Lampleigh v Brathwait [1615] EWHC KB J17 (24 March 1615)

Brathwait asked Lampleigh to obtain a royal pardon for him, which Lampleigh performed successfully. Brathwait then promised to pay £100 but later refused. The court held that a past act, when done at the promisor's request, constitutes good consideration.

Facts

The defendant, Thomas Brathwait, had feloniously slain a man named Patrick Mahume. He asked the plaintiff, Anthony Lampleigh, to ‘labour and do his endeavor to obtain his pardon from the King’. Lampleigh agreed and, at his own expense and through considerable effort, rode and journeyed to and from London, Royston, and Newmarket to secure the royal pardon for Brathwait, which he successfully did. After Lampleigh had performed this service, Brathwait promised to give him £100 in consideration of his efforts. Brathwait subsequently failed to pay the £100, and Lampleigh brought an action of assumpsit to recover the amount promised.

Issues

The primary legal issue before the court was whether a promise to pay made after the performance of an act constitutes a legally binding contract. The defendant argued that the consideration was ‘past and executed’ before the promise was made, and therefore, it could not support the subsequent promise to pay. This raised the question of the validity of past consideration in the formation of a contract.

Judgment

The Court of King’s Bench found in favour of the plaintiff, Lampleigh, holding that the promise was enforceable. The court distinguished between a ‘mere voluntary courtesy’ and an act performed at the specific request of the promisor. While a purely voluntary act without a prior request cannot be good consideration for a subsequent promise, an act that was undertaken at the defendant’s request is different. The court reasoned that the initial request from Brathwait to Lampleigh to secure the pardon carried with it an implied understanding that the service would eventually be remunerated. The subsequent express promise of £100 was not a new, unsupported promise but rather a confirmation and quantification of the reward for the service performed at Brathwait’s request.

The court’s reasoning is encapsulated in the following key passage:

First, it was agreed, that a meer voluntary curtesie will not have a consideration to uphold an assumpsit. But if that curtesie were moved by a suit or request of the party that gives the assumpsit, it will bind, for the promise, though it follows, yet it is not naked, but couples it self with the suit before, and the merits of the party procured by that suit, which is the difference.

The judgment effectively established that where a past act was done at the promisor’s request, and it was understood that payment would be made, a subsequent promise to pay is binding.

Implications

This case is a foundational authority in English contract law, establishing a significant exception to the general rule that ‘past consideration is no consideration’. The principle derived from Lampleigh v Brathwait is that if a person carries out an act at the request of another, and it was understood or implied at the time of the request that the act would be paid for, then a subsequent promise to pay is legally enforceable. This doctrine of ‘past consideration performed at the promisor’s request’ prevents a party from unconscionably benefiting from a requested service and then refusing to pay on the technical ground that the promise was made after the service was completed. It remains a crucial principle, later refined in cases like Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614, which summarises the requirements for this exception to apply.

Verdict: The judgment was for the plaintiff, Lampleigh. The defendant, Brathwait, was ordered to pay the promised sum of £100.

Source: Lampleigh v Brathwait [1615] EWHC KB J17 (24 March 1615)