Watt v Hertfordshire CC [1954] EWCA Civ 6

A fireman was injured when a heavy jack, hastily loaded unsecured on a lorry during an emergency call to free a trapped woman, shifted and crushed his leg. He sued his employer in negligence. The Court of Appeal held there was no breach of duty, emphasising the higher risks justified in life‑saving emergencies.

Facts

Mr William Frederick Watt was employed in the Fire Service under the control of Hertfordshire County Council and stationed at Watford. On 27 July 1951 an emergency call was received that a woman was trapped under a heavy vehicle approximately 200–300 yards from the fire station.

The officer in charge, Sub‑officer Richards, directed that two teams of men should go to the scene. Anticipating the possible need for lifting equipment, he ordered that a heavy jack capable of raising substantial weights be taken.

The jack belonged to the London Transport Executive and was on loan to the fire service. It weighed between two and three hundredweight and was only rarely needed. The County Council had an Austin vehicle specially fitted to carry this jack, but on that day the Austin was properly out on other service.

The only available vehicle was a Fordson lorry with a flat body, side boards and a tailboard, but with no fixtures, clips or other fittings to secure the jack. The second team, including the plaintiff, lifted the jack onto the lorry and then rode on the back: two men in the front seat and three in the body, with the plaintiff sitting towards the front right of the lorry body. The jack was held manually by other firemen but was not otherwise secured.

As the lorry travelled the short distance to the accident scene, the driver braked suddenly. The unsecured jack moved within the body of the lorry, crushed the plaintiff’s leg and caused serious injury.

The plaintiff alleged that the County Council, as his employer, had been negligent. Particulars included failure to load or secure the jack so that it could not become dislodged, loading it in a way which made it likely to move if the lorry stopped suddenly, permitting the plaintiff to ride in the back with the jack, transporting the jack on a vehicle without securing devices, and failure to provide adequate supervision of the loading.

Mr Justice Barry at first instance dismissed the claim, holding that negligence had not been proved.

Issues

The principal legal issue was whether Hertfordshire County Council, as employer, had breached its duty of care to provide a safe system of work and proper equipment when it allowed the jack to be transported unsecured on the Fordson lorry in the circumstances of an emergency call.

Embedded within this was a broader question: how the standard of reasonable care is to be assessed where dangerous acts are undertaken in the course of emergency, life‑saving operations rather than routine or commercial activity.

Judgment

Lord Justice Singleton

Singleton LJ agreed with the judgment of Barry J and set out the factual background and applicable legal principles. He accepted that fire service work inherently involves risk, but that firemen are entitled to expect that their equipment is as good as reasonable care can secure.

He noted it was not alleged that any individual employee, including the driver or Sub‑officer Richards, had personally driven negligently or given negligent orders. Instead, the case advanced on appeal was that, as the defendants had the jack, they were under a duty to have a vehicle permanently available and properly fitted to carry it, and that in the absence of such a vehicle the jack ought not to have been used or that assistance should have been summoned from St Albans, about seven miles away.

Singleton LJ characterised the call as a genuine emergency involving a woman trapped under a heavy vehicle. The firemen believed they should go promptly and take a lifting jack. He held that it could not be the correct approach to require the officer in charge to delay and call another station for equipment, thereby losing valuable time.

He cited Lord Herschell’s well‑known formulation of the employer’s duty from Smith v Baker & Sons:

“It is quite clear that the contract between employer and employed involves on the part of the former the duty of taking reasonable care to provide proper appliances, and to maintain them in a proper condition, and so to carry on his operations as not to subject those employed by him to unnecessary risk.”

Singleton LJ emphasised that the plaintiff, as a fireman, accepted that his work involved some risk, though counsel argued not this type of risk. Singleton LJ asked what a reasonable man in the position of the station officer would have done. He concluded that a reasonably careful officer would have acted as Sub‑officer Richards did, sending out the available vehicle with the jack for a very short journey to attempt to save life.

He rejected the contention that employers were under a duty to have at all times a specially fitted vehicle at the station or otherwise not to deploy the jack for such a short journey. He relied also on Lord Justice Asquith’s statement in Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd:

“In determining whether a party is negligent, the standard of reasonable care is that which is reasonably to be demanded in the circumstances. A relevant circumstance to take into account may be the importance of the end to be served by behaving in this way or in that. As has often been pointed out, if all the trains in this country were restricted to a speed of five miles an hour, there would be fewer accidents, but our national life would be intolerably slowed down. The purpose to be served, if sufficiently important, justifies the assumption of abnormal risk.”

He held that in this case the purpose was the saving of life, and that, judged in that light, the defendants had not failed in the duty they owed their workmen. The appeal should therefore be dismissed.

Lord Justice Denning

Denning LJ agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. He explained that determining negligence involves balancing the risk against the measures necessary to eliminate it, and that one must also balance the risk against the end to be achieved.

He contrasted a commercial enterprise, where the object is profit, with the human objective of saving life or limb. He indicated that what might be negligent in a non‑emergency commercial setting may not be negligent when life is at stake. He acknowledged that some risks, such as emergency vehicles running red lights, may still be too great to justify, but in this case the risk involved in sending out the lorry with the jack was not so great as to forbid the attempt to save life.

Lord Justice Morris

Morris LJ also agreed that the appeal failed. He described the accident as resulting from a “somewhat unusual concatenation of circumstances”. Calls for the use of the jack were extremely rare and it happened to come when the Austin vehicle, which would normally have carried the jack, was otherwise engaged.

He considered it reasonable for the Austin vehicle to have been used for other purposes and rejected the suggestion that the service should have kept another specially fitted vehicle always available; such provision was not reasonably practicable.

Referring to the evidence of Mr Bottin, Assistant Chief Officer in the London Fire Brigade, he recorded that London operated 29 sets of lifting gear, one per two stations, and that it was not reasonably practicable to adapt all vehicles to carry jacks. He set out part of the questioning:

“Q.—Can you always undertake that that one vehicle will be available for the transport of a jack?

A.—No.

Q.—In your view is it reasonably practicable for a Fire Service to adapt all of its vehicles for the transport of jacks?

A.—No. I would not think it was reasonable.

Q.—You have been a station officer, have you not?

A.—I have.

Q.—Supposing you found yourself in charge of a station, and supposing the equipment available was not that most suitable for the purpose but you found that human life was in danger and you might save it by adopting a method not entirely suitable, what in your view would be your duty as a station officer?

A.—I have had that experience, and I did not hesitate to get the equipment there as quickly as possible.”

Morris LJ considered that Mr Richards had acted in accordance with the traditions of the fire service by taking steps to get the equipment to the scene as quickly as possible. He could not accept that the employers had failed in their duty.

Implications

This decision confirms that the standard of reasonable care in negligence is context‑sensitive. Where emergency, life‑saving operations are involved, the courts will allow a greater degree of risk than in ordinary commercial activities. Employers must still take reasonable care, but the assessment of what is “reasonable” includes the urgency and importance of the purpose being pursued.

The case is a leading authority on balancing risk against the social value of the activity, particularly in the context of public services such as the fire brigade. It demonstrates that an employer’s duty to provide safe equipment and a safe system of work does not impose absolute obligations, especially when quick decisions must be taken in rare and urgent circumstances, and that employees in inherently dangerous public services are taken to accept certain risks which are inseparable from the emergency nature of their work.

Procedurally, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declined to disturb the first‑instance finding of no negligence, and refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed; judgment for Hertfordshire County Council, with no finding of negligence in relation to the plaintiff’s injuries, and leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused.

Source: Watt v Hertfordshire CC [1954] EWCA Civ 6