McLeod v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1994] EWCA Civ 2

Police officers accompanied Mrs McLeod's ex-husband to collect property from her home following divorce proceedings. Mrs McLeod sued the police for trespass, arguing they had no right to enter. The Court of Appeal held police may enter private premises to prevent an anticipated breach of the peace.

Facts

Mrs Sally McLeod and Mr Ian McLeod divorced in 1988. Following property proceedings, a County Court order required Mrs McLeod to deliver specified property to her ex-husband by 6th October 1989. On 3rd October 1989, Mr McLeod attended Mrs McLeod’s property at 96 Berkeley Avenue with family members to collect the items. His solicitors had arranged for two police officers (PC White and PC Strevett) to attend. Mrs McLeod was not at home; only her elderly mother Mrs Mealing was present. The property was removed in two van loads. When Mrs McLeod returned home, she was very angry but PC White insisted Mr McLeod be allowed to leave with the property.

Related Proceedings

Mrs McLeod brought criminal proceedings against Mr McLeod and his family for theft (dismissed), and civil proceedings against the solicitors and Mr McLeod’s party for trespass (successful, with damages awarded). This action was against the Metropolitan Police Commissioner for trespass to land, trespass to goods, and breach of duty.

Issues

1. In what circumstances may police officers enter private premises to prevent a breach of the peace?

2. Did such circumstances exist in this case to justify the officers’ entry?

Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mrs McLeod’s appeal, holding that the police officers had lawful justification for entering the premises.

The Common Law Power of Entry

Lord Justice Neill examined section 17 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, noting that section 17(6) preserved the common law power of entry to deal with or prevent a breach of the peace. Referring to Thomas v Sawkins [1935] 2 KB 249, Lord Hewart CJ had stated:

“I think that there is quite sufficient ground for the proposition that it is part of the preventive power, and, therefore, part of the preventive duty, of the police, in cases where there are such reasonable grounds of apprehension as the justices have found here, to enter and remain on private premises.”

Neill LJ concluded:

“I am satisfied that Parliament in section 17(6) has now recognised that there is a power to enter premises to prevent a breach of the peace as a form of preventive justice. I can see no satisfactory basis for restricting that power to particular classes of premises such as those where public meetings are held. If the police reasonably believe that a breach of the peace is likely to take place on private premises, they have power to enter those premises to prevent it.”

Exercise of the Power

Neill LJ emphasised the need for caution:

“It seems to me it is important that when exercising his power to prevent a breach of the peace a police officer should act with great care and discretion; this will be particularly important where the exercise of his power involves entering on private premises contrary to the wishes of the owners or occupiers. The officer must satisfy himself that there is a real and imminent risk of a breach of the peace.”

Application to the Facts

The trial judge had found the police officers attended to prevent a breach of the peace and reasonably concluded there was danger of such a breach. The officers had been informed by a solicitor that trouble might occur, and PC White’s experience indicated breaches of the peace did occur at such events.

Implications

This case confirms that police officers have a common law power, preserved by section 17(6) of PACE 1984, to enter private premises without consent where they reasonably apprehend a breach of the peace is imminent. The power is not limited to public meetings but extends to private dwellings. However, officers must exercise this power with great care and discretion, ensuring there is a genuine and imminent risk. The decision has significant implications for the balance between police powers and the right to privacy in one’s home.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The police officers had lawful justification for entering Mrs McLeod’s property as they reasonably apprehended a breach of the peace might occur. Mrs McLeod’s claims for trespass to land, trespass to goods, and breach of duty against the Commissioner of Police failed.

Source: McLeod v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1994] EWCA Civ 2