Burden of proof CASES
In English law, the burden of proof refers to the obligation placed upon a party in legal proceedings to prove the facts necessary to establish their claim or defence.
Definition and principles
The burden of proof determines which party must provide evidence to persuade the court that their version of the facts is correct. Generally, the claimant carries the burden to prove their case, although the burden can shift depending on the nature of the allegations and defences involved.
Standard of proof
The standard required varies according to the type of case:
- Civil cases: The claimant must prove their case on the balance of probabilities, meaning it is more likely than not (over 50%) that their claim is true.
- Criminal cases: The prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, a much higher threshold to protect against wrongful conviction.
Shifting burden
In some circumstances, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant, who must demonstrate specific defences or counterclaims. This occurs notably in cases involving allegations of duress or undue influence.
Case example: Barton v Armstrong (1973)
In Barton v Armstrong, the Privy Council examined duress in contract law, holding that once the claimant showed threats had been made, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove the threats did not induce the contract. The case highlights the complexities and practical implications of burden shifting.
Consequences of failure
If the party bearing the burden of proof fails to meet the required standard, their claim or defence typically fails, emphasising the critical role that burden of proof plays in litigation outcomes.
Criticism and practical application
Critics argue the shifting nature of burdens can introduce uncertainty. Courts thus approach burden-shifting cautiously, ensuring fairness and balance in legal proceedings.
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A customs officer was injured by falling bags of sugar at the defendant's warehouse. The court held that the incident itself was sufficient evidence of negligence, establishing the legal principle of 'res ipsa loquitur' (the thing speaks for itself). Facts The claimant, Mr Scott, was a customs officer. While on duty, he was lawfully present on the premises of the London and St Katherine Docks Company. As he was passing the entrance to one of the defendant’s warehouses, six heavy bags of sugar, which were being handled by the defendant’s employees using a crane, fell and struck him. The claimant
A steel erector died after falling 70 feet. His employer breached its statutory duty by not providing a safety belt. However, the employer was not held liable as evidence showed the deceased would not have worn a belt anyway, thus breaking the causal link. Facts The case concerned a fatal accident involving an experienced steel erector, Hugh McWilliams, who fell 70 feet to his death while working for the defenders, Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd, on the construction of the Forth Road Bridge. The defenders were in breach of Regulation 94 of the Building (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations,
A barge owner negligently misrepresented the vessel's capacity to a hirer, relying on memory of the Lloyd's Register instead of the ship's official documents. The Court of Appeal held this failed the Misrepresentation Act 1967's requirement of 'reasonable grounds' for belief. Facts A. Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd (‘Ogden’) required barges to dispose of excavated clay at sea. They entered into negotiations to hire two German-built barges from Howard Marine and Dredging Co. Ltd (‘Howard Marine’). During these negotiations, Ogden’s manager asked for the deadweight capacity of the barges. Howard Marine’s manager, Mr Howlett, stated their capacity was 1,600 tonnes.
Facts Mr Barton was the managing director of a company, and Mr Armstrong was its chairman. Following a power struggle, Barton agreed to buy Armstrong’s shares in the company through the execution of several deeds. Barton subsequently sought a declaration that these deeds were void, alleging that he had been coerced into signing them by Armstrong’s threats to have him murdered. The trial judge found that Armstrong had indeed made death threats and that Barton had taken them seriously. However, the trial judge also found that Barton had entered into the agreement for what were considered sound business reasons, primarily
