R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61

Mark Golds killed his partner with a knife and admitted the killing, raising diminished responsibility. The Supreme Court considered the meaning of 'substantially impaired' under section 2 Homicide Act 1957 (as amended), holding it requires significant impairment, not merely more than trivial.

Facts

The appellant, Mark Golds, was convicted of murdering his partner. He admitted the killing, which occurred at their home in front of her young children following a running domestic argument. He inflicted some 22 knife wounds together with blunt impact internal injuries which proved fatal. He had a long history of mental disorder, including outpatient treatment and medication for depression, paranoia and auditory hallucinations.

At trial, the sole issue was whether the partial defence of diminished responsibility under section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 (as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) reduced his liability from murder to manslaughter. Two consultant forensic psychiatrists agreed there was an abnormality of mental functioning arising from a recognised medical condition substantially impairing the relevant abilities, though they disagreed on the precise diagnosis (mixed personality disorder with acute psychotic episode vs paranoid psychotic illness/schizophrenia). There was no contradictory psychiatric evidence.

The trial judge declined to define the word ‘substantially’ for the jury, leaving it as an ordinary English word. The jury convicted of murder.

Issues

The Court of Appeal certified two questions:

(1) Where diminished responsibility is raised, must the court direct the jury as to the definition of ‘substantial’ in section 2(1)(b)?

(2) If so, should it be defined as ‘something more than merely trivial’, or in a way connoting more, such as ‘something whilst short of total impairment that is nevertheless significant and appreciable’?

Arguments

Appellant

Mr Etherington QC submitted that ‘substantially impaired’ meant any impairment that was more than merely trivial. He pointed to the dictionary having two possible meanings of ‘substantial’: (i) having some substance, present rather than illusory, and (ii) important or weighty. He relied on usages such as section 212 of the Equality Act 2010, where ‘substantial’ is statutorily defined as ‘more than minor or trivial’.

Respondent

Mr Perry QC submitted that ‘substantially’ is an ordinary English word incorporating a question of degree, properly left to the jury, and that the established meaning in the diminished responsibility context required impairment of weight or importance, not merely impairment beyond the trivial.

Judgment

Lord Hughes, giving the unanimous judgment, undertook an extensive review of the authorities including R v Spriggs, R v Byrne, R v Seers, R v Simcox, R v Lloyd, R v Egan, R v Gittens, R v Ramchurn, and the Scottish authority Galbraith v HM Advocate.

The Court identified two possible senses of ‘substantial’: (i) present rather than illusory (more than trivial), and (ii) important or weighty. The Court held that in the context of diminished responsibility, the second sense applies. The decision in R v Lloyd had been misread by some later courts and Bench Books; Lloyd itself had rejected the submission that any impairment beyond the trivial sufficed.

The Court held that Parliament, in carrying forward the word ‘substantially’ into the 2009 amendments, must be taken to have adopted the established meaning developed over 50 years. This usage accords with principle, since diminished responsibility effects a radical alteration in the offence of conviction, and reduction to manslaughter should be occasioned by a weighty reason, not one that merely passes the trivial.

On directing the jury, the Court held it is generally unnecessary and unwise to define ‘substantially’. Trial judges should leave the ordinary English word to the jury. However, if the jury has been introduced to the ‘spectrum’ illustration (between trivial and total impairment), or if there is risk of misunderstanding, the judge must make clear that it is not enough that the impairment is merely more than trivial. Acceptable formulations include ‘significant and appreciable’ (provided ‘appreciable’ connotes considerable rather than merely recognisable), ‘a serious degree of impairment’, or ‘something far wrong’.

The Court also considered R v Brennan, endorsing its approach that where uncontradicted psychiatric evidence supports diminished responsibility, the Crown must explain the basis on which it invites the jury to reject the evidence, and the judge should warn the jury against acting as amateur psychiatrists. However, the Court cautioned against readily withdrawing murder from the jury under Galbraith principles given the sensitivity of murder trials and the fact that the burden lies on the defence.

Applying these principles, the debate over the meaning of ‘substantially’ barely arose on the facts. If the appellant was indeed in the grip of a psychotic episode involving persecutory delusions, that would by any ordinary standard involve substantial impairment. The real question was whether on the balance of probabilities he had been so affected. The judge had left the issues squarely to the jury.

Implications

The decision clarifies that ‘substantially impaired’ in section 2(1)(b) of the Homicide Act 1957 (as amended) means impairment of importance or weight, not merely impairment beyond the trivial. This authoritative resolution corrects a misreading that had developed in the Crown Court Bench Books and certain authorities.

Practical guidance is given for trial judges: ordinarily, no further definition of ‘substantially’ is required; the word should be left as an ordinary English word imparting a question of degree. The ‘spectrum’ illustration may be used but must be coupled with a clear statement that impairment beyond the trivial is not sufficient.

The decision matters to trial judges, prosecutors, defence counsel, and forensic psychiatrists who use the term in reports. Psychiatrists are now to be taken to use ‘substantially’ in the second (weighty) sense identified by the Court.

The decision also offers important guidance on the relationship between expert evidence and the jury’s role in diminished responsibility trials: where psychiatric evidence is uncontradicted, the Crown must articulate a rational basis for rejecting it, and the jury should be warned against speculating as amateur psychiatrists. Withdrawal of murder from a jury under Galbraith in this context should be approached with particular caution given the sensitivity of murder trials and the reverse burden of proof.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The conviction for murder was upheld.

Source: R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61