Glamorgan CC v Glasbrook Bros Ltd [1924] UKHL 3 (19 December 1924)

A colliery, fearing striking miners, promised to pay police for an on-site garrison. The police, who believed a mobile force was adequate, agreed. The House of Lords held the promise to pay was contractually enforceable as providing a garrison, beyond what the police deemed necessary, constituted good consideration.

Facts

During a national coal strike in 1921, Glasbrook Brothers Ltd (the respondents), owners of a colliery in Glamorgan, experienced significant industrial unrest. After a stay-at-home strike, the safety men who maintained the mine decided to return to work, but faced intimidation from striking miners. The colliery manager requested police protection, specifically asking for a constant stationary garrison of police officers to be billeted at the colliery. The police superintendent believed that adequate protection could be provided by a mobile force that would patrol the area and be available on call. However, the colliery manager insisted on the resident garrison. The police superintendent agreed to provide the requested garrison only if the colliery owners promised to pay for the officers’ services and expenses. The colliery owners agreed to these terms in writing. After the strike, the colliery owners refused to pay the £2,200 requested, arguing that the police were merely fulfilling their public duty to provide protection and that there was therefore no consideration for their promise to pay.

Issues

The central legal issue before the House of Lords was whether the police authority (Glamorgan County Council) was entitled to be paid for the special police services provided. This depended on whether the police had provided good consideration for the colliery’s promise to pay. Specifically, could the police charge for services when they already had a public duty to protect life and property, or did the provision of the stationary garrison, at the specific request of the colliery, go beyond this public duty?

Judgment

The House of Lords, by a 3-2 majority, allowed the appeal, finding in favour of the police authority. The majority held that the promise to pay was enforceable because the police had provided protection that went beyond what they considered necessary for the performance of their public duty.

Majority Opinion

Viscount Cave L.C., delivering the leading judgment, established a clear principle distinguishing between the police’s public duty and the provision of ‘special’ services. He reasoned that while the police cannot charge for fulfilling their ordinary duties, they can charge for services that go beyond that duty, especially when requested by a private individual who promises to pay.

If in the judgment of the police authorities, formed reasonably and in good faith, the garrison was necessary for the protection of life and property, then they were not entitled to make a charge for it, for that would be to exact a payment for the performance of a duty which they clearly owed to the appellants and their servants; but if they thought the garrison a superfluity and only consented to provide it at the request of the respondents and upon their promise to pay the cost, then in my opinion they were entitled to charge for it.

Viscount Finlay concurred, stating:

There is an obligation on the police to afford efficient protection, but if an individual asks for special protection in a particular form, for the special benefit of himself, the police may say: ‘We will give it to you if you pay for it.’ The police are the judges of what is necessary to secure life and property.

The majority concluded that the police authorities have the discretion to determine the appropriate level of protection required to fulfil their duty. If a party requests and agrees to pay for a level of protection exceeding what the police, in their professional judgment, deem sufficient, then the police are providing a special service for which they are entitled to charge. The provision of this extra service constitutes valid consideration for the promise to pay.

Dissenting Opinion

Lord Carson and Lord Blanesburgh dissented. They argued that it was the absolute public duty of the police to provide all necessary protection to life and property, and the nature of that protection could not be the subject of a commercial bargain. Lord Carson expressed concern over the public policy implications:

I cannot myself see how it can be permissible for a police officer to say ‘I do not think a garrison is necessary, and I am not prepared to recommend the stationing of a police garrison in the colliery, but I will do so if you pay me so much a day.’ Such a position would, in my opinion, be subversive of the whole public welfare.

The dissenters’ view was that if the garrison was necessary, the police had a duty to provide it without charge. If it was not necessary, they should not have provided it at all.

Implications

The decision in Glasbrook Brothers is a landmark case in the English law of contract concerning consideration. It established the principle that while the performance of an existing public duty is not good consideration, doing something *more* than that duty requires can amount to good consideration. The case confirms that public authorities, such as the police, have the discretion to define the scope of their public duty and can legitimately charge for ‘special services’ that go beyond it, particularly when those services are provided at the specific request of a private party. This principle has had lasting implications for the policing of private events like football matches, concerts, and festivals, where organisers are often required to pay for a dedicated police presence.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the judgment of the trial judge in favour of the Glamorgan County Council was restored, confirming Glasbrook Brothers Ltd’s liability to pay for the police services.

Source: Glamorgan CC v Glasbrook Bros Ltd [1924] UKHL 3 (19 December 1924)