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February 26, 2026

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National Case Law Archive

TG and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 596 (Admin)

Four asylum seekers challenged the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s decisions to accommodate them at Wethersfield, a former RAF base in Essex, arguing the accommodation was inadequate for their needs and that the systems and policies governing allocations were unlawful. The Court rejected the systemic challenges to the allocation process, the adequacy of conditions, and most policy grounds, but found a breach of the Public Sector Equality Duty in promulgating versions 11 and 12 of the Allocation Policy. Three of the four individual claimants succeeded on the ground that the defendant acted unlawfully in judging accommodation at Wethersfield adequate for their particular needs.

Facts

From 12 July 2023, the Secretary of State began using Wethersfield, a former RAF base near Braintree in Essex, to accommodate single adult male asylum seekers aged 18–65 under section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (IAA 1999). The site had capacity for approximately 1,700 residents but never housed more than 658 at any one time. Accommodation involved room-sharing in dormitory-style blocks and portacabins in a rural, relatively isolated location. Services were operated by Clearsprings Ready Homes (CRH) with sub-contractors providing security, catering, transport, and welfare. On-site healthcare was provided by Commisceo under NHS contract.

The four claimants were asylum seekers who arrived in the UK during 2023, claimed asylum, and were accommodated at Wethersfield for varying periods:

  • TG (Eritrean, age 25): at Wethersfield from 24 August to 20 November 2023. He had been violently trafficked in Libya, information he disclosed at screening and on his ASF1 form but which was overlooked.
  • MN (Afghan, age 31): at Wethersfield from 12 July 2023 to 23 February 2024. A former Afghan police officer who had experienced exploitation and violence during his journey to the UK but did not initially disclose vulnerabilities. His mental health deteriorated significantly during his prolonged stay.
  • HAA (Somali, age 31): at Wethersfield from 4 October 2023 to 26 January 2024. He had witnessed family members murdered by Al Shabaab and suffered violence himself. He experienced racial harassment and attempted suicide on 27 December 2023.
  • MJ (Afghan, age 26): at Wethersfield from 21 September 2023 to 6 March 2024. His father and brother were killed by the Taliban. His mental health deteriorated at the site, developing an adjustment disorder, and an incident on 21 February 2024 led to hospitalisation.

Each claimant was eventually transferred from Wethersfield — in most cases only after pre-action correspondence, judicial review claims, or interim relief applications.

The defendant’s Allocation Policy went through four versions (9–12) during the relevant period, progressively changing suitability criteria for vulnerable asylum seekers. Notably, version 11 (February 2024) removed the blanket prohibition on accommodating certain vulnerable persons at the site, instead introducing a framework under which they “may not be suitable” depending on whether their special needs could be met on-site, with the burden on the asylum seeker to provide supporting evidence.

Issues

The case raised both systemic and individual grounds of challenge:

Systemic Grounds

  1. Ground 1 – Unlawful allocation process: Whether the defendant’s system for assessing suitability for Wethersfield complied with the duty of reasonable inquiry under the Tameside principle, both at initial allocation and on an ongoing basis.
  2. Ground 2 (systemic element) – Inadequate accommodation: Whether conditions at Wethersfield were so deficient that the site was incapable of providing adequate accommodation under sections 95 and 96 of IAA 1999.
  3. Ground 3 – Unlawfulness of Allocation Policy versions 11/12: Whether the policy was unlawful (a) on its terms, (b) in its operation, or (c) for failure to comply with the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.
  4. Ground 4 – Reasonable adjustments: Whether the defendant breached sections 20 and 29 of the Equality Act 2010 by failing to make anticipatory reasonable adjustments for disabled asylum seekers.
  5. Ground 5 – Human trafficking: Whether the policy treating potential victims of modern slavery as suitable for Wethersfield unless they had received a positive reasonable grounds decision under the NRM breached Article 4 ECHR.
  6. Ground 6a – PSED and race: Whether the defendant failed to have sufficient regard to the risk of racial harassment at the site.

Individual Grounds

Each claimant challenged the lawfulness of the defendant’s decision to accommodate him at Wethersfield and to continue doing so, given his individual vulnerabilities. Additional individual grounds included breach of the duty to make reasonable adjustments (Ground 4) and Article 8 ECHR (Ground 7).

Judgment

Mr Justice Mould delivered judgment, upholding one systemic ground and three individual claims, while rejecting the remaining challenges.

The Court found that unlike the position in NB (concerning Napier Barracks), the defendant had remedied the deficiencies in the screening interview and ASF1 form. Part 6 of the screening questionnaire, added in January 2024, specifically asked asylum seekers about factors relevant to accommodation suitability. Section 15 of the ASF1 form now included questions directed at the suitability criteria. The monitoring arrangements, while subject to legitimate criticism, were not so deficient as a system that they were incapable of enabling the defendant to gather reasonably necessary information. The system was held to be Tameside compliant.

The Court held that the standard of adequacy under sections 95 and 96 of IAA 1999 was “one of subsistence rather than anything more.” The arrangements described in evidence — room-sharing, shuttle bus services, on-site medical and welfare provision, recreational facilities, and a place of worship — satisfied this requirement. The statutory framework expressly permits room-sharing, temporary accommodation, and no-choice allocation. While complaints about conditions were understandable, they did not render the site inherently incapable of providing adequate accommodation.

The guidance in versions 11 and 12 requiring asylum seekers to provide evidence of special needs was consistent with Regulation 4 of the 2005 Regulations, which expressly absolved the defendant from any obligation to arrange evaluations herself. The policy retained flexibility for caseworkers and did not impose requirements that would inevitably lead to unlawful outcomes in a material number of cases, applying the R(A) / Gillick test.

The Court found that the Equality Impact Assessment (Policy EIA) dated 10 January 2024, which was said to assess the proposed changes in version 11, simply did not assess those changes. The Policy EIA focused on the version 10 change regarding victims of modern slavery and stated — contrary to the proposed new policy — that individuals with mental impairments “will not be housed at these sites.” There was no attempt to assess the equality implications of the significant change allowing disabled or mentally impaired asylum seekers to be accommodated at Wethersfield if their needs could be met on-site. This was “a most serious and inexplicable omission” amounting to a clear failure to fulfil the PSED.

The anticipatory duty under sections 20(3) and 29(7) of EA 2010 was sufficiently discharged by the suitability criteria in the Allocation Policy, which provided that disabled persons whose special needs could not be met at Wethersfield would be accommodated elsewhere, while those whose needs could be met might be accommodated at the site with appropriate adjustments.

The change from version 9 to version 10 of the Allocation Policy — treating potential victims of trafficking as suitable for Wethersfield unless they had a positive reasonable grounds NRM decision — was consistent with statutory guidance issued under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and with the protection duty under Article 4 ECHR as explained in TDT and Rantsev.

The evidence established that the defendant had due regard to the need to eliminate racial discrimination. The site-specific EIAs acknowledged the potential for tensions between ethnic groups, and the operational response — zero tolerance of racially motivated harassment, incident reporting, police involvement — was reasonable. Mr Butler’s unchallenged evidence that violence was generally caused by personal animosity rather than inter-group tension was accepted.

Individual Claims

ClaimantGround 2 (Inadequate accommodation)Ground 4 (Reasonable adjustments)Ground 7 (Article 8 ECHR)
TGUpheld ✓Upheld ✓Rejected
MNUpheld ✓RejectedRejected
HAAUpheld ✓RejectedRejected
MJRejectedN/AN/A
  • TG: The defendant conceded that TG’s screening interview disclosed he was a potential trafficking victim, which should have triggered an NRM referral and rendered him unsuitable under version 9 of the Allocation Policy. His accommodation at Wethersfield was unlawful throughout. The defendant also breached her duty to make reasonable adjustments under section 29(7) EA 2010, as the oversight meant she failed to make the adjustment her own policy provided for. However, the three-month period was too short and insufficiently severe to constitute an Article 8 breach.
  • MN: While lawfully accommodated initially, the defendant failed to review MN’s suitability promptly following receipt of Dr Pethania’s clinical psychology letter on 30 January 2024, which constituted the individual evaluation previously said to be lacking. MN was unlawfully accommodated for approximately 25 days. However, MN’s mental impairment was not “long-term” within EA 2010 and did not constitute a disability, so his section 29(7) claim failed.
  • HAA: While lawfully accommodated initially, the defendant’s decision on 15 January 2024 that Wethersfield remained adequate for his needs was unlawful. The defendant failed to take properly into account powerful evidence from welfare officers, safeguarding referrals, and the CRH safeguarding manager’s recommendation for immediate removal. His mental impairment was likewise not established as a long-term disability under EA 2010.
  • MJ: The defendant acted reasonably in initially accommodating MJ and, on 24 January 2024, in determining he remained suitable in light of balanced advice from Dr Wilson (HOMA). Both psychiatric experts subsequently agreed MJ had suffered an adjustment disorder precipitated by Wethersfield that fully resolved on removal, rather than the more serious conditions initially diagnosed. MJ’s claim failed on all grounds.

Implications

This judgment provides important clarification on several fronts:

  1. Systemic vs. individual challenges: The Court confirmed that a systemic challenge to a policy must show the policy is incapable of lawful operation, not merely that it has been unlawfully applied in individual cases (R(A) / Gillick test). The allocation system for Wethersfield, unlike that found unlawful in NB for Napier Barracks, was held to be Tameside compliant following remedial steps.
  2. Standard of adequacy: The statutory standard for asylum accommodation is one of subsistence — adequate for essential living needs and health. The Reception Conditions Directive no longer applies in domestic law following EU withdrawal legislation, but this was held to make no significant practical difference.
  3. PSED compliance: The judgment underscores that equality impact assessments must actually assess the policy change in question. An EIA that addresses a different change, or proceeds on assumptions contradicted by the proposed policy, will not satisfy the duty.
  4. Burden of evidence on asylum seekers: The policy requiring asylum seekers to provide evidence of special needs was held to be consistent with Regulation 4 of the 2005 Regulations, which places no obligation on the defendant to arrange evaluations. However, the defendant must still review suitability promptly when credible individual evaluations are provided.
  5. Ongoing monitoring obligation: Where the defendant’s own policy emphasises ongoing suitability monitoring, failures to act on significant welfare and safeguarding information — particularly from the defendant’s own staff and systems — can render continued accommodation unlawful.

Verdict

  • Ground 3(c) (PSED breach in promulgating version 11 of Allocation Policy): Upheld.
  • All other systemic grounds: Rejected.
  • TG: Succeeds on Grounds 2 and 4 (unlawful accommodation and breach of duty to make reasonable adjustments).
  • MN: Succeeds on Ground 2 (unlawfully accommodated for approximately 25 days).
  • HAA: Succeeds on Ground 2 (unlawful decision of 15 January 2024).
  • MJ: Fails on all grounds.
  • Parties invited to make submissions on the appropriate terms of the order.

The Tameside duty: “the question for the court is did the Secretary of State ask himself the right question and take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable him to answer it correctly?” (Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014 Lord Diplock at 1065b).

Source: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/AC-2023-LON-0033447-TG-and-others-Final-Judgment.pdf

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To cite this resource, please use the following reference:

National Case Law Archive, 'TG and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 596 (Admin)' (LawCases.net, February 2026) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/tg-and-others-v-secretary-of-state-for-the-home-department-2025-ewhc-596-admin/> accessed 1 March 2026