Isle of Wight Council v Platt [2017] UKSC 28

A father took his daughter on holiday during term time despite the head teacher's refusal. He was prosecuted under section 444(1) of the Education Act 1996 for failing to ensure regular school attendance. The Supreme Court held 'regularly' means 'in accordance with the rules prescribed by the school'.

Facts

The respondent, Mr Platt, was the father of a seven-year-old girl, Mary, who was a registered pupil at a primary school on the Isle of Wight. In January 2015, he sought permission to take Mary out of school for a holiday between 12 and 21 April 2015. The head teacher refused the request and warned that a fixed penalty notice would be issued if the holiday went ahead. Despite this refusal, the father took Mary out of school from 13 to 21 April 2015 (seven school days). A penalty notice for £60 was issued and, when unpaid, increased to £120. The father did not pay, and he was prosecuted under section 444(1) of the Education Act 1996.

At trial in the magistrates’ court, Mary’s attendance was 95% before the holiday and 90.3% afterwards. The magistrates ruled there was no case to answer because the school’s guidance stated that satisfactory attendance was 90-95%. The Divisional Court upheld this approach, holding that attendance outside the offence dates was relevant. The Council appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

The central question was the meaning of the word ‘regularly’ in section 444(1) of the Education Act 1996, which makes it an offence for a parent of a child of compulsory school age who ‘fails to attend regularly’ at school. Lady Hale identified three possible meanings:

• (a) evenly spaced/at regular intervals;
• (b) sufficiently often/sufficiently frequently;
• (c) in accordance with the rules.

Arguments

The Council and the Secretary of State (intervening) argued that ‘regularly’ meant attendance in accordance with the rules prescribed by the school, such that any unauthorised absence without statutory excuse could constitute the offence. The father argued that without a clear definition, ‘regular’ was too vague to found a criminal offence and that overall attendance levels should be considered.

Judgment

The Supreme Court, in a judgment delivered by Lady Hale (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and Lord Hughes agreed), allowed the appeal and held that ‘regularly’ in section 444(1) means ‘in accordance with the rules prescribed by the school’.

Rejection of ‘at regular intervals’

This meaning was rejected because it would allow attendance on, say, every Monday to count as regular, even where daily attendance was required. It was also inconsistent with Hinchley v Rankin [1961] 1 WLR 421, which held that attendance had to be regular for the prescribed period.

Rejection of ‘sufficiently frequently’

Lady Hale gave nine reasons for rejecting this interpretation, including: school attendance is compulsory and governed by rules; the 1944 Act was intended to expand, not relax, compulsory education; the open-ended ‘reasonable excuse’ defence had been replaced by a closed statutory list; section 444(3) and (6) provisions suggest absence on a single day matters; boarders under section 444(7) are expected to have 100% attendance; the interpretation was too uncertain to found a criminal offence, leaving parents unable to know when they were committing an offence; and there were strong policy reasons concerning the disruptive effect of unauthorised absences on individual children, teachers, and other pupils.

Adoption of ‘in accordance with the rules’

The Court considered concerns that a single missed attendance could lead to criminal liability but found this was addressed through sensible prosecution policy, including fixed penalty notices, absolute or conditional discharges, and the distinction between the strict liability offence in section 444(1) and the more serious offence in section 444(1A). The interpretation was also consistent with the structure of section 444(3)(a) and (9), which treats leave as part of the definition of the offence rather than as a defence, and with the section 7 duty requiring ‘full-time’ education.

Earlier decisions in Crump v Gilmore (1969) 68 LGR 56 and London Borough of Bromley v C [2006] EWHC 1110 (Admin), to the extent they adopted a different interpretation, should not be followed.

Implications

The decision establishes that a parent commits an offence under section 444(1) of the Education Act 1996 whenever a child of compulsory school age fails to attend school in accordance with the rules prescribed by the school, unless one of the statutory exceptions applies (sickness, unavoidable cause, leave, or a day set apart for religious observance). Overall attendance percentages are not the relevant test.

The ruling significantly strengthens the position of schools and local authorities in dealing with unauthorised term-time holidays. It removes the argument, previously available under Bromley, that high overall attendance can defeat a prosecution. Parents must therefore comply with school attendance rules even where their child’s general attendance is excellent. The decision preserves discretion through prosecution policy, fixed penalty notices, and sentencing, providing safeguards against trivial cases producing harsh outcomes.

The Court emphasised that this interpretation provides the certainty required of criminal liability, enabling parents to know precisely what conduct is prohibited. The case was returned to the magistrates with a direction to proceed as if the father’s submission of no case to answer had been rejected.

Verdict: The appeal was allowed. The Supreme Court held that ‘regularly’ in section 444(1) of the Education Act 1996 means ‘in accordance with the rules prescribed by the school’. A declaration was made to that effect, and the case was remitted to the magistrates with a direction to proceed as if the father’s submission of no case to answer had been rejected.

Source: Isle of Wight Council v Platt [2017] UKSC 28