Ms Perry was convicted of collecting information likely to be useful to terrorists. She appealed arguing the trial judge misconstrued her defence statement. The Supreme Court held that interpreting the defence statement was a question of fact, not law, and dismissed her appeal against concurrent findings.
Facts
The appellant, Ms Perry, was convicted of collecting or making a record of information likely to be useful to a terrorist under section 58(1)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2000. During a police search of her home, handwritten notes on cigarette papers were found containing coded information relating to a 2015 arms seizure that led to Kevin Nolan’s conviction. The prosecution alleged the notes represented a debriefing exercise by dissident republicans.
Ms Perry claimed she received papers anonymously through her letterbox in late 2017, which she copied in her own handwriting for her journalistic work on policing and MI5 approaches. She asserted she did not ‘collect’ the information and that any currency in the notes had dissipated by the time she received them.
Issues
The certified question was whether the construction of a defence statement provided under Part 1 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is a question of law for the trial judge.
The substantive issue was whether the trial judge erred in interpreting paragraph 4(n) of the defence statement and in finding that the appellant’s oral evidence contradicted her defence statement.
Judgment
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Lord Hamblen, delivering the judgment, held that the interpretation of paragraph 4(n) of the defence statement involved a question of fact, not law. The interpretation concerned the meaning of the document as understood or intended by the appellant, rather than its legal effect.
Key Reasoning
The Court applied the principles from R v Thain regarding appellate review of findings by a judge sitting without a jury. The interpretation of paragraph 4(n) had to be considered in its evidential context and as part of the overall assessment of credibility.
The Court found the judge’s interpretation was not perverse. The natural inference from placing the two sentences in paragraph 4(n) together was that they were connected, suggesting the appellant knew the notes related to the Nolan conviction.
The Court emphasised that this was an appeal against concurrent findings of fact, which should only be disturbed in very rare cases. The trial judge’s credibility finding was supported by multiple cogent reasons beyond the defence statement interpretation.
Implications
This case clarifies that interpreting defence statements involves questions of fact where the issue concerns the meaning intended or understood by the accused, rather than the legal effect of the document. Appellate courts will be reluctant to disturb such findings, particularly where there are concurrent findings from both trial and appellate courts. The decision reinforces the limited scope for challenging factual findings in second appeals to the Supreme Court.
Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the appellant’s conviction, finding no error in the trial judge’s interpretation of the defence statement and no grounds to disturb the concurrent findings of fact.
Source: R (Respondent) v Perry (Appellant) [2025] UKSC 17 (30 April 2025)
Cite this work:
To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'R (Respondent) v Perry (Appellant) [2025] UKSC 17 (30 April 2025)' (LawCases.net, September 2025) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/perry-r-v-2025-uksc-17-30-april-2025/> accessed 30 April 2026

