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Goluchowski and Sas v District Court and Circuit Court in Poland [2016] UKSC 36

Reviewed by Jennifer Wiss-Carline, Solicitor

Case citations

[2017] 2 All ER 887, [2016] UKSC 36, [2016] 1 WLR 2665, [2016] WLR 2665, [2016] WLR(D) 345, [2016] 3 CMLR 39

Two Polish nationals challenged European Arrest Warrants seeking their extradition to serve sentences in Poland, arguing the warrants failed to particularise domestic warrants and activation decisions. The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals, clarifying EAW content requirements under section 2(6) of the Extradition Act 2003.

Facts

The appellants, Maciej Goluchowski and Marek Sas, were both Polish nationals wanted by Polish judicial authorities for the purpose of serving sentences of imprisonment in Poland. The European Arrest Warrants (EAWs) issued in their respect raised distinct factual circumstances:

Goluchowski

An EAW was issued by the District Court in Elblag on 13 August 2010 in respect of two offences. The sentences (ten months and two years respectively) had been conditionally suspended. In each case, Goluchowski breached the conditions, the sentences were activated by court order, and when he failed to attend the correction facility, domestic summonses and arrest warrants were issued.

Sas

EAW 1 was issued by the Zielona Gora Circuit Court on 23 January 2008 in respect of an eight-month sentence imposed on 24 April 2006 (varied on appeal on 2 November 2006). Sas remained at liberty pending appeal and was due to report to the detention facility on 25 January 2007 but failed to do so. EAW 3 was issued by the District Court in Jelenia Gora on 21 August 2008. It related to a cumulative judgment of 11 February 2004. Sas had been granted early conditional release on 30 June 2005, but this was revoked on 29 September 2007 for breach of supervision conditions.

Issues

The High Court certified questions asking:

  • Whether an EAW is defective under section 2(6)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003 if it does not give particulars of domestic warrants issued in the issuing state to enforce the relevant judgment.
  • In Goluchowski’s case, whether section 2(6)(c) requires only the conviction to be particularised, or also the decision activating the suspended sentence following which the requested person could be said to be unlawfully at large.

The wider issue was the proper interpretation of the content requirements of section 2(6) of the 2003 Act and article 8.1(c) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, in particular for conviction cases involving suspended sentences and revoked conditional releases.

Arguments

Appellants

Both appellants submitted that an EAW must contain particulars of any (or at least the most recent) domestic warrant issued to arrest a person wanted to serve a sentence of imprisonment. Miss Montgomery QC (for Goluchowski) further submitted that an EAW must evidence the judicial decision activating a suspended sentence, and that this followed from both the 2003 Act and the Framework Decision. Mr Summers QC (for Sas) advanced a similar objection regarding EAW 3 but did not necessarily extend his argument to the Framework Decision, noting Parliament may have introduced more protective conditions domestically.

Respondents

The Polish judicial authorities contended that the EAWs satisfied the requirements of section 2(6) and article 8.1(c), being properly based on enforceable judgments, with any further procedural matters being capable of being addressed by supplementary information requested under article 15 of the Framework Decision.

Judgment

Lord Mance (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Wilson, Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson agreed) dismissed both appeals.

Section 2(6)(c) and domestic warrants

The Court held that, in a conviction case where an enforceable judgment or equivalent decision exists, there is no requirement that any domestic warrant also be evidenced in the EAW. Article 8.1(c) of the Framework Decision offers alternative bases for an EAW (an arrest warrant, an enforceable judgment, or any other enforceable judicial decision with the same effect), and the appropriate basis depends on the context. Section 2(6)(c) is likely to have practical bite only in limited circumstances, such as where a convicted person absconds before sentencing.

Sas (EAW 1)

As Sas’s sentence became final and enforceable upon his unsuccessful appeal, neither the subsequent summons to report to the detention facility nor the later court order requiring police to bring him in were warrants within section 2(6)(c) or matters requiring mention under article 8.1(c). EAW 1 was valid.

Goluchowski and Sas (EAW 3) – activation and revocation decisions

The Court considered whether the EAWs needed to particularise the suspension activation decisions (Goluchowski) or the revocation of conditional release (Sas, EAW 3). Lord Mance drew heavily on the recent Court of Justice decision in Parchetul de pe lângă Curtea de Apel Cluj v Bob-Dogi (Case C-241/15), which established that failure to evidence a required underlying judicial decision in an EAW does not automatically invalidate it; rather, the executing authority must request supplementary information under article 15, and validity ultimately depends on whether a proper underlying basis in fact exists.

Lord Mance considered Lord Sumption’s statement in Zakrzewski v District Court in Torun, Poland [2013] UKSC 2:

It follows that the scheme of the Framework Decision and of Part 1 of the 2003 Act is that as a general rule the court of the executing state is bound to take the statements and information in the warrant at face value. The validity of the warrant depends on whether the prescribed particulars are to be found in it, and not on whether they are correct. It cannot be open to a defendant to challenge the validity of a warrant which contains the prescribed particulars by reference to extraneous evidence tending to show that those statements and information are wrong.

The Court reasoned that Lord Hope’s earlier observation in Dabas v High Court of Justice in Madrid, Spain [2007] UKHL 6 – that an EAW lacking required statements cannot be “eked out by extraneous information” – must be qualified in light of Bob-Dogi. The principle of conforming interpretation (following Pupino) and section 202 of the 2003 Act enable cooperation and regularisation of formal (rather than substantive) defects through the process of requesting further information.

The Court held that, where supplementary information confirms the EAWs rest on a valid factual basis of enforceable judgments and decisions, it would be perverse to treat them as invalid merely because the full history of activation or revocation did not appear on the EAW’s face. On their face, the EAWs satisfied section 2(6) by particularising enforceable judgments and the sentences imposed and due to be served.

Implications

Clarification of EAW validity in conviction cases

The decision clarifies that, in conviction cases, an EAW may properly be based on an enforceable judgment alone, without necessarily evidencing any associated domestic arrest warrant. The reference in section 2(6)(c) to “any other warrant” is to be read narrowly and is unlikely to bite in standard conviction cases.

Qualification of Zakrzewski and Dabas

The judgment qualifies the strict approach previously suggested in Dabas and Zakrzewski. Whilst the general rule remains that the executing court takes the EAW at face value, formal defects in the particulars of an EAW may be cured by supplementary information furnished under article 15 of the Framework Decision and section 202 of the 2003 Act. Lord Neuberger’s short judgment confirmed that Lord Sumption’s remarks in Zakrzewski were not intended to express an absolute rule.

Approach to suspended sentences and revoked releases

Where a sentence has become enforceable through activation of a suspended sentence or revocation of a conditional release, it is not necessarily fatal that the EAW does not set out that procedural history; supplementary information can establish the proper foundation. However, the Court noted that mutual confidence may be better served by accepting an accurate statement of enforceability at face value initially, with the option for the executing state to seek further information.

Practical significance

The decision matters to extradition practitioners, requested persons, and issuing judicial authorities across EU member states. It demonstrates the United Kingdom courts’ commitment to interpreting the 2003 Act consistently with the Framework Decision, particularly following the UK’s opt-back-in under Protocol No 36 to the Treaty of Lisbon (effective from 1 December 2014), and consistently with the duty under Pupino. The case underscores that the EAW system depends on the principles of mutual recognition and confidence between member states, and that refusal of surrender on formal grounds should remain exceptional. It also affirms the role of article 15 dialogue in resolving apparent deficiencies in EAWs.

Verdict: Both appeals were dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the High Court, holding that the EAWs issued in respect of Mr Goluchowski (in respect of two activated suspended sentences) and Mr Sas (EAW 1 relating to a sentence enforceable after dismissal of appeal, and EAW 3 relating to a sentence following revocation of conditional release) were valid and enforceable.

Source: Goluchowski and Sas v District Court and Circuit Court in Poland [2016] UKSC 36

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National Case Law Archive, 'Goluchowski and Sas v District Court and Circuit Court in Poland [2016] UKSC 36' (LawCases.net, June 2026) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/goluchowski-and-sas-v-district-court-and-circuit-court-in-poland-2016-uksc-36/> accessed 16 June 2026