Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) App No 2346/02, 35 EHRR 1 (ECtHR)

Mrs Pretty, suffering from terminal motor neurone disease, sought an undertaking that her husband would not be prosecuted if he assisted her suicide. The European Court of Human Rights held that the UK's prohibition on assisted suicide did not violate Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 or 14 of the Convention, finding the blanket ban justified to protect vulnerable persons.

Facts

Mrs Diane Pretty was a 43-year-old woman suffering from motor neurone disease (MND), a progressive degenerative illness causing severe paralysis. Though mentally competent, she was physically unable to commit suicide without assistance. She wished her husband to help her end her life to avoid the suffering and indignity of her disease’s final stages. Her solicitor requested that the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) undertake not to prosecute her husband under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, which criminalises assisting suicide. The DPP refused. Her judicial review application and subsequent appeals to the Divisional Court and House of Lords were dismissed.

Issues

The applicant alleged violations of Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, arguing that:

Article 2

The right to life includes a right to choose death and to self-determination regarding life and death.

Article 3

The State had a positive obligation to protect her from degrading treatment by allowing assisted suicide.

Article 8

The prohibition interfered with her right to private life and personal autonomy.

Article 9

Her belief in assisted suicide was protected under freedom of conscience.

Article 14

She was discriminated against as a disabled person unable to commit suicide without assistance.

Judgment

Article 2

The Court held that Article 2 protects the right to life and cannot be interpreted as conferring a right to die or to self-determination in choosing death. The Court stated:

“Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather than life.”

Article 3

The Court found that Article 3 imposes primarily a negative obligation on States to refrain from inflicting ill-treatment. The positive obligation invoked would require the State to sanction actions intended to terminate life, which cannot be derived from Article 3.

Article 8

The Court accepted that the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying Article 8 and that the applicant’s situation engaged her private life rights. However, it found the interference justified as necessary in a democratic society. The Court observed:

“The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom. Without in any way negating the principle of sanctity of life protected under the Convention, the Court considers that it is under Article 8 that notions of the quality of life take on significance.”

Nevertheless, the blanket ban was proportionate given the need to protect vulnerable persons from abuse.

Article 9

The Court held that the applicant’s views did not constitute a manifestation of religion or belief within Article 9.

Article 14

The Court found objective and reasonable justification for not distinguishing between those physically capable and incapable of committing suicide, as doing so would undermine protection of life and increase risk of abuse.

Implications

This landmark judgment established that the Convention does not guarantee a right to die or to assisted suicide. States retain a wide margin of appreciation in regulating end-of-life decisions. The ruling affirmed that blanket prohibitions on assisted suicide can be justified to protect vulnerable persons, even where individual applicants may not themselves be vulnerable. The case remains authoritative on the limits of personal autonomy under the Convention when balanced against the protection of life.

Verdict: The Court unanimously declared the application admissible but held that there had been no violation of Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 or 14 of the Convention.

Source: Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) App No 2346/02, 35 EHRR 1 (ECtHR)