Re W [2013] EWHC 1957 (Fam)

A local authority sought permission to invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to revoke a 2004 adoption order after the adoptive parents rejected the twelve-year-old child. Bodey J refused permission, holding revocation was unlikely and would cause further harm.

Facts

G, a girl aged twelve and a half, was adopted by Mr and Mrs Y in or about 2004 when she was four. Shortly afterwards, in 2005, the adoptive parents separated. G remained with Mrs Y and her two adoptive brothers. The adoption proved unsuccessful; the adopters reported a range of difficult behaviours including soiling, hoarding food, sexualised behaviour and poor hygiene. Despite involvement from CAMHS and Social Services, Mr and Mrs Y felt they had ‘nothing left to give’ and, in November 2012, consented to G being placed with foster carers, where she is now thriving.

In the care proceedings, Mr and Mrs Y conceded threshold, accepting they had abandoned G’s care to the local authority. They now want no contact with G. G, however, still feels attachment to them and wrote to the court saying she missed them and did not understand why they did not want to see her, though she felt loved with her foster carers.

The local authority applied for permission to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to seek revocation of the adoption order, relying on informal advice from a consultant child and adolescent psychiatrist, Professor Z, who indicated that severing all ties with the Y family would be in G’s best interests. The application was supported by Mrs Y, not opposed by Mr Y, and supported by the Children’s Guardian.

Issues

The central issue was whether the court should grant permission to invoke the inherent jurisdiction with a view to revoking the adoption order, given that the statutory ground for revocation under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 was inapplicable, and that the inherent jurisdiction may only be used in exceptional circumstances.

Arguments

The local authority, supported by the Children’s Guardian, argued that the rejection of G by the Y family was causing a unique form of significant emotional and psychological harm, and that revocation would enable her to make a ‘fresh start’. They relied on the informal opinion of Professor Z. Additional grounds concerning potential misuse of parental responsibility by Mr and Mrs Y were advanced, though the judge rejected these as insufficient even to establish a prima facie case.

The Children’s Guardian submitted that it would be inconceivable to proceed with a revocation application without giving notice to the natural family.

Judgment

Bodey J refused permission to invoke the inherent jurisdiction. He reaffirmed that the inherent jurisdiction can only be used to revoke an adoption in highly exceptional circumstances, citing Swinton Thomas LJ in Re B (Adoption Order: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] Fam 239:

To allow considerations such as those put forward in this case to invalidate an otherwise properly made Adoption Order would in my view undermine the whole basis on which Adoption Orders are made, namely that they are final and for life, as regards the adopters, the natural parents and the child. In my judgment, counsel is right when he submits that it will gravely damage the lifelong commitment of adopters to their adoptive children if there is a possibility of the child, or indeed the parents, subsequently challenging the validity of the Order.

He also cited Wall LJ in Re W: Webster & Anor v Norfolk County Council [2009] EWCA Civ 59:

Adoption is statutory process; the law relating to it is very clear. The scope for the exercise of judicial discretion is severely curtailed. Once Orders for Adoption have been lawfully and properly made, it is only in highly exceptional and very particular circumstances that the court will permit them to be set aside.

The judge noted that revocation would, as Thorpe LJ observed in Re W (A Child) [2010] EWCA Civ 1535:

The consequence of setting aside an Adoption Order seems to me self-evidently a reversion in law to the status quo ante.

This meant the natural parents would regain parental responsibility on revocation, making it almost impossible to proceed without giving them an opportunity to be heard. Enquiries showed the natural father was a Schedule 1 offender of unknown whereabouts, and the natural mother was herself experiencing significant stressors and unable to care for one of her other children in care.

Weighing the advantages and disadvantages, Bodey J considered that although there was a possibility revocation could provide G with a fresh start, this had to be balanced against the finality principle of adoption, the risk of further litigation (such as contact applications from birth family), the distress of serving the birth family, the further professional assessments G would face, the risk she might feel ‘doubly rejected’, and considerable public expense. He described the process as ‘a Pandora’s box’ and concluded that it was far less likely than likely that a revocation order would ultimately be made. The application failed to meet the thresholds of being proportionate, necessary and reasonably likely to succeed.

The judge was satisfied that G was thriving in foster care and that, with age-appropriate explanation from her social worker, she would likely settle in her new environment once the litigation was withdrawn from her life. He made a final care order in the ongoing care proceedings.

Implications

The decision reinforces the established principle that adoption orders are intended to be final and for life, and that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court will only be deployed to revoke an adoption in highly exceptional circumstances. Bodey J’s analysis demonstrates that even where adoptive parents themselves support revocation, and where the child has suffered emotional harm through adoption breakdown, this will not necessarily suffice to justify permission to invoke the jurisdiction.

The judgment highlights the practical hurdles in such applications: the revival of parental responsibility in the natural parents on revocation, the consequent need to serve and hear from the birth family, and the attendant risks to the child of further assessments, representation issues, and possible consequent litigation such as contact disputes. Bodey J’s formulation that such an application must be ‘proportionate, necessary and reasonably likely to be ultimately successful’ provides a useful practical threshold for local authorities and practitioners considering similar applications.

The case is significant for children’s practitioners, local authorities, and adoption agencies grappling with adoption breakdown, demonstrating that the preferred course where an adoption has failed may be to secure the child’s welfare through care proceedings and permanence in foster care, rather than attempting to unwind the adoption itself. The judgment does not disturb the possibility that, in a truly exceptional case, revocation via the inherent jurisdiction may still be available, but sets a cautious and restrictive approach.

Verdict: Permission to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to seek revocation of the adoption order was refused. A final care order was made in the care proceedings.

IMPORTANT UPDATE : see In the matter of X and Y [2026] UKSC 13

Source: Re W [2013] EWHC 1957 (Fam)