JR222, Re Application for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2024] UKSC 35

A former nurse at Muckamore Abbey Hospital challenged the Minister of Health's refusal to suspend a public inquiry into patient abuse pending her criminal trial. The Supreme Court held that under section 13(1) of the Inquiries Act 2005, necessity applies to both the decision to suspend and the period of suspension, not merely the duration.

Facts

JR222, a former staff nurse at Muckamore Abbey Hospital, was charged alongside seven co-accused with criminal offences relating to alleged abuse of vulnerable patients with severe learning disabilities between April and June 2017. The Minister of Health established a public inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 to examine abuse at the Hospital. JR222 requested the Minister suspend the Inquiry until determination of her criminal proceedings under section 13(1)(b) of the Act. The Minister refused, determining it was not necessary to suspend given the protective measures in place, including a Memorandum of Understanding between the Inquiry, PSNI and PPS, restriction orders, and an undertaking from the Director of Public Prosecutions that evidence given to the Inquiry would not be used in criminal proceedings.

Issues

Interpretation of Section 13(1)

The central issue was whether the word ‘necessary’ in section 13(1) of the Inquiries Act 2005 qualifies only the period of suspension, or whether it also qualifies the decision to suspend an inquiry. The appellant contended necessity applied only to duration; the respondent argued necessity applied to both the decision to suspend and the period of suspension.

Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Lord Stephens, delivering the judgment, held that section 13(1) naturally reads as one question which must be considered and answered as a whole, with necessity applying to both the purposes in section 13(1)(a) and (b) and to the period of suspension.

“In agreement with the courts below I consider that the true interpretation is that section 13(1) naturally reads as one question which must be considered and answered as a whole. On this basis necessity applies to both the purposes in section 13(1)(a) and (b) and to the period of suspension.”

Lord Stephens relied upon several factors supporting this interpretation:

Legislative Intent

The court considered Hansard material where Lord Evans of Temple Guiting stated during the Bill’s passage:

“Clause 12 allows a Minister to suspend an inquiry only when it is necessary to allow for the completion of other related investigation or the determination of any civil or criminal proceedings.”

Statutory Purpose

The court found the respondent’s interpretation supported by the statutory purpose of inquiries to address public concerns. It would be contrary to that purpose to suspend an inquiry unless necessary for the stated purposes.

“JR222’s interpretation would result in delay to the public interest being served by an inquiry in circumstances where it was not necessary for the delay to occur for one or other of the purposes set out in section 13(1)(a) or (b).”

Avoiding Illogical Results

The court noted that if necessity only applied to the period of suspension, this would create the illogical result of a stricter test applying at the less important secondary stage rather than the more important anterior stage of determining whether to suspend.

Implications

This judgment clarifies the threshold for suspending public inquiries under the Inquiries Act 2005. Ministers must now be satisfied that suspension is necessary, not merely desirable or appropriate, before halting important public inquiries to allow completion of related investigations or proceedings. This interpretation protects the public interest served by inquiries, particularly where vulnerable individuals are concerned, whilst still permitting suspension where genuinely necessary to protect the integrity of criminal proceedings. The decision affirms that robust safeguards within an inquiry may obviate the need for suspension.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the Minister correctly applied the concept of necessity to the entirety of his discretion under section 13(1) of the Inquiries Act 2005, and the Minister’s refusal to suspend the Inquiry was lawful.

Source: JR222, Re Application for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2024] UKSC 35