Mr George, a convicted drug dealer with indefinite leave to remain, faced deportation but succeeded on Article 8 grounds, revoking the order. The Supreme Court held that revocation of a deportation order does not revive previously invalidated indefinite leave to remain.
Facts
Mr Fitzroy George was born in Grenada in 1984 and came to the United Kingdom aged 11. He was granted indefinite leave to remain by March 2000. He was subsequently convicted on seven occasions of offences including supplying Class A drugs, receiving sentences of three years’ detention and four years’ imprisonment. The Secretary of State deemed his deportation conducive to the public good, and following unsuccessful appeals, a deportation order was made on 24 April 2008 under section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971. This invalidated his indefinite leave to remain.
Mr George then contended that deportation would breach his Article 8 rights due to his relationship with his partner and daughter. An immigration judge allowed his appeal on 31 March 2009, describing the case as “borderline”, with the effect that the deportation order was revoked. The Secretary of State refused to reinstate indefinite leave to remain, instead granting successive periods of discretionary leave (initially six months, then three years).
Mr George sought judicial review, arguing that his original indefinite leave to remain revived automatically on revocation of the deportation order. He failed at first instance but succeeded before a majority of the Court of Appeal. The Secretary of State appealed.
Issues
The central issue was whether, upon revocation of a deportation order under section 5(2) of the Immigration Act 1971, previously held indefinite leave to remain (invalidated by section 5(1) when the order was made) automatically revives, or whether the Secretary of State is free to consider afresh what leave, if any, to grant.
Arguments
For Mr George
Mr Knafler QC advanced three principal arguments: (i) that section 5(1) prescribes three consequences of a deportation order (direction to leave, prohibition on return, invalidation of leave), all of which are reversed by revocation under section 5(2); (ii) that section 76 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, granting the Secretary of State power to revoke indefinite leave where a person is liable to deportation but cannot be deported for legal reasons, would be otiose unless leave revived on revocation of a deportation order; and (iii) that analogous provisions in section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and the automatic deportation scheme under the UK Borders Act 2007 supported revival.
For the Secretary of State
Robin Tam QC argued that the natural reading of section 5(2) is prospective, that Parliament would have provided expressly for revival if intended, and that consistent contemporaneous and subsequent understanding (reflected in Immigration Rules from 1972 onwards) confirmed that revocation did not revive leave.
Judgment
Lord Hughes, with whom the other Justices agreed, allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal.
Construction of section 5(1) and (2)
The wording of section 5(2) did not by itself provide a conclusive answer, but if anything suggested revocation operates prospectively rather than retrospectively. Revival is a “significant and far-reaching legal concept” that would ordinarily be expressly provided for.
Contemporaneous and subsequent understanding
The court placed considerable weight on the fact that draft Immigration Rules prepared alongside the 1971 Act (Cmnd 4610), the 1972 Statement of Immigration Rules (HC 510, paragraph 66), every subsequent Statement of Changes including the current HC 395 at paragraph 392, and successive editions of Macdonald’s Immigration Law and Practice all recorded that revocation of a deportation order does not entitle a person to re-enter but only renders them eligible to qualify for admission under the Rules.
The section 76 argument
The court rejected the Court of Appeal majority’s reasoning based on section 76 of the 2002 Act. Section 76(1) has real work to do independently of Mr George’s scenario: it applies to persons whose legal bar to deportation is apparent from the outset (so no deportation order is ever made), and to automatic deportation cases under the 2007 Act where the appealable decision is the antecedent decision that the Act applies rather than the deportation order itself. Furthermore, the historic understanding of section 5(2) precluded any assumption that Parliament enacted section 76 believing revival occurred.
Stanley Burnton LJ’s scenario
The court accepted the force of the dissenting judge’s example: a deported person seeking a brief compassionate visit would require revocation of the deportation order and a fresh grant of limited leave; Parliament cannot have intended revival of indefinite leave in such circumstances.
Analogous statutes
Section 10 of the 1999 Act operates in a different regime with different appeal rights, and it is unsafe to reason from later legislation to the meaning of the 1971 Act. Hypothetical scenarios under the 2007 Act likewise could not determine construction of an Act passed 36 years earlier.
Coherence
There is no legal symmetry in indefinite leave to remain co-existing with the status of a person whose presence is not conducive to the public good. Legal obstacles to deportation may be temporary (conditions abroad may change; family relationships may break down), and it makes coherent sense for the Secretary of State to retain the ability to regulate status through limited or conditional leave.
Implications
The decision confirms that section 5(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 operates prospectively: revocation of a deportation order terminates its ongoing effect but does not retrospectively undo the invalidation of any prior leave to remain effected by section 5(1). A person in Mr George’s position must have their status regularised, but this need not (and generally will not) take the form of restored indefinite leave; the Secretary of State may lawfully grant successive periods of limited or discretionary leave.
The judgment matters to foreign nationals with previous indefinite leave who are liable to deportation but cannot presently be removed for Convention reasons, and to their legal representatives. It confirms the Secretary of State’s power to keep their immigration status under review and to grant only such leave as is appropriate given their continued status as persons whose presence is not conducive to the public good.
The decision also illustrates the court’s willingness to give weight to a long, consistent legislative and administrative understanding of statutory wording, particularly where reflected in successive Immigration Rules laid before Parliament. It reinforces caution against interpreting older statutes by reference to later, discrete legislative provisions in the same field, where immigration law is subject to fast-moving change. The court explicitly did not decide the meaning of section 10(8) of the 1999 Act or the operation of the 2007 Act appeal regime, leaving those questions open for future cases on their own facts.
Verdict: The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal. It held that on the correct construction of section 5(2) of the Immigration Act 1971, revocation of a deportation order does not retrospectively undo the invalidation of prior leave to remain effected by section 5(1); Mr George’s indefinite leave did not revive, and the Secretary of State’s grant of successive limited leaves was lawful. The order of the judge dismissing the claim for judicial review was reinstated.
Source: R (on the application of George) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 28
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To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'R (on the application of George) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 28' (LawCases.net, August 2026) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/r-on-the-application-of-george-v-the-secretary-of-state-for-the-home-department-2014-uksc-28/> accessed 23 August 2026
