R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex parte Hague [1991] UKHL 13

Prisoners challenged segregation from the general inmate population as false imprisonment. The House of Lords held that lawful segregation does not found such a claim, as a prisoner's liberty is already removed by their sentence, leaving no 'residual liberty' to be taken.

Facts

This case involved appeals by two prisoners, Mr. Hague and Mr. Weldon, who were segregated from the general prison population and claimed this amounted to the tort of false imprisonment. Mr. Hague was a prisoner at H.M. Prison Parkhurst. Following a period of non-cooperation, the governor decided to transfer him to H.M. Prison Wormwood Scrubs. Pending this transfer, he was placed in the segregation unit under Rule 43(1) of the Prison Rules 1964 for the maintenance of good order and discipline. Mr. Weldon, a prisoner at H.M. Prison Wakefield, was also segregated under Rule 43 for good order and discipline. Both men challenged the lawfulness of their segregation through judicial review and also brought private law claims for damages for false imprisonment.

Issues

The central legal issue before the House of Lords was whether a prisoner, who is already lawfully detained under a sentence of imprisonment, can maintain a civil action for the tort of false imprisonment if they are subsequently confined to a specific part of the prison, such as a segregation unit, in a manner that is contrary to the prison rules. The case explored the concept of a prisoner’s ‘residual liberty’ and the appropriate legal remedy for a breach of prison rules by the authorities.

Judgment

The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeals, holding that the tort of false imprisonment was not available to a prisoner in these circumstances. The court ruled that the appropriate remedy for a prisoner alleging that a governor has misused their powers is an application for judicial review.

Reasoning of the Court

The leading judgment was delivered by Lord Bridge of Harwich. He held that imprisonment is a single, indivisible state and that a prisoner’s loss of liberty is total for the duration of their sentence. Once lawfully imprisoned, a prisoner has no ‘residual liberty’ that can be further taken away by internal segregation, thus precluding a claim for false imprisonment.

For a prisoner, segregation is a method of confinement within the prison. He is not deprived of his liberty. He has already been deprived of it by the sentence of the court. A prisoner who is lawfully in prison has, as I have said, lost his liberty for the duration of his sentence. He is therefore not entitled to any particular compartment of the prison and he cannot complain of false imprisonment merely because he is moved from one part of the prison to another, whatever the reason. His remedy, if any, is by way of judicial review.

Lord Bridge distinguished the situation from one where a prisoner is subjected to intolerable conditions beyond the scope of lawful imprisonment, which might give rise to a different cause of action, but not false imprisonment. He emphasised the distinction between public and private law remedies.

Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle delivered a concurring speech, reinforcing this view:

The proposition that a prisoner who has been lawfully committed to prison has no residual liberty which can be the subject of an action for false imprisonment at first sight seems surprising and to be contrary to the principle that a prisoner retains all his civil rights which have not been taken away by the sentence of a court and its necessary consequences. However, on closer examination I am satisfied that the proposition is correct… Once a prisoner is in prison he has lost his liberty to be at large. He is in lawful custody and the governor is responsible for his safe keeping… I do not consider that a prisoner who is lawfully detained can, in relation to his confinement within the prison, complain of false imprisonment at the hands of the governor.

The court concluded that while prisoners retain certain civil rights, the right to liberty is wholly removed by the sentence. The conditions of that detention, including segregation, are matters of prison administration governed by public law and subject to challenge by judicial review, not by a private law action for false imprisonment.

Implications

The decision in R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex parte Hague is a landmark ruling on the scope of prisoners’ rights in English law. It firmly establishes that the tort of false imprisonment cannot be used to challenge the conditions of confinement for a lawfully detained prisoner. The case clarifies that a prisoner’s ‘residual liberty’ does not extend to freedom of movement within the prison. Its primary significance lies in reinforcing the distinction between public law and private law. For prisoners, the a proper avenue for challenging administrative decisions by prison authorities (such as segregation) is through judicial review, which can quash an unlawful decision, rather than a private action for damages in tort.

Verdict: The appeals were dismissed.

Source: R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex parte Hague [1991] UKHL 13