Scott v London and St Katherine’s Docks [1865] EngR 220

A customs officer walking lawfully between warehouses in London docks was struck by six falling bags of sugar. The Exchequer Chamber held such an unexplained accident, where the docks were under the defendants’ control, was reasonable evidence of negligence, articulating the principle that the accident itself can prove fault.

Facts

The plaintiff, Scott, was an officer of the Customs, described as an auxiliary examiner who supervised the weighing of goods. On 19 January he had been performing duty at the East Quay of the London Docks and was directed by the surveyor, Mr Lilley, to proceed to the Spirit Quay to carry out further duty.

At Spirit Quay there were warehouses. The plaintiff went to the entrance of one warehouse to find Mr Lilley but was told he was in another warehouse. As he moved between the doorways on the quay, six bags of sugar suddenly fell upon him from above, causing serious injuries. There was no barrier, fence or warning.

I am an officer of the Customs. I am an auxiliary examiner. I superintend weighing goods. On the 19th of January I had performed duty at the East Quay of the London Docks. I was directed to go from the East Quay to the Spirit Quay by Mr. Lilley, the surveyor. I went to the Spirit Quay in order to do duty. I proceeded on my way. There are warehouses on the Spirit Quay. I went to the entrance of one of the warehouses, and could not find Mr. Lilley. I was told he was in another warehouse. I was proceeding to where I was told he was at the time of the accident. I proceeded to the first door I met upon the quay. I went into the warehouse of which it was the door. I met a labouring man about two yards within the warehouse. I asked him if Mr. Lilley was there. He said, “No, sir; you will find him in the next doorway.” In passing from one doorway to the other I was felled to the ground by six bags of sugar falling upon me. (He then described the injuries he received.) No one but myself was at the place. I had no warning. There was no fence or barrier. No one called out. I heard the rattling of a chain.

The declaration alleged that the defendants were possessed of a warehouse and of a crane or machine for lowering goods from it, and that their servants negligently lowered bags of sugar from the warehouse so that they fell on the plaintiff as he lawfully passed along the stone pavement in the docks.

The defendants pleaded not guilty. At the trial before Martin B., the judge took the view that, even assuming the bags were being dealt with by the defendants’ servants in the course of their employment and that the plaintiff was lawfully present, there was insufficient evidence of negligence to leave to the jury. He therefore directed a verdict for the defendants.

Issues

1. Whether there was evidence of negligence fit to be left to the jury

The central issue was whether the mere fact that bags of sugar fell on the plaintiff from a warehouse under the defendants’ control was reasonable evidence of negligence by the defendants or their servants, sufficient to justify leaving the matter to a jury.

The defendants argued that the accident occurred within a private dock, not a public highway, and that the public had no right to walk in front of the warehouses. They contended that the facts were as consistent with the absence of negligence as with its presence, and possibly consistent with contributory negligence by the plaintiff. They relied on authority that a mere scintilla of evidence, or proof only of the occurrence of an accident, was not enough to require submission to a jury.

The plaintiff, through the Solicitor General, accepted that no general rule made every accident evidence of negligence, but maintained that in circumstances like these, where the instrumentalities causing the accident were under the defendants’ management, the occurrence was more consistent with negligence than with due care. Given that the relevant facts were peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendants and their servants, it was argued that the plaintiff had given all that could reasonably be expected of him.

2. The standard for drawing an inference of negligence from the occurrence of an accident

The broader legal issue was what standard should govern when a judge can infer negligence from the very nature and circumstances of an accident, such that a case is properly left to a jury. The Court considered earlier authorities where the happening of specific types of accident (such as the breaking down of a coach or a collision between trains) had been treated as prima facie evidence of negligence.

Judgment

The case came before the Exchequer Chamber as an appeal from a decision of the Court of Exchequer, which had made absolute a rule setting aside the directed verdict for the defendants and ordering a new trial on the basis that there was evidence of negligence fit for a jury.

Field, for the defendants, argued that the facts were equally consistent with proper care or with negligence, and that there was no obligation on the defendants to erect barriers or give warnings; the plaintiff, as a mere licensee, was under a duty to look after his own safety. The Solicitor General argued that the fall of the bags of sugar from the defendants’ warehouse onto a lawful passer-by was itself evidence pointing more strongly to negligence than to due care.

Delivering the statement of the majority’s conclusions, Erle C.J. set out the governing principles:

There must be reasonable evidence of negligence.

But where the thing is shewn to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.

He noted that the whole Court agreed to the principles stated in the authorities cited for the defendants, and that the dispute lay in applying those principles to the judge’s notes of evidence:

We all assent to the principles laid down in the cases cited for the defendants ; but the judgment turns on the construction to be put on the Judge’s notes. As my brother Mellor and myself read them we cannot find that reasonable evidence of negligence which has been apparent to the rest of the Court.

Thus, Crompton J., Byles J., Blackburn J. and Keating J. considered that the plaintiff’s evidence — that six bags of sugar fell on him as he walked lawfully in front of the warehouse, the crane and warehouse being under the defendants’ control, without warning or barrier — constituted reasonable evidence of negligence to go to the jury. Erle C.J. and Mellor J. dissented on the sufficiency of the evidence but accepted the general evidential principle.

The Court ultimately held that the decision of the Court of Exchequer ordering a new trial should stand:

The judgment of the Court below must be affirmed, and the case must go down to a new trial, when the effect of the evidence will in all probability be more correctly ascertained.

Judgment affirmed.

Implications

This case establishes that in actions for personal injury based on negligence, a plaintiff must produce reasonable evidence of negligence before the case can be left to the jury. However, where the instrumentality causing the injury is under the defendant’s management, and the type of accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, it does not occur if proper care is used, the occurrence of the accident itself can amount to reasonable evidence of negligence in the absence of explanation by the defendant.

The report notes that the decision was followed and adopted in subsequent cases, including Briggs v. Oliver, Smith v. Great Eastern Railway, and others, and was distinguished in several later authorities. This demonstrates its continuing influence on the law of evidence in negligence, particularly concerning when courts may infer negligence from the character and circumstances of an accident and require the defendant to provide an explanation.

Verdict: Judgment of the Court of Exchequer affirmed; the rule setting aside the directed verdict for the defendants and ordering a new trial was upheld.

Source: Scott v London and St Katherine’s Docks [1865] EngR 220