R v Fulling [1987] EWCA Crim 4

The appellant confessed to insurance fraud after police revealed her lover's affair with another woman in the adjacent cell. The Court of Appeal considered whether this amounted to 'oppression' under s.76(2)(a) PACE 1984. The court held oppression requires impropriety and gave the word its ordinary dictionary meaning.

Facts

Ruth Susan Fulling was convicted of obtaining property by deception after claiming approximately £5,665 from insurers for a bogus burglary at her flat. She was arrested in July 1985 following information from an informant named Turnpenny. During police interviews, the appellant initially exercised her right to silence. However, after allegedly being told by police that her lover, Drewery, had been having a three-year affair with a woman named Christine Judge, who was in the adjacent cell, the appellant made a confession.

The appellant claimed on voir dire that she confessed because the revelation about Drewery’s affair distressed her so much that she ‘just couldn’t stand being in the cells any longer’. The police denied making such revelations.

Issues

The central issue was whether the confession was properly admitted under section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). Specifically, the court had to determine whether the confession was obtained by ‘oppression’ within the meaning of section 76(2)(a).

Interpretation of ‘Oppression’

The court needed to establish the meaning of ‘oppression’ under the new statutory framework of PACE 1984, as distinct from earlier common law and Judges’ Rules formulations.

Judgment

The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Lane, delivered the judgment dismissing the appeal. The court held that PACE 1984 is a codifying Act, and therefore its language should be given its natural meaning without reference to the previous state of the law.

The court distinguished between section 76(2)(a) (oppression) and section 76(2)(b) (unreliability), noting that subsection (b) is wider than the old ‘voluntary’ test and covers circumstances previously artificially included within ‘oppression’.

“This in turn leads us to believe that ‘oppression’ in section 76(2)(a) should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning. The Oxford English Dictionary as its third definition of the word runs as follows: ‘exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, harsh, or wrongful manner; unjust or cruel treatment of subjects, inferiors, etc.; the imposition of unreasonable or unjust burdens’.”

The court further stated:

“We find it hard to envisage any circumstances in which such oppression would not entail some impropriety on the part of the interrogator.”

Even assuming the appellant’s version of events was true, the court held that the police revealing information about her lover’s affair did not constitute oppression within the statutory meaning.

Implications

This case established the authoritative interpretation of ‘oppression’ under section 76(2)(a) PACE 1984. The judgment clarified that:

• Oppression should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning
• Oppression will almost invariably involve some impropriety by the interrogator
• Section 76(2)(b) covers situations where confessions may be unreliable without any police impropriety
• The two limbs of section 76(2) serve distinct purposes and should not be conflated

The case is significant for establishing a narrower definition of oppression than some earlier common law formulations, whilst recognising that the broader unreliability ground in section 76(2)(b) provides alternative protection for defendants.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was correct to reject the submission under section 76 of PACE 1984, and the confession was properly admitted.

Source: R v Fulling [1987] EWCA Crim 4