R (on the application of Bano) v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2026] UKSC 22

Mrs Bano was offered private rented sector accommodation in Derby by Waltham Forest, which she refused. She later sought judicial review claiming the main housing duty continued. The Supreme Court held the duty ceased automatically on refusal of a compliant offer, and a statutory review under section 202 was her proper remedy.

Facts

The appellant, Mrs Sabhya Bano, a single parent of two children, applied to the London Borough of Waltham Forest (‘Waltham Forest’) for assistance as a homeless person on 5 January 2017. On 23 February 2017, Waltham Forest accepted that it owed her the main housing duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. She and her children were placed in temporary accommodation in Newham in May 2017.

On 11 June 2020, Waltham Forest sent Mrs Bano an offer letter (‘the Offer Letter’) offering her a three-bedroom flat in Derby on a 24-month assured shorthold tenancy — a ‘private rented sector offer’ under section 193(7AA). The letter stated the offer would discharge the main housing duty whether accepted or refused, informed her of her right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, and provided information about local amenities in Derby. However, it did not fully comply with section 193(7AB)(c) because it omitted information about the effect of section 195A(2) (following Norton v Haringey LBC [2022] EWCA Civ 1340).

Mrs Bano refused the offer. She did not request a review within the 21-day period under section 202(3). She remained in the Newham property until eviction in March 2024. On 29 August 2023, she issued judicial review proceedings challenging Waltham Forest’s refusal to accept that the main housing duty continued. By the time of the Supreme Court hearing, Mrs Bano had signed an introductory tenancy in Walthamstow and accepted the appeal was academic as regards her personally, but the court proceeded because of the public importance of the statutory construction issues.

Issues

The principal issues were:

1. Whether, on the proper construction of section 193(7AA), the main housing duty ceases automatically upon acceptance or refusal of a compliant private rented sector offer, or whether the local housing authority must additionally take and notify a decision that the offer has been accepted or refused.
2. Whether the Offer Letter itself constituted a decision capable of being reviewed under section 202.
3. Whether any of Waltham Forest’s later communications constituted a fresh decision generating a right of review under section 202.

Arguments

Appellant’s arguments

Mrs Bano, represented by Liz Davies KC, argued that a compliant offer alone did not end the main housing duty; Waltham Forest was required to take a definite decision that she had accepted or refused the offer and notify her of that decision. Only such a notified decision would trigger the 21-day review period under section 202(3). Without such a decision, she had no right of review and hence no alternative statutory remedy barring judicial review. She contended that the word ‘possible’ in the required warning implied a further decision was needed, that the structure of subsection (7AA) required determination of whether acceptance or refusal had occurred, and that Waltham Forest’s construction produced absurd results in cases of short deadlines, undelivered offer letters, or automatic cessation under section 193(6)(a).

Respondent’s arguments

Waltham Forest, represented by Nicholas Grundy KC, argued that a compliant offer letter is itself the reviewable decision; upon acceptance or refusal the duty ceases automatically without any further decision or notification. The Offer Letter notified Mrs Bano of the decision, from which the 21-day review period ran. Mrs Bano had had an adequate alternative remedy by way of statutory review under section 202, precluding judicial review.

Judgment

Ground 1: Construction of section 193(7AA)

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on this ground. Applying ordinary principles of statutory construction, the court held that the plain wording of section 193(7AA) provides that the authority ‘shall also cease to be subject to the duty’ if the applicant accepts or refuses a compliant private rented sector offer. The provision does not require the authority to ‘decide’, ‘be satisfied’ or ‘determine’ that acceptance or refusal has occurred, nor does it require notification of any such subsequent decision. The court contrasted subsection (7AA) with subsection (5), which expressly requires notification, and noted that the amendments introduced by the Localism Act 2011 to subsection (7) had removed prior notification requirements. Mrs Bano’s construction would require the court to read additional words into the subsection which Parliament had not enacted.

The court rejected the argument that this produced absurd or unworkable results. Where an offer letter has gone astray, the duty will not cease because acceptance or refusal presupposes receipt of the offer. Where eligibility ceases under section 193(6)(a) without the applicant’s knowledge, the applicant is not adversely affected until the authority takes some later decision (such as terminating accommodation), and that later decision is itself reviewable under section 202(1)(a) or (b). Practical concerns about short deadlines could be addressed by accepting the offer and requesting a review under section 202(1A), or by seeking an extension of time under section 202(3).

Ground 2: Was the Offer Letter a reviewable decision?

The Supreme Court held that the Offer Letter was itself the decision for section 202(1)(b) purposes. It was not merely an indication of a future intention but a decision that, whether accepted or refused, the offer would bring the main housing duty to an end. Although non-compliant in one respect (the omission concerning section 195A(2)), Mrs Bano had not sought review within time and the decision stood. The 21-day review period ran from the date of the Offer Letter.

Ground 3: Subsequent communications

The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s view (based on Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 755) that a subsequent ‘confirmatory’ decision that the duty had ceased was itself reviewable. Allowing confirmatory decisions to be reviewable would circumvent the 21-day time limit in section 202(3), undermine the statutory purpose of expedition and finality, and deprive authorities of their discretion to extend time. It was also difficult to distinguish confirmatory from substantive decisions. Neither Waltham Forest’s letter of 7 October 2020 nor 30 May 2023 generated a fresh right of review. Where an applicant only later becomes aware of a decision, the correct route is to seek an extension of time under section 202(3).

Outcome

The appeal was dismissed. Mrs Bano had had a suitable alternative remedy by way of statutory review of the Offer Letter, precluding her judicial review claim.

Implications

The decision clarifies the operation of section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 in a manner likely to affect many homelessness cases. Key principles emerging include:

• A compliant private rented sector offer under section 193(7AA), or a final Part 6 offer under section 193(7), causes the main housing duty to cease automatically upon the applicant’s acceptance or refusal, without the need for any subsequent decision or notification by the authority.
• The offer letter itself is the reviewable decision for the purposes of section 202(1)(b), and the 21-day review period runs from the notification of the offer letter to the applicant.
• An offer letter cannot cause the duty to cease unless the applicant has received it, since there can be no acceptance or refusal without knowledge of the offer.
• Subsequent ‘confirmatory’ decisions do not open up a fresh review right; applicants who become aware of a decision late must seek an extension of time under section 202(3).
• Judicial review will ordinarily be precluded where the statutory review procedure under section 202 (with onward appeal to the County Court under section 204) is available, applying the suitable alternative remedy principle reiterated in In re McAleenon [2024] UKSC 31.

The court also observed that it would be ‘good practice’ for authorities to inform applicants that the right to request a review extends beyond suitability to include a review of the decision that the offer will bring the main housing duty to an end, though there is no statutory obligation to do so.

The judgment is significant for local housing authorities, homelessness applicants, and practitioners because it settles a point of construction with wide practical consequences: authorities need not issue a separate discharge notification following acceptance or refusal of a compliant offer, and applicants must act promptly within the 21-day statutory window if they wish to challenge such an offer. The decision reinforces the primacy of the statutory review and appeal mechanism, marginalising judicial review as a route of challenge in this area.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court held that on the proper construction of section 193(7AA) of the Housing Act 1996, the main housing duty ceased automatically upon Mrs Bano’s refusal of the compliant private rented sector offer. The Offer Letter itself was a decision reviewable under section 202, and Mrs Bano had had a suitable alternative statutory remedy which precluded her judicial review claim.

Source: R (on the application of Bano) v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2026] UKSC 22