Jones v Padavatton [1968] EWCA Civ 4 (29 November 1968)

A mother promised her daughter an allowance and the use of a house if she moved to London to study law. When they fell out, the mother sought possession of the house. The court found this was a flexible family arrangement, not a binding contract.

Facts

In 1962, Mrs Jones offered her daughter, Mrs Padavatton, a monthly allowance of $200 (US) if she would leave her well-paid job and comfortable life in Washington D.C., USA, and move to London with her young son to read for the Bar. The daughter accepted. The initial arrangement became difficult as the allowance paid in Trinidad dollars was less than the daughter expected. In 1964, the mother proposed a new arrangement: she bought a house in London where the daughter could live with her son, and rent out other rooms to tenants. The income from the tenants would serve as the daughter’s maintenance, replacing the allowance. The house was conveyed into the mother’s name. The relationship between mother and daughter subsequently deteriorated significantly. In 1967, five years after the initial arrangement, the mother issued a summons in the County Court seeking possession of the house. The daughter had not yet successfully completed her Bar examinations.

Issues

The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the arrangements made between the mother and daughter constituted a legally binding contract. The court had to determine:

1. Whether the 1962 agreement to pay maintenance was intended to create legal relations.
2. Whether the subsequent 1964 agreement concerning the house was intended to create legal relations.
3. If a contract existed, what were its terms, specifically concerning duration, and whether it could be terminated by the mother.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal, by a majority, allowed the mother’s appeal and granted her possession of the house. However, the judges reached this conclusion via different reasoning.

Lord Justice Danckwerts

Lord Justice Danckwerts, forming the majority view, held that neither arrangement was intended to create a legally enforceable contract. He relied heavily on the precedent of Balfour v Balfour, which established that arrangements between close family members are presumed not to be legally binding. He found the evidence pointed towards a domestic arrangement based on trust and affection, not a formal contract. He noted the vagueness of the terms as evidence of this:

The parties were mother and daughter. I am satisfied that neither of them at that time intended to enter into a legally binding contract, either then or later. Not only was the relationship between the parties that of mother and daughter, but the terms of the arrangement are, in my view, far too vague and uncertain to be enforceable as a contract.

As an alternative finding, he stated that even if there were a contract, it could not last indefinitely. He considered that a ‘reasonable time’ for the daughter to complete her studies had passed after five years, entitling the mother to terminate the arrangement.

Lord Justice Salmon

Lord Justice Salmon dissented on the primary issue of contractual intention. He argued that the significant consideration and life changes made by the daughter—giving up her job, home, and moving country—were serious enough to rebut the presumption against legal relations in domestic agreements.

I cannot think that either of them would have entered into this arrangement unless they had intended that it should be binding in law.

However, he ultimately concurred with the overall decision to grant possession to the mother. He reasoned that while a contract existed, its terms were not sufficiently clear, particularly regarding its duration. He implied a term that the daughter was obliged to complete her studies within a ‘reasonable time’. Since she had been in London for five years and had failed her exams multiple times, he concluded that this reasonable period had expired, and the contract had therefore come to an end, allowing the mother to lawfully terminate the licence and reclaim her property.

Lord Justice Fenton Atkinson

Agreeing with Lord Justice Danckwerts, Lord Justice Fenton Atkinson found that there was no intention to create legal relations. He emphasised the initial informal nature of the promise and concluded that the family relationship was the dominant factor:

At the time when the first arrangement was made, the mother and the daughter, in my judgment, were not intending to enter into a legally binding contract. I think that the mother’s promise was not a firm promise… but was a family arrangement whereby the mother was to provide for her daughter… and that it was not intended to be a binding contract.

He therefore concluded that the mother was entitled to possession as the daughter was merely a licensee whose licence had been validly revoked.

Implications

The case is a leading authority on the doctrine of ‘intention to create legal relations’ in contract law. It powerfully reinforces the principle established in Balfour v Balfour that there is a strong presumption that domestic and family arrangements are not intended to be legally binding. While Lord Justice Salmon’s dissenting opinion shows that this presumption can be rebutted by evidence of sufficient gravity and reliance, the majority view underscores the high threshold required. The decision also highlights the importance of certainty of terms; even where legal intention might be found, an agreement can fail for being too vague, particularly concerning duration.

Verdict: The appeal by the mother was allowed, and an order for possession of the house was granted to her.

Source: Jones v Padavatton [1968] EWCA Civ 4 (29 November 1968)