Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC QB J57 (7 June 1861)

The fathers of a marrying couple promised to pay the groom money. After the bride's father died without paying, the groom sued his estate. The court held the groom could not sue, as he was a stranger to the contract and its consideration.

Facts

An agreement was made in writing between John Tweddle, the father of the plaintiff (William Tweddle), and William Guy, the father of the woman the plaintiff was to marry. In consideration of the intended marriage, both fathers mutually promised to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff. John Tweddle promised £100 and William Guy promised £200. The agreement explicitly stated that the plaintiff “has full power to sue the said parties in any Court of law or equity for the aforesaid sums hereby promised and specified.” The marriage took place, but William Guy subsequently died without having paid the promised £200. The plaintiff, William Tweddle, brought an action against the executor of William Guy’s estate, Mr Atkinson, to recover the unpaid sum.

Issues

The central legal issue was whether the plaintiff, a third party to the agreement for whose benefit the contract was made, could maintain an action to enforce the promise. This questioned the established principle of contract law that a person must be a party to the contract to sue upon it. A subsidiary issue was whether the plaintiff had provided any consideration for the promise made by the deceased, William Guy.

Judgment

The Court of Queen’s Bench gave judgment unanimously for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff’s action must fail. The judges affirmed the principle that consideration must move from the promisee and that a stranger to the consideration cannot sue on a contract.

Wightman, J.

Justice Wightman acknowledged that some older cases suggested a third-party beneficiary could sue, but stated that modern authority had decisively overruled this view. He held that the plaintiff was a stranger to the consideration, and therefore could not enforce the contract.

It is now established that no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit.

Crompton, J.

Justice Crompton concurred, emphasising that the consideration for the promise must move from the party entitled to sue. He dismissed the argument that natural love and affection between the plaintiff and his father could support the promise from the other party. He also pointed out the absurdity of allowing someone to sue on a contract without also being liable to be sued under it.

The consideration must move from the party entitled to sue upon the contract. It would be a monstrous proposition to say that a person was a party to the contract for the purpose of suing upon it for his own advantage, and not a party to it for the purpose of being sued.

Blackburn, J.

Justice Blackburn agreed, citing the case of Price v. Easton as direct authority for the proposition that a stranger to the consideration cannot sue. He concluded that the declaration was bad because the plaintiff was not a party to the consideration.

Mr. M. Lloyd has cited no case where a person who was a stranger to the consideration has been enabled to sue upon it. The case of Price v. Easton (4 B. & Ad. 433) is a direct authority for this proposition.

Implications

This case is a foundational authority in English contract law for the doctrine of privity of contract. It firmly established the rule that a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations on any person who is not a party to the contract. The decision reinforces the principle that consideration is essential for an enforceable promise and that such consideration must ‘move from the promisee’. Consequently, a third-party beneficiary, who has not provided consideration, has no standing to sue to enforce the contract, even if it was explicitly made for their benefit.

Verdict: Judgment for the defendant.

Source: Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC QB J57 (7 June 1861)