Akbars Restaurant (Middlesborough) Limited v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] UKSC 26

The Home Secretary issued a £15,000 civil penalty notice to a Middlesbrough restaurant for employing an illegal worker, citing all three mutually exclusive limbs of section 15(1) of the 2006 Act without specifying which applied. The Supreme Court held the notice was invalid for failing to give proper reasons.

Facts

The appellant operates a restaurant in Middlesbrough. On 15 January 2023, immigration officers inspected the premises and identified a migrant whose leave to remain had expired working there. Following an unanswered information request, on 13 March 2023 the Secretary of State issued a civil penalty notice (CPN) under section 15 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, imposing a penalty of £15,000.

The CPN stated the appellant had breached section 15 by employing an adult subject to immigration control who fell within one or more of the three limbs of section 15(1), without specifying which. The accompanying Statement of Case similarly failed to identify the particular limb relied on. When the appellant objected and requested clarification, none was provided. Only shortly before the county court appeal hearing did the Secretary of State clarify that reliance was being placed on section 15(1)(b)(ii) (leave having ceased by passage of time), later adding section 15(1)(b)(iii).

HHJ Gargan in the county court and the Court of Appeal (Lewison, Coulson and Zacaroli LJJ) both upheld the validity of the CPN.

Issues

The central issue was whether a penalty notice issued under section 15 of the 2006 Act complies with the requirement in section 15(6)(a) that it “state why the Secretary of State thinks the employer is liable to the penalty” where it lists all three mutually exclusive limbs of section 15(1) without specifying which applies. A subsidiary issue was whether, if there was a defect, the CPN should nonetheless be treated as valid applying the approach in R v Soneji [2006] 1 AC 340.

Arguments

Appellant

The CPN was invalid because it failed to comply with section 15(6)(a). By listing all three mutually exclusive grounds in section 15(1), the Secretary of State had not actually stated why she thought the employer was liable, and had failed to give fair notice of her reasons.

Respondent

The Secretary of State submitted that section 15(6)(a) required only general identification that section 15 had been breached. The purpose of the regime was to discourage illegal employment and encourage employer checks; the appellant’s interpretation would allow technical arguments to frustrate that aim. Alternatively, relying on R v Soneji, any defect did not render the notice invalid because there had been substantial compliance and no real prejudice.

Judgment

The Supreme Court (Lord Sales, with whom Lord Leggatt, Lady Rose, Lord Richards and Lady Simler agreed) allowed the appeal.

Constitutional context

Lord Sales emphasised the penal nature of the regime. Where the state imposes a penalty, proper reasons must be given both to justify the action and to enable the person affected to respond. Fairness demanded accurate and sufficient information so the employer could decide whether to appeal, understand what evidence was needed, and contest the reasons in court. Citing Ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, Parliament is taken to legislate on the footing that administrative powers detrimentally affecting persons must be exercised fairly.

Interpretation of section 15(6)(a)

Reading section 15(6)(a) in its ordinary and natural meaning, and in context, the requirement to state “why” the Secretary of State thinks the employer is liable requires her to explain her thought process, including which of the mutually exclusive limbs of section 15(1) she considers applicable. Since the Secretary of State must necessarily have formed a view on that under section 15(2), there was no sensible reason not to disclose it.

Statutory scheme

The wider provisions in sections 16 and 17 reinforced this interpretation. The objection procedure under section 16 presupposes the employer can understand and challenge the basis on which the penalty was imposed. Section 17(3) provides that an appeal is a re-hearing of “the Secretary of State’s decision to impose a penalty”, meaning the focus is the decision actually taken, including the limb relied on. The Secretary of State cannot defend an appeal on a limb not previously specified, though she may adduce new evidence bearing on matters already decided.

Purpose

Lord Sales rejected Mr Malik’s reliance on a general statutory purpose of discouraging illegal working. The purpose of a provision must be tied to the language chosen. Citing Maunsell v Olins [1975] AC 373 and Rodriguez v United States (1987) 480 US 522, legislation does not pursue its purposes at all costs; drafters balance competing objectives, including fairness and legal certainty.

Application of R v Soneji

The middle-way approach in R v Soneji did not save the CPN. Section 15(6)(a) sets out a clear condition of validity. The constitutional context and the operation of the regime as a whole demonstrated Parliament intended strict compliance. An employer should not have to appeal to discover which limb was being relied on. The requirement imposed no unreasonable burden on the Secretary of State, who holds the relevant records and must in any event identify the limb to exercise her power under section 15(2). JN (Cameroon) was distinguished, as the statutory context there was materially different: the operative decision was the underlying deportation decision, not the notice itself.

Implications

The decision establishes that a civil penalty notice under section 15 of the 2006 Act must identify which specific limb of section 15(1) is being relied upon; a notice listing all three mutually exclusive grounds without specifying is invalid. The Secretary of State cannot cure such a defect by later specifying the limb in correspondence or by relying on the appeal being a re-hearing.

More broadly, the judgment reinforces principles of statutory interpretation: purpose must be tied to the statutory language, and generalised appeals to purpose cannot override the natural meaning of a provision read in context. Where the state exercises penal powers, courts will interpret reason-giving requirements in a manner that respects fairness, the rule of law, and the affected person’s ability to understand and challenge the case against them.

The decision matters particularly to employers facing civil penalty notices, who now have a clear right to receive a properly particularised notice, and to the Home Office, which must ensure notices specify the applicable statutory ground. It also confirms that the Soneji framework does not automatically apply a substantial compliance test to every procedural requirement; the question remains one of statutory purpose, and where the requirement protects fundamental fairness in the exercise of penal power, strict compliance may be required.

Verdict: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the civil penalty notice was invalid because it failed to specify which limb of section 15(1) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 the Secretary of State relied on, in breach of the requirement in section 15(6)(a) to state why the employer was liable to the penalty.

Source: Akbars Restaurant (Middlesborough) Limited v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] UKSC 26