R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292

Huda Ammori, co-founder of Palestine Action, challenged the Home Secretary's decision to proscribe the group under the Terrorism Act 2000. The High Court found the decision unlawful for breaching the Home Secretary's own policy and disproportionately interfering with Convention rights under Articles 10 and 11.

Facts

On 5 July 2025, the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025 came into force, adding Palestine Action to the list of proscribed organisations under Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The decision to proscribe was made by the Home Secretary on 20 June 2025, following the attack on RAF Brize Norton. Palestine Action was founded in 2020 as a direct action protest group targeting Elbit Systems UK Limited and associated businesses, with the objective of disrupting Israel’s arms trade in Britain.

The Home Secretary’s decision followed a process commencing in late 2024, involving assessments by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP), and the Proscription Review Group (PRG). JTAC concluded that Palestine Action met the statutory test as an organisation concerned in terrorism, relying on three incidents (Thales in Glasgow 2022, Instro Precision in Kent 2024, and Elbit in Bristol 2024) assessed as amounting to terrorism within section 1 of the 2000 Act, the publication of the “Underground Manual”, and Palestine Action’s promotion of its attacks.

The claimant, Huda Ammori, a co-founder of Palestine Action, challenged the decision on four grounds after permission was granted by Chamberlain J and the Court of Appeal.

Issues

The four grounds on which permission was granted were:

• Ground 8: Whether the Home Secretary was required, at common law, to give Palestine Action notice and an opportunity to make representations before proscription.
• Ground 5: Whether the Home Secretary failed to have regard to relevant considerations.
• Ground 6: Whether the decision breached the Home Secretary’s own published policy on the exercise of the discretion to proscribe.
• Ground 2: Whether proscription was incompatible with Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (via section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998).

Arguments

Claimant

The claimant argued that fairness at common law required prior notice and consultation (relying on Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No.2) [2013] UKSC 39). She submitted that relevant considerations were disregarded, including Palestine Action’s objectives of preventing alleged genocide, the availability of alternative measures, and the wider impact on freedom of expression. She contended that the Home Secretary failed to apply the statutory policy properly, that proscription was disproportionate under the Bank Mellat four-step analysis, and that it discriminated contrary to Article 14. She characterised Palestine Action as a non-violent protest group in the tradition of civil disobedience.

Defendant

The Home Secretary argued no duty of prior consultation arose, relying on Begum v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 152. She submitted the policy was properly applied, that Article 17 of the Convention precluded reliance on Articles 10 and 11 for support of a proscribed organisation, and that any interference was proportionate in pursuit of national security and the protection of the rights of others. The Home Secretary also invoked section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

Judgment

Ground 8 (Procedural Fairness) — Dismissed

The court rejected the claim that fairness required prior notice. Distinguishing Bank Mellat, the court emphasised the national security context, the broad definition of “organisation”, practical difficulties in identifying those to consult, and the risk of pre-emptive action. The procedural requirements on the face of Part II of the 2000 Act were sufficient.

Ground 5 (Relevant Considerations) — Dismissed

The court found that the Home Secretary was well aware of Palestine Action’s justifications, and the remaining parts collapsed into Grounds 2 and 6.

Ground 6 (Breach of Policy) — Upheld

The court held that the Home Secretary’s policy on the exercise of discretion required a qualitative assessment of whether proscription was proportionate given the nature and scale of an organisation’s terrorism-related activities. The Home Secretary erred by treating the “operational advantages” of proscription (the additional criminal offences and evidential presumptions arising from proscription) as a key consideration favouring proscription. Such advantages applied to any organisation meeting the concerned in terrorism threshold and were therefore inconsistent with the policy’s purpose of limiting use of the discretion. This was not a peripheral factor but central to the reasoning.

Ground 2 (Convention Rights) — Upheld

The court rejected the Home Secretary’s reliance on Article 17 of the Convention, finding it could not be used circularly based on the disputed proscription itself. The court accepted the significant interference with Articles 10 and 11 but found that some aspects of the claimant’s evidence overstated the impact. The court rejected arguments that Palestine Action was a non-violent civil disobedience organisation, noting the Underground Manual’s encouragement of serious property damage.

Applying the four-step Bank Mellat proportionality analysis, the court accepted the legitimate aims and rational connection, and rejected the suggested less intrusive alternatives. However, at the fair balance stage, the court held that “the nature and scale of Palestine Action’s activities, so far as they comprise acts of terrorism, has not yet reached the level, scale and persistence that would justify the application of the criminal law measures that are the consequence of proscription, and the very significant interference with Convention rights consequent on those measures.” Conventional criminal offences with severe maximum sentences were available to address Palestine Action’s conduct. Because Ground 6 succeeded, the interference was also not “prescribed by law”.

The Article 14 claim was rejected: comparator organisations had not been shown to engage in terrorism-defined conduct, and there was no evidence of differential treatment based on race or national origin.

Section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981

The court refused to withhold relief, finding the error on Ground 6 significant and that it could not be said that the same decision would have been reached without it.

Implications

The judgment clarifies several aspects of the proscription power under the Terrorism Act 2000. First, it confirms that there is no common law duty of prior consultation before proscription, given the national security context and the statutory scheme. Secondly, it reinforces that the Home Secretary’s long-standing discretionary policy operates as a qualitative filter and must be applied consistently with its purpose of limiting the use of proscription. The “operational benefits” of proscription cannot themselves justify exercise of the discretion, as these would apply to any organisation meeting the statutory threshold.

Thirdly, the judgment addresses the proportionality of proscription under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, holding that where an organisation’s terrorism-defined activities are small in number and existing criminal offences carry significant maximum penalties, proscription may be disproportionate. The court emphasised that proscription is specifically designed to eliminate an organisation, resulting in particularly significant interference with rights of association.

The decision is important for how the state responds to protest groups whose activities include serious criminality but whose acts meeting the definition of terrorism are limited in number. It also clarifies that Article 17 of the Convention cannot be used in a self-referential manner to remove Convention protection simply because of the proscription decision under challenge.

The court proposed to quash the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action, subject to further representations on relief. The strength of the case for proscription may need further consideration by the Home Secretary.

Verdict: The claim was allowed in part. Grounds 5 and 8 were dismissed; Grounds 6 and 2 succeeded. The court proposed to make an order quashing the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action, subject to further representations on relief.

Source: R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292