to be as in Gaffney and related cases, his actions should be assessed by reference to that earlier understanding.

Lord Slynn accepted that some legal systems, and occasionally the European Court of Justice, have restricted the retrospective effect of rulings but concluded that, even if such a technique were available, it would not be justified here. Evans’s case had established the correct principle, and she was entitled to compensation.

Lord Hope held that the Divisional Court’s order could only sensibly be read as retrospectively declaring what Evans’s rights had always been as at 17 September 1996. He considered that, particularly where liberty is at stake, the declaratory theory must apply.

Lord Hobhouse rejected a broad doctrine of non-retrospectivity as inconsistent with the constitutional role of the courts and the decision in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council. He observed that judicial decisions are evidence of the law, not the law itself in an absolute sense, and that:

“The Divisional Court did not say that the appellant’s was entitled to be released on 15 November, the date of the judgment: it declared that she had been entitled to be released on 17 September.”

Human Rights (Article 5 ECHR)

Although the Human Rights Act 1998 was not yet in force, the House considered article 5 ECHR. Lord Steyn observed that article 5(1) and 5(5) reinforce the conclusion that a defence based on mistaken understanding of the law is unavailable:

“Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”

Lord Hope analysed the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the requirement that detention be lawful under domestic law. As the Divisional Court had held that Evans’s detention after 17 September 1996 was unlawful under English law, that would also indicate a breach of article 5(1), engaging a right to compensation under article 5(5). This was consistent with the domestic tort of false imprisonment.

Lord Hobhouse likewise concluded that article 5 was aligned with the existing common law position: where domestic law renders the detention unlawful, compensation is due.

Damages

Collins J had assessed general damages at £2,000 for the 59-day unlawful detention, and there was no claim for special, aggravated or exemplary damages. The Court of Appeal increased the award to £5,000, in part because the original award produced a daily rate lower than that contended for by the Governor himself and in part to provide guidance on levels of compensation for such cases.

Lord Steyn held that the increase was within the Court of Appeal’s power and appropriate. Lord Hope agreed:

“I do not think that their decision as to the appropriate sum to be awarded is one with which your Lordships should interfere.”

Lord Hobhouse also agreed that the increased award should stand.

Implications

Clarification of false imprisonment

The decision confirms that false imprisonment is a strict liability tort. A defendant who detains a person must be able to demonstrate that the detention was substantively and procedurally lawful at the time, measured against the law as it is ultimately held to be, not merely as it was thought to be. Good faith, reasonable care and reliance on authoritative but erroneous judicial decisions do not amount to justification.

The case underscores that, where a statute confers on an executive officer (such as a prison governor) the responsibility to calculate and apply rules affecting liberty, any misapplication leading to over-detention is attributable to the State, which must compensate for the resulting false imprisonment.

Judicial decisions and retrospectivity

The House declined to endorse a general doctrine of prospective overruling to shield the State from liability in such circumstances. While some members recognised that questions of retrospectivity might warrant consideration in other contexts, especially in light of the Human Rights Act 1998, they held that where personal liberty is concerned, the declaratory theory should apply: the court’s decision states what the law has always been.

Interaction with human rights law

The reasoning closely aligns domestic tort principles with article 5 ECHR. Future claims after the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 will be able to invoke both the common law tort of false imprisonment and article 5(5), reinforcing the right to compensation for unlawful detention.

Practical and administrative consequences

The case highlights the importance of accurate statutory interpretation and administrative guidance in prison administration, particularly in complex areas such as crediting remand time. It also sends a clear signal that the risk of misinterpretation of such provisions falls on the State, not on prisoners, and that compensation will be payable where liberty is unlawfully curtailed.

Overall, the decision is a significant reaffirmation of the protection of personal liberty against executive action and the central role of strict liability in the tort of false imprisonment.

Verdict: The House of Lords dismissed the Governor’s appeal, holding that Evans’s detention for 59 days beyond her correct release date was unlawful and constituted false imprisonment, and upheld the Court of Appeal’s award of £5,000 in damages.

Source: R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans [2000] UKHL 48