Lumley v Gye [1853] EWHC QB J73 (1 January 1853)

A theatre owner, Lumley, had an exclusive contract with singer Johanna Wagner. Gye, a rival, maliciously persuaded her to break this contract. The court held that an action for maliciously procuring a breach of contract was maintainable, establishing the tort of inducing breach of contract.

Facts

The plaintiff, Benjamin Lumley, was the proprietor of the Queen’s Theatre. He entered into a contract with a renowned opera singer, Johanna Wagner, for her to perform exclusively at his theatre for a specific period. The defendant, Frederick Gye, ran a rival theatre. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, knowing of this existing contract, ‘maliciously’ enticed and procured Johanna Wagner to refuse to perform for Lumley, in breach of her contract, with the intent to injure the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed damages for the loss he suffered as a result. The defendant demurred to the declaration, arguing that no cause of action existed in law for such a claim.

Issues

The central legal issue was whether a third party who maliciously procures a person to break a contract for personal services can be held liable in an action for damages to the other contracting party. Specifically, the court had to determine if the principle governing the enticement of servants, traditionally confined to master-servant relationships, could be extended to cover contracts for artistic performances.

Judgment

The majority of the Court of Queen’s Bench (Crompton J., Erle J., and Wightman J.) held that the action was maintainable, overruling the defendant’s demurrer. Coleridge J. delivered a dissenting judgment.

The Majority Opinion

The majority judges reasoned that the principle underlying actions for seducing servants was not limited to the narrow ‘master and servant’ relationship but could be applied more broadly. They held that a malicious act causing damage to another person’s legal right was actionable.

Crompton J. drew an analogy to cases involving the enticing away of servants and apprentices, which were founded on the Statute of Labourers. He argued that the principle should logically extend to contracts for exclusive personal service, even if the person was not a ‘servant’ in the menial sense. He stated:

I think that we are justified in applying the principle of the action for enticing away servants to a case where the defendant maliciously procures a party, who is under a valid contract to give her exclusive personal services to the plaintiff for a specified period, to refuse to give such services during the period for which she had so contracted, whereby the plaintiff was injured.

Erle J. based his concurring judgment on a broader principle that the malicious procurement of a breach of any type of contract, resulting in damage, is a tort. He argued that it is a violation of a legal right to have a contract fulfilled without wrongful interference from others.

He who maliciously procures a damage to another by violation of his right ought to be made to indemnify; and that, whether he procures an actionable wrong or a breach of contract.

Wightman J. agreed with the majority, finding it was not a valid distinction to limit the action strictly to ‘servants’. He concluded that it was the malicious intereference with the contractual relationship for the purpose of causing injury to the plaintiff that constituted the cause of action.

Dissenting Judgment of Coleridge J.

Coleridge J. dissented strongly, arguing that the action for enticing servants was an anomaly in English law, rooted in the ancient Statute of Labourers, and should be strictly confined to the master-servant relationship. He believed that extending this principle to performance artists and other contractors would open the floodgates to litigation and create uncertainty in commercial dealings. He contended that the relationship between Lumley and Wagner was not one of master and servant, and therefore the established legal precedent did not apply. He reasoned:

The remedy is given in respect of the loss of service to which the master has a right in the case of a servant either by law or by statutable enactment… but the service must be that of a servant, in the sense in which that word is now used.

Implications

The judgment in Lumley v Gye was a landmark decision that established the modern economic tort of inducing a breach of contract. It significantly expanded the law by creating liability for deliberate and malicious interference in contractual relations, moving beyond the historical confines of the master-servant relationship. The case affirmed that a valid contract creates a legal right that an individual is entitled to enjoy without malicious interference from third parties. This principle has become a fundamental part of commercial and contract law, protecting contractual stability from wrongful third-party intervention.

Verdict: Judgment for the Plaintiff. The defendant’s demurrer was overruled.

Source: Lumley v Gye [1853] EWHC QB J73 (1 January 1853)