Whitehead v Searle [2008] EWCA Civ 1093

A claimant suffered a minor head injury in a car accident, leading to severe depression and suicide. The court held that the suicide did not break the chain of causation as it was a foreseeable consequence of the depression caused by the defendant's negligence.

Facts

The claimant, Mrs Sylvia Whitehead, was a passenger in a car driven by her husband when it was involved in a collision caused by the negligence of the first defendant, Mrs Searle. Mrs Whitehead, then 63, sustained a minor head injury but subsequently developed a profound personality change and severe depression. Approximately three and a half years after the accident, she committed suicide by taking an overdose of co-proxamol tablets. Her son brought a claim on behalf of her estate against the defendant, arguing that her death was a direct consequence of the accident. The trial judge found that while the depression was caused by the accident, Mrs Whitehead’s act of suicide was a voluntary and rational decision, which therefore constituted a novus actus interveniens, breaking the chain of causation.

Issues

The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the deceased’s act of suicide broke the chain of causation between the defendant’s original negligent act and her death. Specifically, the court had to determine whether a suicide committed while suffering from severe depression, caused by the initial tort, could be classified as a novus actus interveniens, absolving the defendant of liability for the death.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal, overturning the trial judge’s decision. The judgment was delivered by Lord Justice Ward, with whom Lord Justices Tuckey and Rix agreed.

Reasoning of the Court

The court’s decision rested heavily on the House of Lords judgment in Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd [2008] UKHL 13, which was delivered after the trial judge’s decision in this case. In Corr, the House of Lords held that a suicide resulting from a depressive illness caused by a tortious injury was not a novus actus interveniens.

Ward LJ explained that Corr established that the crucial factor is whether the tort caused a state of mind, such as depression, which in turn led to the suicide. The test is not whether the final act of suicide was ‘rational’ or ‘sane’. He cited Lord Bingham in Corr, who stated that the deceased’s suicide was not a voluntary, informed decision but the response of a man suffering from a severe depressive illness which impaired his capacity to make reasoned and informed judgments about his future.

Applying this principle, Ward LJ found that the trial judge had erred in law. The judge had found as a fact that Mrs Whitehead was suffering from severe depression as a result of the accident. This finding was the key causal link. Ward LJ stated:

The judge specifically found that her state of mind was that she was severely depressed. In the light of the learning in Corr, that finding, as it seems to me, became the all important one. In my judgment the law is now clear: the finding of severe depression is the link in the chain of causation. The test is not whether that depression is accompanied by a temporary suspension of the power of reason or a temporary inability to make a reasoned choice.

The trial judge had drawn a distinction between a decision made irrationally under compulsion and a ‘calm and rational decision’. Ward LJ held this distinction was no longer legally valid post-Corr:

That is a distinction which, following Corr, can no longer be maintained as a matter of law. Once a state of severe depression is established, the prospect of suicide is foreseeable and the chain of causation remains intact. A choice may be a ‘reasoned’ one from a subjective point of view, but it is a choice made whilst the victim is in the grip of the depression which is a direct consequence of the tortfeasor’s want of care.

Therefore, because the depression was a foreseeable consequence of the injury, and the suicide was a consequence of the depression, the chain of causation was not broken.

Implications

This case affirms and clarifies the principle set down in Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd. It establishes that where a tortfeasor’s negligence causes a victim to suffer a recognised psychiatric illness like severe depression, the tortfeasor will be liable for the victim’s subsequent suicide, even if the act of suicide itself may appear to have been a ‘rational’ or ‘reasoned’ choice made by the victim. The decision significantly narrows the scope for defendants to argue that suicide is a novus actus interveniens in cases where it is linked to a psychiatric condition caused by the original wrong. The key is the causal link between the injury, the resulting psychological condition, and the final act.

Verdict: The appeal was allowed. The court set aside the trial judge’s conclusion that the chain of causation was broken and entered judgment for the claimant.

Source: Whitehead v Searle [2008] EWCA Civ 1093