McCue v Glasgow City Council [2023] UKSC 1

Mrs McCue, guardian for her disabled son Andrew, challenged Glasgow City Council's charges for community care services, arguing insufficient deductions for disability-related expenditure. The Supreme Court held the Council's charging policy did not constitute unlawful discrimination under sections 15 or 20 of the Equality Act 2010.

Facts

Andrew McCue, a 27-year-old man with Down’s Syndrome, received community care services from Glasgow City Council under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. His mother, acting as his guardian, disputed the Council’s assessment of charges for these services, arguing that various items of disability-related expenditure should be deducted from Andrew’s assessable income when calculating the charge he should pay.

The appellant claimed deductions for items including additional heating costs, transport costs, laundry expenses due to medical creams, costs of attending specialist social clubs, and support worker costs for attending events. The Council accepted only limited deductions (£6.25 for clothing alterations and footwear, and later £2.50 for laundry), but rejected the majority of claimed expenditure as discretionary spending not necessary to meet assessed needs.

Issues

Section 15 Equality Act 2010

Whether the Council discriminated against Mr McCue by treating him unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of his disability when calculating charges for community care services.

Section 20 Equality Act 2010

Whether the Council failed to comply with its duty to make reasonable adjustments by not adequately accounting for disability-related expenditure in its charging policy.

Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Lord Sales delivered the judgment with which all other justices agreed.

Section 15 Analysis

The Court found that the Council’s approach to applying section 87 of the 1968 Act was not unfavourable treatment within section 15(1)(a). The Council’s policy allowed disabled persons to claim deductions for disability-related expenditure that non-disabled persons could not claim, making it favourable rather than unfavourable to disabled persons.

As made clear in the Swansea University Trustees case the failure of the Council to apply section 87 in a more generous way, beyond the favourable treatment for Mr McCue as a disabled person already built into its approach, does not constitute unfavourable treatment for the purposes of section 15(1)(a).

The Court clarified that treatment which is advantageous cannot be said to be unfavourable merely because it is thought it could have been more advantageous.

Section 20 Analysis

Regarding the duty to make reasonable adjustments, the Court held that the Council’s practice of considering disability-related expenditure deductions did not put disabled persons at a disadvantage compared to non-disabled persons. Rather, the practice only applied to disabled people and conferred an advantage on them.

This is for the simple reason that the practice only applies to disabled people. As a distinct practice, as Mr Dailly identified it, it does not allow for any comparison to be made with the treatment of persons who are not disabled, so there is no scope for the application of section 20(3).

Clarification on Disability-Related Expenditure

The Court noted that Lady Wolffe had erred in suggesting disability-related expenditure must be expenditure used to meet needs assessed by the local authority. Such expenditure may include other needs arising from disability, provided they are sufficiently pressing to reduce available means below what it would be practicable to pay as charges.

Implications

This judgment clarifies the interaction between the Equality Act 2010 and local authority charging powers for community care services. It establishes that policies providing additional benefits to disabled persons cannot constitute unfavourable treatment under section 15 merely because they are not generous enough. The decision confirms that local authorities retain significant discretion in assessing what constitutes disability-related expenditure for charging purposes, subject only to ordinary public law constraints of rationality and fairness.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The Council’s charging policy and its application to Mr McCue did not constitute unlawful discrimination under sections 15 or 20 of the Equality Act 2010.

Source: McCue v Glasgow City Council [2023] UKSC 1