Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1946] UKHL 2

During wartime, a Ministry inspector was injured by an explosion in a munitions factory operated by contractors. She alleged strict liability without negligence under Rylands v Fletcher. The House of Lords held there is no such liability absent escape from the occupier’s land.

Facts

The Ministry of Supply owned the Elstow Ordnance Factory. Under an agreement dated 26 January 1942, the respondents, J Lyons & Co Ltd, undertook the operation, management and control of the factory as agents for the Ministry, carrying on the business of filling shell-cases with high explosives.

The appellant, Read, was an employee of the Ministry as an inspector. She was required, following directions from the Labour Exchange, to work at the factory, despite her personal preference otherwise. Her duties as an inspector of shell-filling required her to be present in the shell-filling shop.

On 31 August 1942, while lawfully in the shop in the course of her duties, an explosion occurred. A man was killed and the appellant and others were injured. No negligence was averred or proved against the respondents. At trial, Cassels J nevertheless held the respondents liable, treating the case as governed by Rylands v Fletcher and the House of Lords decision in Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano Co, on the basis that the respondents were engaged in an ultra-hazardous activity giving rise to “strict liability”.

The Court of Appeal (Scott, MacKinnon and du Parcq LJJ) reversed that decision, holding that, absent proof of negligence, a person injured while on the premises had no cause of action, and that the doctrine associated with Rylands v Fletcher required an escape of the dangerous thing from the defendant’s land, causing damage outside.

Issues

1. Strict liability for dangerous operations on the occupier’s premises

Whether, as framed in the appellant’s printed case:

“Whether the manufacturer of high explosive shells is under strict liability to prevent such shells from exploding and causing harm to persons on the premises where such manufacture is carried on as well as to persons outside such premises”

that is, whether a manufacturer of high explosive shells is liable, without proof of negligence, for personal injuries caused by an explosion to persons lawfully on the premises.

2. Application and scope of Rylands v Fletcher

Whether the doctrine in Rylands v Fletcher applies:

• where there has been no “escape” of the dangerous thing from the defendant’s land to land outside his occupation or control; and
• to claims for personal injury, as distinct from damage to property.

3. Nature of the occupier’s duty to invitees

What standard of duty an occupier owes to an invitee (such as an inspector lawfully present in a factory) where inherently dangerous operations are carried on: is it an absolute/strict duty to prevent harm, or a duty to take reasonable care proportionate to the risk?

4. Voluntary assumption of risk

Whether the maxim volenti non fit injuria barred the claim, given that the appellant worked at the factory under the compulsion of wartime labour arrangements. This defence was rejected below and expressly abandoned before the House.

Judgment

Viscount Simon

Viscount Simon treated the appellant as in the position of an invitee, since she was on the premises in the discharge of a public duty. The respondents, as managers and occupiers, owed her the same responsibilities as any occupier to an invitee. He held that the appellant’s claim failed because, on settled principles, an occupier is not liable to an invitee in the absence of negligence, even where the activity is particularly hazardous.

He rejected the trial judge’s application of Rylands v Fletcher. Quoting Blackburn J’s classic formulation from Fletcher v Rylands (L.R. 1 Ex. 265 at 279), he emphasised:

“the person who, ‘ for his own purposes, brings on his lands, and collects and ‘ keeps there, anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must ‘ keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is prima facie ‘ answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence ‘ of its escape.”

Viscount Simon stressed that, as approved in the House of Lords, the doctrine is conditioned by two elements: (i) the condition of “escape” and (ii) the condition of “non-natural use” of land. He noted that Lord Cairns LC had added the requirement of non-natural use, but that on the present facts it was unnecessary to analyse that limb because the essential condition of escape was wholly absent.

He defined “escape” in this context as:

“escape from a place where the defendant has occupation of, or control over, land to a place which is outside his occupation or control.”

He explained that Blackburn J’s references to keeping a thing “in” at peril referred to preventing a thing capable of inflicting mischief from leaving the area the defendant occupied or controlled, not to preventing an explosive substance from exploding in situ. Since the explosion and injuries occurred within the factory, over which the respondents had control, there was no escape in the requisite sense, and the Rylands principle could not apply.

He described the Rainham decision as involving damage to adjoining property and noted that the liability of the company under Rylands had effectively been treated as admitted in that litigation. He expressed the view that, even if it were necessary to decide whether making munitions at the Government’s request in wartime was a “non-natural” use of land “for his own purposes”, the House would not necessarily be bound by Rainham to treat it as such.

On personal injury, he observed that Blackburn J, when later referring to Rylands v Fletcher in Cattle v Stockton Waterworks, treated the principle as covering damage to property (e.g. workmen’s clothes or tools) and left open any question of liability for personal injury.

Viscount Simon concluded that, because there had been no relevant escape, the appellant’s action must fail. He therefore moved that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Lord Macmillan

Lord Macmillan held that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action. The action was for personal injuries and contained no allegation of negligence. He reviewed the historical development of civil liability and stated that, under modern English law, an allegation of negligence is in general essential for a relevant action in reparation for personal injuries, subject to limited, well-established exceptions (notably certain animal cases).

He acknowledged that in the appellant’s printed case the question for decision was posed in terms of “strict liability”, but he distinguished between:

• “strict liability” in the sense of absolute liability irrespective of negligence, which he rejected; and
• a high or exacting standard of care commensurate with the risks of manufacturing explosives, which he accepted as applicable but insufficient to support a claim absent an allegation and proof of negligence.

He expressly disagreed with the assumption that persons injured outside the factory by such an explosion could necessarily rely on Rylands v Fletcher without proof of negligence. Referring to Cassels J’s statement that it was not denied that a person outside would have recovered without proof of negligence, he commented:

“I do not agree with this view. In my opinion persons injured by the explosion inside or outside the defendants’ premises would alike require to aver and prove negligence in order to render the defendants liable.”

Lord Macmillan rejected counsel’s argument that there existed a general legal category of “things and operations dangerous in themselves” carrying absolute liability for personal injuries. He accepted that dangerous things and operations attract a special responsibility and a heightened duty of care, but not liability independent of negligence:

“Accordingly I am unable to accept the proposition that in law the manufacture of high explosive shells is a dangerous operation which imposes on the manufacturer an absolute liability for any personal injuries which may be sustained in consequence of his operations. Strict liability, if you will, is imposed upon him in the sense that he must exercise a high degree of care, but that is all.”

Turning to Rylands v Fletcher, he reiterated that the doctrine derives from the mutual duties of adjoining or neighbouring landowners and is closely akin to trespass and nuisance. He stated that it has “nothing to do with personal injuries” and requires both (i) escape of something from one close to another and (ii) its presence on the land by virtue of some non-natural use. Neither condition existed here: nothing escaped from the respondents’ premises, and in any event he would have hesitated to treat the manufacture of explosives in an industrial community as a non-natural use.

He treated Rainham Chemical Works as a case of damage to adjoining property in which the application of Rylands was largely assumed rather than argued, and which provided no precedent for the appellant’s claim.

Lord Macmillan concluded that no authority, case or textbook justified the appellant’s plea and would accordingly dismiss the appeal.

Lord Porter

Lord Porter framed the issue as whether the occupiers of a munitions factory are liable to a person working there who is injured in the factory by an explosion occurring without negligence. He noted that “normally at the present time in an action of tort for personal injuries if there is no negligence there is no liability.”

He accepted for present purposes that high explosive shells are dangerous things, and that questions of what is a “non-natural” use could be left open. He held that the appeal could be decided on the narrower ground that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher requires an escape.

Citing Blackburn J’s reasoning, he emphasised the need for escape from the defendant’s land to land not under his control. He referred again to the passage:

“it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets to his neighbour’s, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property.”

He considered that in all prior Rylands-type cases there had been some form of escape from the place under the defendant’s control to some other place not subject to his control, and that such escape is necessary if the principle is to apply. He found no authority imposing liability under Rylands for injury occurring on the very property where the dangerous thing was contained.

Although he acknowledged the apparent oddity that a defendant might be liable if the victim were just outside the premises but not if just within, he endorsed Lindley LJ’s warning in Green v Chelsea Waterworks Co that:

“That case [Rylands v Fletcher] is not to be extended beyond the legitimate principle on which the House of Lords decided it. If it were extended as far as strict logic might require, it would be a very oppressive decision.”

Lord Porter therefore held that, in the absence of escape, the principle of Rylands v Fletcher did not apply, and he would dismiss the appeal.

Lord Simonds

Lord Simonds set out a general proposition that, save for specific exceptions, a person is not, in the absence of negligence, liable for harmful consequences of things he has brought or manufactured on his premises unless those things escape and injure another. He left open the further question whether, even after escape, strict liability extends to purely personal injuries as distinct from proprietary damage.

He emphasised that Fletcher v Rylands and Rylands v Fletcher concerned the rights of adjoining landowners and that the defendant there was held liable only because something brought onto his land escaped onto his neighbour’s land. He agreed with MacKinnon LJ that this was the basis of Blackburn J’s judgment and of Lord Cairns’s opinion, and interpreted “escape” in that doctrine as escape from the defendant’s premises, not merely from his control in some broader sense.

Rejecting an expansive notion of ultra-hazardous activity, he stated that, as regards persons lawfully on the defendant’s premises, the obligation is to exercise great care, but liability remains fault-based. The injured person must still prove breach of a duty of care, although the maxim res ipsa loquitur might assist in appropriate cases.

He recognised certain specific exceptions (such as liability for wild or known vicious animals and possibly some dangerous structures) as products of the historical development of tort in distinct compartments. However, he saw no general rule imposing strict liability on those who manufacture explosives towards those lawfully on their premises.

On the defence of volenti non fit injuria, he agreed that it could not apply in circumstances where the appellant’s presence at the factory was due to governmental direction:

“It is not, I think, the law of England that the will of a directing official of a Government Department becomes the will of the unwilling citizen whom he directs.”

Lord Simonds therefore concluded that, as the appellant was injured on the respondents’ premises and no negligence was alleged or proved, she could not recover and the appeal must be dismissed.

Lord Uthwatt

Lord Uthwatt agreed that the appellant was, in substance, on the respondents’ premises in performance of a statutory duty but that this did not alter the nature of the duty owed: she was present with the respondents’ consent and was an invitee. The defence of volenti was rightly rejected: her will had effectively been determined for her by the threat of statutory direction, and consent to relieve the respondents of duty could not be implied.

He surveyed the duties owed by occupiers to different categories of entrants—trespassers, bare licensees, and invitees—and observed that the common feature of those duties is a standard of conduct bounded by what a reasonably minded occupier might consider fair and what entrants might reasonably expect in a civilised community.

He held that there was no reason, consistent with respect for dominion over land and with the position of an invitee, to subject an occupier engaged in a dangerous but lawful business to an absolute duty to safeguard the invitee from harm. The proper standard was a degree of care measured by the degree of danger, not an absolute guarantee of safety. In his words:

“A measure of care determined by the degree of danger is in my opinion the utmost that either party would envisage, and in my opinion the law demands that and no other standard of duty.”

Turning to Rylands v Fletcher, he characterised it as laying down a principle applicable as between occupiers in respect of their lands, concerning intrusion from one land to another. He did not regard it as expressing a wider principle applicable to dangerous businesses or things generally. On that basis, it was unnecessary to consider whether the use of land in this case was “natural” or “non-natural” for Rylands purposes.

He referred with approval to Lewis J’s decision in Howard v Furness Houlder Argentine Lines Ltd as adverse to the appellant’s contention, and to Lord Herschell’s statement in Membery v Great Western Railway Co as emphasising that an occupier’s duty to invitees, even in dangerous activities, is to take reasonable care rather than to assume absolute liability.

Lord Uthwatt therefore rejected the appellant’s contention that the respondents owed an absolute duty and concluded that the appeal should be dismissed.

Implications

This decision confines the doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher to situations where something brought onto land escapes from that land (or from analogous installations under a right or franchise) onto land outside the defendant’s occupation or control, and primarily in relation to proprietary damage. It makes clear that the doctrine does not apply to injuries caused on the very premises where the dangerous thing is contained and casts doubt on its application to purely personal injury claims.

The House of Lords affirmed that, in modern English law, actions for personal injuries generally require proof of negligence, even where inherently dangerous operations are conducted. Hazardous activities raise the standard of care required but do not create absolute liability to persons lawfully on the premises absent a specific, established exception.

The case also clarifies the occupier’s duty to invitees: the duty is one of reasonable care commensurate with the risk, not a guarantee of safety. The rejection of the volenti defence in the context of compulsory wartime labour underscores that apparent acquiescence under governmental direction does not equate to voluntary assumption of risk.

Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd is a leading authority limiting the expansion of strict liability in tort, shaping the understanding of Rylands v Fletcher, and reinforcing negligence-based principles in personal injury and occupiers’ liability cases.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed with costs; the respondents were not liable in the absence of negligence because there had been no escape from their land and no absolute duty to protect the appellant from the explosion.

Source: Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1946] UKHL 2