R (Respondent) v Perry (Appellant) [2025] UKSC 17 (30 April 2025)

A journalist's phone was seized under the Terrorism Act 2000. She argued this breached her right to protect sources under Article 10 ECHR. The Supreme Court ruled the seizure lawful but imposed strict safeguards for examining the data to protect journalistic material.

Facts

The appellant, Ms Isabel Perry, is a journalist who specialises in reporting on terrorism and the Middle East. Upon her return to the United Kingdom from a reporting trip to Syria, she was stopped at Heathrow Airport by police officers. Acting under the powers conferred by Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (‘TACT’), the officers questioned her and seized her mobile phone and laptop computer. Ms Perry refused to provide the passwords for these devices, arguing that doing so would compromise her confidential journalistic sources and breach her professional code of conduct. She was not a terrorist suspect, but the police sought to examine the devices to determine if she had been in contact with terrorist groups. Ms Perry challenged the lawfulness of the seizure and the power to examine her devices, claiming it was an unjustified interference with her rights under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which protects freedom of expression.

Issues

The central legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the power to stop, question, and seize property from a journalist under Schedule 7 to TACT 2000, without a requirement for prior judicial authorisation, was compatible with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. Specifically, the court had to determine if the interference with the protection of journalistic sources was prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim, and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the purposes of national security.

Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that the powers under Schedule 7 were lawful but must be exercised subject to significant procedural safeguards to protect journalistic material.

Lord Reed’s Leading Judgment

Delivering the sole judgment, Lord Reed affirmed the critical importance of protecting journalistic sources as a cornerstone of press freedom. He stated:

Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom… Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital public watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected.

However, Lord Reed reasoned that the state’s interest in preventing terrorism was a powerful countervailing consideration. He concluded that the initial power to seize a journalist’s property at a port under Schedule 7 was not, in itself, a violation of Article 10. The power was sufficiently foreseeable and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting national security.

The crucial part of the judgment concerned the subsequent examination of the seized material. Lord Reed held that the domestic legal framework was deficient because it lacked adequate procedural safeguards to protect journalistic sources from being revealed during an examination. To remedy this and make the powers compatible with Article 10, the Court read into the legislation a new procedural requirement. It ruled that police could not examine the contents of a journalist’s seized devices unless they first obtained an order from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT). Such an order would only be granted where the access was justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest and was strictly necessary and proportionate. The only exception would be in cases of an urgent and imminent threat to life.

Implications

This landmark decision strikes a new balance between national security and press freedom in the context of counter-terrorism powers. While affirming the state’s ability to seize materials from journalists at borders, it significantly strengthens the protection for journalistic sources by imposing a requirement for prior judicial authorisation before such materials can be examined. The judgment effectively creates a ‘judicial brake’ on the executive’s powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, ensuring a court must scrutinise the necessity and proportionality of any intrusion into journalistic confidentiality. This case reinforces the principle established in other jurisdictions that any interference with Article 10 rights, particularly those concerning the press, demands the most anxious scrutiny by the courts.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed.

Source: Perry, R. v [2025] UKSC 17 (30 April 2025)