Littlewoods overpaid VAT to HMRC over decades due to a mistake of law. HMRC repaid the principal and simple interest totalling £268m, but Littlewoods sought £1.25bn in compound interest at common law. The Supreme Court rejected the claim, holding it was statutorily excluded and not required by EU law.
Facts
Littlewoods operated catalogue sales businesses and, between 1973 and 2004, mistakenly accounted for VAT on agents’ commission paid in kind on the basis that the taxable supplies were reduced by only 2.5% rather than the full 12.5%. As a result, they overpaid VAT to HMRC. Between 2002 and 2004 Littlewoods claimed repayment under section 80 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994. HMRC conceded the overpayment in 2004 and, between 2005 and 2008, repaid £205m of principal plus £268m in simple interest under section 78 of the 1994 Act.
Littlewoods then brought proceedings seeking an additional £1.25 billion in compound interest at common law, relying on unjust enrichment principles established in Sempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Comrs. The sums involved were enormous because, applying section 32(1)(c) of the Limitation Act 1980, the period over which interest could be compounded stretched back over 40 years. Some 5,000 similar claims were stayed pending the outcome, with HMRC estimating total VAT exposure at £17 billion.
Issues
Two principal issues fell for determination:
- Whether Littlewoods’ common law claims for compound interest were excluded by sections 78 and 80 of the 1994 Act as a matter of English statutory construction.
- If excluded, whether that exclusion was contrary to EU law, in particular the requirement identified by the CJEU (Case C-591/10) that taxpayers receive an “adequate indemnity” for VAT levied in breach of EU law.
Arguments
Littlewoods argued that the qualifying words in section 78(1) (“if and to the extent that they would not be liable to do so apart from this section”) preserved any other liability to pay interest, including common law restitutionary claims for the use value of money under Sempra Metals. They further argued that EU law required full reimbursement of the use value of overpaid tax, which simple interest could not provide; expert evidence from Professor John Kay suggested simple interest reimbursed only around 24% of their loss.
HMRC contended that sections 78 and 80 created an exhaustive statutory regime excluding common law claims, and that the CJEU’s judgment did not require full compensation for the time value of money, only reasonable redress.
Judgment
Issue 1: Statutory exclusion
The Supreme Court (Lord Reed and Lord Hodge giving the leading judgment, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke and Lord Carnwath agreed) held that section 78 impliedly excludes common law claims for interest. The Court reasoned that section 78 contains a series of limitations—the requirement of official error in subsection (1), the prescribed rate of simple interest in subsection (3), and the short limitation period in subsection (11)—which would all be rendered pointless if concurrent common law claims for compound interest were available. The literal reading of the qualifying words would render section 78 “a dead letter”.
Applying the interpretive approach in R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health and Royal College of Nursing v DHSS, the Court held that the reservation in section 78(1) must be read as referring only to other statutory liabilities to pay interest (such as under section 85A of the 1994 Act or section 35A of the Senior Courts Act 1981), not to common law claims. This conclusion was reinforced by section 80(7) and the reasoning in Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs Comrs.
Issue 2: Compatibility with EU law
The Court departed from the interpretation of the CJEU’s judgment adopted by Henderson J and the Court of Appeal. The phrase “an adequate indemnity” in paragraph 29 of the CJEU’s judgment did not require full reimbursement of the use value of money. Rather, it conferred on member states a discretion to provide reasonable redress, subject to the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.
Three reasons supported this conclusion: (i) the structure of the CJEU’s judgment, particularly paragraph 30, in which the Court noted that interest already paid exceeded the principal by more than 23%, indicated that simple interest could constitute reasonable redress; (ii) the widespread practice among 12 of 13 surveyed EU member states of paying simple interest on overpaid tax; and (iii) prior and subsequent CJEU case law (including Metallgesellschaft, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, Irimie, and Wortmann) consistently treated the rate and method of calculating interest as matters for national law, without imposing a requirement of full compensation for the time value of money.
The Court distinguished Marshall (No 2), holding that its references to “adequate” compensation concerned the principal sum of compensation for sex discrimination, not the calculation of interest. The simple interest already paid, exceeding the principal by 25%, constituted an adequate indemnity. No further reference to the CJEU was necessary.
Implications
The decision has substantial practical consequences. It eliminates exposure estimated at £17 billion across approximately 5,000 stayed claims relating to VAT and other taxes. Taxpayers who have overpaid VAT are confined to the statutory remedies provided by sections 78 and 80 of the 1994 Act and cannot pursue parallel common law claims for compound interest based on Sempra Metals.
The case clarifies that where Parliament has created a comprehensive statutory regime for the recovery of overpaid tax, with deliberate limitations on time and remedy designed to protect public finances, that regime will be construed as excluding concurrent common law remedies by implication, even in the absence of express exclusion. The reasoning extends and reinforces the approach taken in Investment Trust Companies.
On EU law, the judgment provides a careful re-reading of the CJEU’s “adequate indemnity” formulation, confirming that member states retain significant discretion as to the rate and method of calculating interest on tax unduly levied. Simple interest can suffice where it represents reasonable redress, particularly where the aggregate of interest already paid is substantial relative to the principal. The decision is significant for revenue authorities across the EU and for the limits of EU-law-based remedies in domestic tax recovery proceedings.
Verdict: The Supreme Court dismissed Littlewoods’ cross-appeal on issue 1 and allowed HMRC’s appeal on issue 2. Littlewoods’ common law claims for compound interest were held to be excluded by sections 78 and 80 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994, and that exclusion was not contrary to EU law. The simple interest already paid (exceeding the principal by 25%) constituted an adequate indemnity.
Source: Littlewoods Ltd and others v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2017] UKSC 70
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To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'Littlewoods Ltd and others v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2017] UKSC 70' (LawCases.net, May 2026) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/littlewoods-ltd-and-others-v-commissioners-for-her-majestys-revenue-and-customs-2017-uksc-70/> accessed 21 May 2026


