Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC QB J57 (7 June 1861)

William Tweddle married the daughter of William Guy. Both fathers agreed in writing to pay sums to William Tweddle, with the agreement stating he could sue for the amounts. When Guy's executor failed to pay, Tweddle sued. The court held that a stranger to the consideration cannot sue on a contract, even if made for his benefit.

Facts

William Tweddle married the daughter of William Guy. Prior to the marriage, both William Guy (the bride’s father) and John Tweddle (the groom’s father) made verbal promises to provide marriage portions. After the marriage, both fathers entered into a written agreement dated 11th July 1855, whereby Guy agreed to pay £200 and John Tweddle agreed to pay £100 to William Tweddle (the son/groom). The agreement explicitly stated that William Tweddle had ‘full power to sue the said parties in any Court of law or equity for the aforesaid sums hereby promised and specified.’ William Guy died without paying the £200, and William Tweddle brought an action against Guy’s executor, Atkinson.

The Written Agreement

“Whereas it is mutually agreed that the said William Guy shall and will pay the sum of 200l. to William Tweddle, his son-in-law; and the said John Tweddle, father to the aforesaid William Tweddle, shall and will pay the sum of 100l. to the said William Tweddle, each and severally the said sums on or before the 21st day of August, 1855. And it is hereby further agreed by the aforesaid William Guy and the said John Tweddle that the said William Tweddle has full power to sue the said parties in any Court of law or equity for the aforesaid sums hereby promised and specified.”

Issues

The central issue was whether the plaintiff, William Tweddle, who was a stranger to the consideration of the contract (the consideration having moved between the two fathers), could maintain an action to enforce the contract made for his benefit.

Arguments

For the Defendant

Edward James argued that the plaintiff was a stranger to both the agreement and the consideration as stated in the declaration, and therefore could not sue upon the contract, citing the established principle that an action for breach of contract must be brought by the person from whom the consideration moved.

For the Plaintiff

Mellish argued that there was an exception to the general rule in cases of contracts made by parents for the purpose of providing for their children, citing old cases including Dutton and Wife v. Poole. He contended that the natural relationship between father and son constituted the father as agent for the son, for whose benefit the contract was made.

Judgment

Wightman J

Acknowledged that some old decisions appeared to support the proposition that a stranger to consideration may sue if in near relationship to the party from whom consideration proceeded, but stated that there was no modern case supporting this, and that it was now established that no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit.

Crompton J

Stated that the modern cases had effectively overruled the old decisions and that consideration must move from the party entitled to sue. He noted it would be monstrous to say a person was party to a contract for suing but not for being sued, and expressed preparedness to overrule the old decisions.

Blackburn J

Confirmed that while Dutton v. Poole could not be directly overruled, there were distinct grounds on which it could not be supported. He noted that natural love and affection are not sufficient consideration whereon an action of assumpsit may be founded.

Implications

This case established the fundamental doctrine of privity of contract in English law, holding that only parties to a contract can sue upon it, and that consideration must move from the promisee. Even an express term in a contract purporting to give a third party rights to sue cannot override this principle. The case confirmed that neither family relationships nor the clear intention of contracting parties can confer enforceable rights upon third parties. This remained the law until the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 created statutory exceptions to the privity doctrine.

Verdict: Judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff could not maintain an action on the contract as he was a stranger to the consideration.

Source: Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC QB J57 (7 June 1861)