Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17 (20 March 2013)

A former employee engaged in a prolonged campaign of correspondence against his ex-employer, alleging criminality. He claimed this was for the purpose of detecting crime. The Supreme Court held this statutory defence to harassment requires the conduct to be rationally connected to the purpose.

Facts

The respondent, Mr Willoughby, was a former employee of the appellant, Mr Hayes. Following the end of his employment, Mr Willoughby embarked upon a persistent campaign against Mr Hayes, alleging significant financial misconduct, including tax evasion and fraud. Over several years, Mr Willoughby sent a large volume of correspondence containing these allegations not only to Mr Hayes but also to his family, business associates, professional regulators (such as the Financial Services Authority) and government bodies (including HM Revenue and Customs). Mr Hayes brought a claim against Mr Willoughby for harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

Issues

Mr Willoughby relied on the defence provided by section 1(3)(a) of the 1997 Act, which states that a course of conduct does not amount to harassment if it was ‘pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime’. The central legal issue before the Supreme Court was the proper construction of this defence. Specifically, the court had to determine whether it was sufficient for the defendant to have a genuine subjective belief that their conduct was for the stated purpose, or whether the law imposed an additional requirement of rationality. The Court of Appeal had found that the test was purely subjective.

Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal, with Lord Sumption delivering the sole judgment. The court held that the defence under section 1(3)(a) is not satisfied by a defendant’s purely subjective belief. The conduct must be rationally connected to the stated purpose of preventing or detecting crime.

Reasoning of the Court

Lord Sumption analysed the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘for the purpose of’, concluding that it implies a rational link between the means (the conduct) and the end (the purpose). He stated:

The phrase ‘for the purpose of’ connotes a rational connection between the purpose and the conduct. A person who pours petrol over a house and sets it on fire for the purpose of burning it down is acting rationally. A person who does the same for the purpose of subduing a wasps’ nest is not. The latter may genuinely believe that his action is a means of achieving its objective. But he is not acting for that purpose, because it is an irrational, and therefore in law a different, one.

The court distinguished between the concepts of ‘rationality’ and ‘reasonableness’. Rationality was held to be a less demanding standard, focused on the internal logic and good faith of the defendant’s mental processes, rather than the objective reasonableness of the outcome.

Rationality is not the same as reasonableness. Reasonableness is an external, objective standard applied to the outcome of a person’s thoughts or intentions… Rationality, by comparison, is concerned with the internal coherence of a person’s mental processes.

Applying this test, Lord Sumption found that Mr Willoughby’s conduct fell well short of the standard of rationality. The trial judge had found that the campaign was an ‘obsessive and relentless’ vendetta. The evidence did not rationally support the extreme allegations, and the manner in which they were pursued was oppressive and disconnected from any genuine attempt to detect crime.

Mr Willoughby’s campaign against Mr Hayes was not, on the judge’s findings, rationally connected with the prevention or detection of crime. He was not seeking to prevent crime, which was well in the past. He was not seeking to detect it, because he had no interest in collecting evidence which might point away from his theory. He was seeking to get his own back.

Implications

This decision is significant for clarifying the scope of the statutory defences to harassment under the 1997 Act. By introducing a ‘rationality’ test for the section 1(3)(a) defence, the Supreme Court has placed a crucial limit on its use. It prevents the defence from being used as a charter for individuals pursuing obsessive vendettas or personal grievances, even if they subjectively convince themselves they are acting to uncover crime. The judgment strikes a balance between protecting individuals from harassment and allowing for legitimate whistleblowing or crime detection activities, ensuring the latter are based on some logical foundation.

Verdict: The appeal was allowed. The injunction granted at first instance was restored.

Source: Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17 (20 March 2013)