In the matter of X and Y (Children: Adoption Order: Setting Aside) [2026] UKSC 13

The Supreme Court held that the High Court has no inherent (parens patriae) jurisdiction to revoke a validly made adoption order on welfare grounds. AM, adoptive mother of X and Y, sought revocation after both children returned to their natural mother. The appeal was dismissed.

Facts

X and Y were placed for adoption with AM in 2012 following prolonged foster care, and an adoption order was made in May 2013. Contact with their natural mother, BM, was maintained and facilitated by AM. In 2021, both children left AM’s home: Y moved to live with BM, and X later moved to live with her natural father. Care proceedings in 2023 concluded with child arrangements orders reflecting these living arrangements. By the time the matter reached the Supreme Court, X and Y were adults.

AM applied to the High Court in April 2023 to revoke the adoption orders under the inherent (parens patriae) jurisdiction on welfare grounds, supported by BM, X and Y. Lieven J accepted such a jurisdiction existed but held it could not be exercised on welfare grounds alone. The Court of Appeal dismissed AM’s appeal, holding that no first instance jurisdiction existed to set aside a validly made adoption order outside statute.

Issues

The central question was whether the High Court has any jurisdiction, other than by way of appeal, to set aside a validly made adoption order — specifically whether the inherent parens patriae jurisdiction of the High Court permits revocation of an adoption order in exceptional circumstances on welfare grounds.

Arguments

Appellant (AM), supported by BM and Y

Mr Goodwin KC submitted that where an adoption order has been validly made and no appeal is available, there must be a non-statutory route to revocation via the inherent jurisdiction to address highly exceptional welfare needs. It was argued that revocation would correct the “legal fiction” whereby BM, the de facto parent, is not recognised in law as Y’s (and possibly X’s) parent. Reliance was placed on a series of Court of Appeal decisions (Re F, Re M, Re B, Re K, Webster, Re W) and first instance authorities said to recognise such an inherent power.

Respondents and Interveners

The Secretary of State for Education, ALC, CoramBAAF and the ICFLPP argued that any such inherent jurisdiction would impermissibly cut across the comprehensive statutory scheme in the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA 2002), which treats adoption orders as final and permanent save for the narrow legitimation exception in section 55. They emphasised policy considerations favouring finality: the lifelong commitment of adopters, the stability of adoptive placements, and the encouragement of prospective adopters.

Judgment

The Supreme Court (Lord Stephens and Lady Simler, with whom Lord Reed, Lord Sales and Lord Doherty agreed) unanimously dismissed the appeal.

Nature of the parens patriae jurisdiction

The Court traced the parens patriae jurisdiction as an ancient prerogative power of the Crown, now vested in the High Court, to protect those unable to protect themselves. Citing Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508 and Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75, the Court reaffirmed that prerogative powers are displaced where Parliament has occupied the field by statute.

No historical power to reorder parental responsibility

The Court held, first, that the parens patriae jurisdiction has never extended to the reordering of parental responsibility by extinguishing it in one parent and transferring it to another. Adoption is entirely a creature of statute, first enacted in the Adoption of Children Act 1926. Before that Act, no mechanism existed to sever the legal parent-child bond. Accordingly, there is no residual prerogative power to revoke an adoption order and restore parental responsibility to a natural parent.

Protection from harm only

Secondly, where the parens patriae jurisdiction survives, it does so to protect children from significant harm where no adequate statutory mechanism is available. Ample powers exist under the Children Act 1989 to protect adopted children, including re-adoption under section 46(5) ACA 2002.

Statute has occupied the field

Thirdly, the ACA 2002 comprehensively governs adoption and its permanence. Any inherent power to revoke would circumvent the statutory scheme. The Court reviewed the history of adoption legislation, the Hopkinson Report (1921), the Tomlin Report (1925), the Hurst Report, the Houghton Report and the 2000 White Paper, concluding that Parliament has consistently adopted the Tomlin Committee’s view that

“the notion of revocation is inconsistent with the notion of adoption”

save only for the narrow legitimation exception (now section 55 ACA 2002).

The authorities

The Court held that the appellate authorities relied upon by AM (Re F, Re M, Re K, Webster, Re W) concerned applications for permission to appeal out of time on grounds of procedural unfairness, fundamental mistake or breach of natural justice — not the existence of an inherent first instance jurisdiction to revoke valid adoption orders. Re B [1995] Fam 239 was the only appellate case to address the issue directly, and it held there was no such inherent jurisdiction. Swinton Thomas LJ’s observation was endorsed:

“To allow considerations such as those put forward in this case to invalidate an otherwise properly made adoption order would, in my view, undermine the whole basis on which adoption orders are made, namely that they are final and for life as regards the adopters, the natural parents, and the child.”

First instance decisions assuming such a jurisdiction (including Re W (Bodey J) and Re O (Munby P)) reflected a misunderstanding of the appellate authorities.

Human Rights and UNCRC

The Court observed that section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 does not confer jurisdiction the court does not otherwise possess (citing Abbasi v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2025] UKSC 15). The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s suggestion that an extreme Convention-based situation might justify revocation, finding it impossible to envisage such a case given the protective powers available under the Children Act 1989.

Appeals out of time

The Court confirmed that adoption orders are not immune from challenge: appeals out of time remain available where there is an appealable error such as procedural irregularity, breach of natural justice, or fundamental mistake.

Implications

The decision authoritatively settles a long-standing uncertainty in family law: the High Court has no inherent or parens patriae jurisdiction to revoke a validly made adoption order on welfare grounds. The only statutory route to revocation is the legitimation exception in section 55 of the ACA 2002; beyond that, challenges must proceed by way of appeal (including appeals out of time).

The ruling disapproves a line of first instance authority (beginning with Re W [2013] EWHC 1957 (Fam) and continued in Re O [2016] EWHC 2273 (Fam)) which had assumed the existence of such an inherent jurisdiction in highly exceptional cases. The Court identified this as a misreading of the Court of Appeal authorities, which concerned procedural appeals, not substantive revocation.

The decision has significant practical implications for adoptive families, natural families, adopted persons (including adult adopted persons), local authorities, and adoption agencies. It reinforces the lifelong finality of adoption, which the Court considered essential to encouraging prospective adopters, stabilising adoptive placements, and promoting the welfare of adopted children. Adopted children facing breakdown or identity difficulties must be protected through existing Children Act 1989 mechanisms (care orders, special guardianship, child arrangements orders, re-adoption, name changes), not through revocation.

The Court expressly recognised that prospective welfare assessments may turn out to be incorrect, but emphasised that an adopted child stands in the same legal position as a natural child: parenthood cannot be revoked save by a further adoption order. Any change in this position is a matter for Parliament, not the courts. The judgment thus closes off what had been regarded as a narrow judicial safety valve and confirms that reform, if desired, must come from Parliament.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The High Court has no jurisdiction, whether under the inherent (parens patriae) jurisdiction or otherwise, to revoke a validly made adoption order. The only statutory exception is the legitimation exception under section 55 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Challenges to adoption orders must proceed by way of appeal (including, where appropriate, appeals out of time).

Source: In the matter of X and Y (Children: Adoption Order: Setting Aside)